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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC 
 
1.1. Fiscal constitutions: definition and scope 
 
“Fiscal constitution” is a buzzword. The internet search engines now report more than three 
hundred thousand hits for the term “fiscal constitution”,1 which indirectly establishes the 
popularity of the term. Although used frequently, particularly in the context of the recent 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the notion of the fiscal constitution is rarely precisely 
defined. Since the concept of a fiscal constitution is at the core of this dissertation, it is both 
legitimate and desirable to start a “journey” into the fiscal constitution by defining this concept. 
Fiscal constitutions contain a country-specific set of laws, rules and regulations, which affect 
decision-making in the area of fiscal policy.2 Fiscal constitutions cover constitutional law as well 
as ordinary statutory law like basic fiscal and financial laws, rulings of the constitutional court, 
norms and cultural commitments. Fiscal constitutions determine the rules of the public finance 
“game”, thereby providing a framework for policy-makers and driving or discouraging certain 
policy patterns (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 5). By shaping incentives and limiting 
arbitrariness, the fiscal constitution can therefore determine the course of fiscal policy and fiscal 
outcomes (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003, p. 127). A simplified and somewhat mechanical causal 
relation from fiscal constitutions to fiscal outcomes is shown in figure 1.1. 
                                                    
1
  See, for instance, Google Scholar available at www.scholar.google.com (accessed on February 27, 2015). 
2
 The notion of fiscal constitution was presumably coined by Buchanan and Wagner (1977, p. 23). 
According to them, fiscal constitution is a set of formal and informal rules governing fiscal choice. Note 
that James Buchanan was a Nobel Prize winning economist in 1986 (see 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1986/buchanan-facts.html accessed 
on March 5, 2015). 
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Figure 1.1. Fiscal constitutions shape fiscal policy: the link from institutions to outcomes 
 
Source: Raudla (2010, p. 111). The figure neglects endogeneity, i.e. the way fiscal outcomes may contribute to 
shaping fiscal constitutions, or when both fiscal outcomes and fiscal constitutions are simultaneously shaped by other 
factors. 
Even though at first glance the notion of a fiscal constitution suggests a reference to the written 
constitution as a document such named, academic researchers also refer to the broader definition 
of a fiscal constitution. According to Berggren and Kurrild-Klitgaard (2002), one should 
distinguish between the fiscal constitution in a narrow sense and the broad (effective) fiscal 
constitution.  
The narrow fiscal constitution will be perceived literally as a set of provisions affecting public 
finance, which are enshrined in the written constitution.3 As such, the narrow fiscal constitution 
provides a (relatively) stable institutional framework for fiscal policy over time.4 The stability of 
fiscal constitution is guaranteed by high and enforceable political costs for breaching, bypassing 
or changing constitutional law. According to Drazen (2004), there are two features of 
constitutional law that potentially impose high political costs.  
First, constitutional law is granted a high status in a hierarchy of the legal sources by virtue of the 
fact that constitution is more difficult to amend or abolish. Constitutional law is typically subject 
to harsher amendment procedures than ordinary statutory laws.5 Stringent procedures increase the 
                                                    
3
  Constitution is at the apex of the legal system. According to the hierarchy of legal sources applied in this 
thesis, ordinary statutory laws, regulation and administrative decisions are subordinated to the constitution 
and can be reviewed for compliance with the constitution (in Latin the concept is known as lex superior 
derogat inferiori) (Akehurst, 1975). See also Kelsen (1958, translation 1982). 
4
  There is an inherent trade-off between stability and flexibility of the constitution. Constitutional law cannot 
easily adapt to a changing environment because amending the constitution is usually a tough exercise. 
Given this inflexibility, an ill-designed fiscal constitution could be therefore a persistent burden. A careful 
ex-ante design of a fiscal constitution is, hence, essential (Campanella, 2011). 
5
  Besides qualified-majorities and popular referendums, waiting periods and (in federal systems) ratifications 
by states are often required to amend a constitutional provision. Due to these restrictions, the constitutional 
law is rarely changed even under tempting circumstances. For instance, in Australia the constitution was 
changed merely eight times since its outset in 1901. It is because the Constitution of Australia requires a 
referendum in which double majority is needed to pass an amendment, i.e. eligible citizens need to vote 
‘yes’ nationally, as well as in the majority of states. 
Fiscal 
constitution
Behavior of 
policy 
actors
Fiscal 
policy
Fiscal 
outcomes
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costs of amending the constitution, i.e. transaction costs to build a coalition for constitutional 
amendment.  
Secondly, constitutional law refers to issues that are considered fundamental to society in a deeper 
conceptual sense, similarly to basic rights or liberties (Drazen, 2004, p. 26). The elevation of the 
principle of fiscal sustainability to constitutional law, ranked at the apex of the hierarchy of legal 
sources, may signal the fact that fiscal discipline is perceived as a basic goal of society or that the 
society attaches fundamental significance to it (similarly to freedom of speech, for instance). A 
fundamental right enshrined in the constitution is one that is seen by its very nature as being more 
persistent than an ordinary legislation (Drazen, 2004, p. 26). Additionally, non-compliance with a 
fundamental right may bring a more fierce reaction, strong criticism from the public and incur 
more negative publicity, as compared to the breach of an ordinary legislation (Blume and Voigt, 
2013). This imposes high reputational (prestige) costs on the incumbents, which harm their re-
election prospects. It is also of note that constitutional provision ensures greater visibility, which 
reduces the costs of monitoring for compliance. In every society, constitutions attract special 
attention. People are willing to discover what their rights are and whether or not they are violated. 
The legalization of a fiscal rule on a constitutional level may therefore induce the creation of 
mechanisms to monitor compliance that had not previously existed (Drazen, 2004, p. 22). These 
mechanisms may be created outside the political system, for example, within civil society 
(especially through non-governmental watchdogs) or in the press.  
From their early days, constitutions have contained some provisions pertaining to public finance 
(Kosikowski, 2004). The very first constitutions were focused, however, on general procedural 
rules regarding taxes and state budgets.6 More restrictive constitutional regulations on public 
                                                    
6
  The French Constitution 1791 – one of the first constitution ever enacted – has devoted the whole chapter 
to issues related to public finance. The section was entitled “About public taxation”. To some extent, this 
practice of placing public finance provisions within a stand-alone chapter was continued in the next 
centuries. For instance, the section entitled “Finance” can be found in the Belgian Constitution 1831 and 
the Prussian Constitution 1850. The separated chapters on public finance under different labels were 
entrenched in the Finnish Constitution 1919, the Estonian Constitution 1920, the Lithuanian Constitution 
1922 and the Romanian Constitution 1923. Constitutions launched after the World War II seem to 
recognize the pattern of devoting the entire chapter to issues pertaining to public finance. For example, 
these were the cases in Japan (1946), Germany (1949), Greece (1975) and Spain (1978). Also Israel 
devotes one of its basic laws of 1975 to the State Economy to regulate financial flows from and to the state. 
The separated chapters on public finance are included also in the new constitutions of some post-socialist 
countries, i.e. Slovenia (1991), Lithuania (1992), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Poland (1997), Albania 
(1998) and Hungary (2011). The primary purpose of having an exclusive chapter on public finance in 
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finance, i.e. especially numerical fiscal rules7, have begun operating within a constitutional 
framework only recently. Notwithstanding that, constitutions are somewhat crude documents and 
their meaning is made precise, and thus workable, only by ordinary statutory laws, constitutional 
court decisions and overarching norms. Although the country’s constitution is the most important 
contract for a given country and it sets the framework for all other contracts, i.e. statutory laws, 
regulations and judicial decisions, it is also a vastly incomplete contract8. Constitutions frequently 
contain broad and imprecise provisions, which leave ample leeway for reinterpretations9 (Rodden, 
2006, p. 358). As a result, a plethora of other legal arrangements with lower status in the hierarchy 
of legal sources (e.g. secondary statutory laws, specific regulations, judicial decisions) attempt to 
fill the grey areas uncovered by the constitution or simply complement broad and vague 
constitutional provisions. Another problem with the “black letter” constitution relates to an 
implicit constitutional change (Voigt, 1999). This is the change that relies on the modified 
interpretation of the constitutional document and not on its explicit amendment. While the 
meaning of the constitution might change, the constitutional document itself remains unchanged. 
For that reason, one may argue that the broad definition of fiscal constitution is somewhat more 
accurate than the narrow definition as it allows the inclusion of all actual rules guiding fiscal 
policy, both on constitutional and “sub-constitutional” level in written and unwritten form. Due to 
the fact that constitutional law provides only a general framework for conducting fiscal policy and 
is, therefore, very incomplete institutional framework, this dissertation applies the broad definition 
of fiscal constitution, although in some parts the emphasis is specifically placed on the fiscal 
constitution in a narrow sense. Consequently, for the purpose of this dissertation, the fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                                         
constitutional law is to stress the importance of fiscal framework in the whole subject-matter regulated by 
the constitution. For more on history of fiscal aspects of constitutions see Sokolewicz (2005). 
7
  Numerical fiscal rules are defined as enduring institutional (legal) restraints on public finance, typically 
expressed in terms of a quantitative indicator for fiscal performance (Kopits and Symansky, 1998, p. 2). 
One of the best-known examples of the numerical fiscal rule is the deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP imposed 
by the Maastricht Treaty (formally Treaty on the European Union). 
8
  Constitutions, as any other contracts, are incomplete, i.e. they do not regulate for all possible contingencies. 
This is due to the insurmountable transaction costs hypothetically involved in designing a complete (fully 
specified) constitution covering all possible states of the world (Schäfer and Ott, 2004, pp. 278-280). 
9
  For instance, in Canada constitution assigns the power to spend on anything needed for “peace, order and 
good government” to the federal level. On the other hand, it endows provinces with the right to spend on 
“property and civil rights”. Over the last 150 years since 1867 a system has evolved with respect to 
spending in which anybody can do almost anything since almost anything can be interpreted as having to 
do with “peace, order and good government” or “property and civil rights” (Bird, 2014). 
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constitution consists of all legal arrangements – irrespective of their status in the hierarchy of 
legal sources – and norms, which influence the conduct of fiscal policy and, thus, fiscal outcomes. 
 
1.2. Description of the problem and purpose of this dissertation 
 
An overarching question posed by this dissertation is: why does the public debt grow (see figure 
1.2), and why are fiscal (debt) crises repetitive and so widespread (see figure 1.3)? In other 
words, why do countries not learn from their own mistakes and the mistakes of their counterparts 
in preventing the growth of public debt and fiscal crises? From the behavioral point of view, one 
might argue that the problem is with the fallacy of the “this time is different” perception. “This 
time is different” syndrome relates to over-optimism regarding the risks stemming from high 
public debt and the likelihood of the fiscal crisis occurrence (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011, p. 
xxxiv). Irrespective of past events, the subsequent governments continuously claim that they 
apply better policies than their predecessors, that they are more knowledgeable, and that they 
learn from past failures. If fiscal crisis occurs due to high public debt, the governments tend to 
attribute it to the external shocks and mistakes committed by the predecessors, rather than to their 
own policies. Likewise society persuades itself that the contemporary boom, unlike many booms 
that preceded collapses in the past, is built on sound bases, structural reforms, technological 
innovation, and decent governance (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011, xxxiv). However, “this time” is 
almost never different. A recent sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, which can be traced back to 
2010, exemplifies it perfectly. 
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Figure 1.2. Evolution of central government public debt in advanced and emerging 
economies 
 
Source: Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011, p. 8). 
Figure 1.3. Countries in default by their share of world income in the period 1800-2006 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, p. 6). 
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The behavioral fallacy of “this time is different” attitude still does not provide a full answer to the 
question: why do governments generate permanent deficits that cause ever-growing debt and 
trigger fiscal crisis? It seems the main problem relates to the fact that fiscal policy is a result of 
the political process, which turns out to be biased toward a deficit.10 The public choice literature 
provides an insight into this “political deficit bias” problem.11 This literature emphasizes that 
politicians – similarly to other individuals – are interested in pursuing their own objectives. For 
politicians these are re-election prospects, reputational rewards, and maximization of private 
gains. These objectives are often pursued by means of budget deficits. What is attractive about 
deficit is its short-run effect (short-term economic boost, if any), which might come at the expense 
of some negative short- and long-term consequences (see section 1.3). 
                                                    
10
  Deficit as a fiscal phenomenon has its economic rationale conceptualized by Barro (1979). According to 
Barro’s tax smoothing hypothesis, the deficit and the surplus should be used optimally in order to minimize 
the distortionary effect of taxation. To avoid the negative effect of increased taxation, the optimal solution 
is to keep the tax rate constant over the business cycle, i.e. to allow for the budget deficits during the 
economic downturn and surpluses during the economic upturn. The tax smoothing hypothesis states that 
under the assumption of symmetric business cycles, both the deficits and surpluses are supposed to 
equalize and be neutral for the accumulation of debt. Therefore, the more permanent accumulation of debt 
occurs only when periods of stagnations, recessions and wars prevail over the economic prosperity and 
peacetime. However, as pointed out by Roubini and Sachs (1989), the tax smoothing hypothesis cannot 
explain a sharp debt accumulation in developed countries in 1970s and 1980s. The actual deficits of this 
time were too large as compared to what would have been justified by the unfavorable economic 
conditions. Barro’s model also fails to explain why debt accumulation occurred in some countries and not 
in others. Consequently, Roubini and Sachs stressed that the driving forces of the excessive and persistent 
deficits are rather political in nature. 
11
  There are at least six well established hypotheses explaining the political deficit bias. (1) The political 
business cycle hypothesis, which says that fiscal loosening occurs prior to elections and is only rarely 
compensated by fiscal tightening after the elections (Nordhous, 1975). (2) The fiscal (deficit) illusion 
hypothesis relies on the fact that electorate underestimates the future tax burden related to the current debt 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Owing to the bounded rationality of electorate (Simon, 1985), politicians are 
prone to spend excessively while keeping current taxation unchanged. (3) Intergenerational conflict 
hypothesis stems from the fact that future generations are under-represented in collective decision-making 
(Tabellini, 1991). Since incumbent governments do not face opposition from the next generations, they 
increase current spending knowingly that burden of public debt will be shifted to future generations. (4) 
Hypothesis on strategic use of public debt says that if the government is not sure of being re-elected, it will 
behave strategically by reducing a room-for-budget maneuver of future government through excessive 
deficit policy (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990) (5) The conflict of interest (war of attrition) between political 
parties within the coalition government results in a strategic political bargaining leading to a delayed fiscal 
reform and, thus, to excessive deficit over a longer period of time (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). (6) The 
fiscal common problem results from the fact that general taxation is used to finance the needs of specific 
constituencies or targeted public policies (Weingast et al., 1981). Under these circumstances, it is rational 
for politicians to increase spending for their electoral districts because the benefits are internalized by the 
district voters while the costs are spread among general taxpayers. Since all politicians might think along 
these lines, the consequence is the tragedy of “fiscal common” (Alesina et al., 1997).  
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Fiscal constitutions should be crucial in reducing “political deficit bias”. Fiscal constitutions – if 
complied with12 – should set credible rules that drive or discourage certain policy patterns and 
reduce political discretion in the area of fiscal policy. Given the occurrence of permanent deficits, 
excessive debts and repetitive fiscal crises, immediate questions that arise are as follows: Why are 
the current fiscal constitutions unable to prevent political deficit bias? Are fiscal constitutions ill-
designed? Alternatively, is our knowledge about fiscal constitutions and how they influence fiscal 
behavior and outcomes really sufficient to give proper policy recommendations? 
This dissertation presents a rather critical and conservative view concerning the questions posed. 
The claim here is that the current knowledge about the working of fiscal constitutions and how 
they influence deficit and debt is deficient, and not sufficiently robust to achieve educated policy 
advice. Facing a trade-off between exhaustiveness and precision, this dissertation pays particular 
attention to precision. Consequently this dissertation, instead of searching for an exhaustive 
answer to the overarching question: “why does the public debt grow and why are fiscal crises 
repetitive?”, rather takes a step back and asks much narrower questions. Those narrow questions 
are selected after reviewing and identifying the main weaknesses and critical gaps in the modern 
literature on fiscal constitutions.  
The literature on fiscal constitutions and their effects is organized within three main streams, i.e. 
numerical fiscal rules, procedural fiscal rules and political institutions. The former refers to 
Buchanan’s concept of rules, such as balanced budget13, expenditure14, revenue15 and debt rules16. 
                                                    
12
  It almost goes without saying that for fiscal constitutions to be effective (i.e. successfully correct for 
political deficit bias and make fiscal policy more predictable and disciplined) they must be complied with. 
If fiscal rules and norms are permanently violated or changed, they cannot really be considered as elements 
of the fiscal constitution (see continuous amendments to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act 
1988 in the US and the Israeli Deficit Reduction Law 1991) (Drazen, 2004, p. 25).  
13
  For instance, the constitutional debt brake enacted in Switzerland in 2001 is one of the examples of the 
balance-budget rules (see Article 126 of the Swiss Federal Constitution 1999). This rule dictates the budget 
balance over the business cycle, i.e. practically ‘zero’ deficit (any deficits and surpluses are supposed to 
cancel out within the economic cycle). 
14
  For instance, in Poland the expenditure growth is limited to the real GDP growth rate, taking into 
consideration the inflation forecast for the upcoming year (Article 112aa of Public Finance Act 2009). 
15
  For instance, Lithuania introduced a revenue rule in 2007. According to it, any unexpected revenue within 
the year should serve to cut the general government deficit (see Article 3(4) of the Law on Fiscal 
Discipline 2007). 
16
  A good example of the debt rule is the Polish constitutional debt ceiling established in 1997, which sets the 
upper limit of 60% of GDP for the public indebtedness (see Article 216(5) of the Polish Constitution 
1997). 
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The second stream of literature was developed by von Hagen (1992). This literature focuses on 
effects of procedures guiding the preparation, adoption and implementation of the state budget. 
The third stream of literature is best conceptualized by Persson and Tabellini (2003). They 
investigate the effects of political institutions on different fiscal variables.17 Their main inquiries 
pertain therefore to fiscal effects of basic institutional choices such as (1) parliamentary versus 
presidential system, (2) unicameral versus bicameral parliament,18 (3) proportional versus 
majoritarian electoral system, (4) unitary (centralized) versus federal (decentralized) countries, (5) 
strong versus weak judiciary, and (6) broad versus narrow direct democracy. A concise literature 
review of empirical research on the fiscal constitutions follows. 
The pioneering empirical studies on the effectiveness of the numerical fiscal rules were conducted 
in the United States (hereinafter the US). For instance, Bohn and Inman (1996) demonstrate that 
restrictive budget balance laws are conducive to fiscal discipline. Their empirical investigation is 
pursued for 47 U.S. states over the period 1970-1991. The overall results suggest that the states 
with end-of-the-year no-carryover balance budget rules have lower deficits than the states where 
the fiscal rules are less stringent. Besides the rules’ design, the effectiveness of the fiscal rules is 
also dependent on their legal status and enforcement mechanism. It turns out that states where 
rules are embedded in the states’ constitution and the Supreme Court judges are independently 
elected have better fiscal position than states with only statutory enshrined rules and politically 
appointed judges. Moreover, in states with tighter fiscal rules, adjustments are mostly achieved 
through the reduction of current spending rather than through the increase in taxes. Primo (2007), 
on the other hand, conducts an empirical examination of constitutional and statutory budget 
balance laws for 47 U.S. states for the period 1969-2000. Contrary to Bohn and Inman (1996), 
Primo investigates the effectiveness of the rules in constraining the overall level of spending. 
Results suggest that constitutional budget balance provisions that prohibit deficit carryover, 
enforced by the Supreme Courts, by which judges are elected (and not appointed), are effective in 
                                                    
17
  Political institutions only implicitly (indirectly) influence fiscal performance. It means that certain fiscal 
outcomes are actually the byproducts of particular political interactions and incentives. This is contrary to 
the numerical and procedural fiscal rules, which are considered as direct constraints of political fiscal 
incentives and serve as explicit guidelines for budgetary policy. 
18
  Bicameralism is the separation of the parliament into two chambers (so called upper and lower chamber, or 
first and second chamber). Importantly, once this separation is in place, law to be enacted usually requires 
the approval of each chamber (Hickey, 2013). Contrary to this, unicameralism relies on existence of only 
one chamber of the parliament. 
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keeping down states expenditure. The author also provides evidence that statutory rules, enacted 
in 1970s in order to explicitly limit tax and expenditure, are not effective in restraining the growth 
of states’ spending. 
Feld and Kirchgässner (2008), on the other hand, investigate the effectiveness of the statutory debt 
brakes (balance budget rules) in the Swiss cantons. The empirical examination conducted for 16 
Swiss cantons over the time span 1980-1998 suggests that debt brakes positively influence 
cantonal and local budget balance. Consequently, they are effective in constraining short-run 
fiscal policy incentives. Furthermore, Krogstrup and Wälti (2008) find a positive effect of the 
fiscal rules on the cantonal fiscal performance, i.e. restrictive rules lead to a drop in budget 
deficits. Their panel investigation encompasses 25 cantons in the years 1955-1999. Tellier and 
Imbeau (2004) and Grembi et al. (2011) investigate fiscal rules’ effectiveness in Canadian 
provinces and Italian municipalities, respectively. The former study analyses the stringency of 
anti-deficit laws in the panel of 10 Canadian provinces over the period 1968-2000. Since stricter 
fiscal rules are associated with lower deficits, the authors conclude that rules are effective tools in 
restraining opportunistic politicians. In addition, Grembi et al. (2011) find that fiscal rules matter 
for a fiscal performance. The authors exploit a quasi-experimental setting of the fiscal reform, 
which was carried out in the Italian municipalities in 2001. Overall, as demonstrated by the 
authors, the abolishment of the balanced budget rule led to a 40-60% larger budget deficit in the 
exempted municipalities. This fiscal gap was largely due to the tax reliefs and consequently 
reduced municipal income. 
One of the first cross-country analyses of numerical fiscal rules was pursued by Alesina et al. 
(1999). These authors measure the stringency of the rules by means of a composite indicator of 
budgetary process. The indicator quantifies all procedures and rules which guide drafting, 
approval and implementation of the budget for 20 Latin America and Caribbean countries in the 
years 1980-1992. The empirical results suggest that the value of the index negatively correlates 
with the primary budget deficit. After decomposing the index into three sub-indices, i.e. 
borrowing constraint, agenda setting, and transparency sub-indices, it turns out that only the 
borrowing constraint component is precisely estimated and reaches standard level of significance. 
Therefore, fiscal targets and debt ceilings are the most crucial in limiting the scope of public 
deficit. 
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Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007) is one of the first studies to investigate the effectiveness of national 
numerical fiscal rules in the European Union (hereinafter the EU). Their empirical examination 
comprises 22 EU member states over the period 1990-2005. To capture the rules’ effectiveness, a 
synthetic indicator of numerical fiscal rules was created. It encompasses the qualitative features of 
the fiscal rules such as their coverage (general, central and local government), legal status, 
monitoring, enforcement (whether certain actions are taken in case of rules’ violation) and media 
visibility. Stronger fiscal rules are reflected in a higher indicator. Overall, the authors show that 
the existence and strength of numerical fiscal rules positively correlates with fiscal discipline. The 
coverage and the enforcement turn out to be the most crucial dimensions of the numerical fiscal 
rules, which matter for the capacity to guarantee fiscal discipline. Consequently, the larger the 
coverage (preferably general government) and the stronger the enforcement mechanism of the 
rules, the more successful the rules in constraining fiscal profligacy. 
The effectiveness of constitutionally embedded fiscal rules in constraining a growth of public 
expenditure is studied by Blume and Voigt (2013). Their cross-section analysis investigating 47 
countries suggests that constitutional numerical fiscal constraints are marginally effective in 
restraining the growth of total public spending. Blume and Voigt also conclude that numerical 
fiscal rules imposed by the Maastricht Treaty have no effects.  
The positive effects of numerical fiscal rules on fiscal discipline can be found in many other 
studies. These are among others: Woo (2003), Alt and Lassen (2006), Lagona and Padovano 
(2007), Tapsoba (2012), Foremny (2014), Kantorowicz (2015). The negative effects of rules such 
as fiscal gimmickry19 or crowding out of capital investments20 are discussed by, for instance, 
Kopits (2001), Milesi-Ferretti (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004).  
                                                    
19
  In order to comply with the rules, countries often resort to the so-called “fiscal gimmicks”. Fiscal 
gimmickry is typically materialized through the creative accounting methods, one-off measures and off-
budgeting. Creative accounting methods refer do the financial operations which influence fiscal deficits 
and debt (typically downward). Among others, the most usual accounting gimmicks are the 
misclassifications of the capital injections (e.g. to the chronically loss-making public enterprises), 
overoptimistic growth forecasts and favorable methodologies of estimating potential output (e.g. Hodrick-
Prescott filtering of real GDP). One-off measures, in turn, are classified as government decisions of a non-
recurrent nature. Most typically, they influence government budget balance in a given year and not 
permanently. For instance, the privatization of non-financial assets owned by the state, tax amnesties and 
accelerations of tax intakes are among the most frequently used one-off measures. Lastly, off-budgeting 
methods refer to the creation of extra-budgetary funds, which serve to execute government spending 
without revealing them in the official budget statistics (e.g. corporatization of entities in charge of 
  12  
 
Contrary to the numerical fiscal rules, which contain binding numeric targets, the procedural 
fiscal rules focus on the budgetary process. The procedural fiscal rules consist of all regulations 
governing the decision-making process leading to the formulation of the budget by the 
government, its approval by the parliament and its implementation by the executive (von Hagen, 
1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1994, 1995). There are two models of procedural rules, i.e. 
centralized procedural rules and fragmented (decentralized) procedural rules. A greater number of 
agencies with decision-making power over the budget and representing the interests of different 
constituencies (e.g. ministers, political parties) leads to the fragmentation of budget process. The 
fragmentation, in turn, induces aggravation of the fiscal common problem21 and thus leads to 
deficit bias (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999). To prevent fragmentation, more centralized 
procedural rules need to be adopted. The hypothesis that centralization of the budget process 
reduces the fiscal imbalances via elimination of the fiscal common problem was tested 
empirically. On the one hand, the studies underline the crucial role of finance ministers as fiscal 
entrepreneurs able to centralize the budget process. Strong finance ministers are powerful in 
reducing the number of amendments at the parliamentary stage and limiting changes at the 
execution stage (Hallerberg et al., 2006; 2009; Fabrizio and Mody, 2006). On the other hand, 
there is also some empirical evidence in favor of the contract approach. Contracts, which are 
signed at the planning stage of the budget, are a set of binding fiscal agreements that include fiscal 
objectives and limitations negotiated among all members of the government. The negative 
correlation between the degree of centralization through contracts and debt-to-GDP was found, 
for example, in 10 CEE countries (Gleich and von Hagen, 2000; Gleich, 2003). 
Various political institutions also have effects on fiscal variables. For instance, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) investigate the fiscal effects of two constitutional institutions, namely the form of 
government (presidential versus parliamentary systems) and the electoral system (majoritarian 
versus proportional). They consider four groups of fiscal outcomes: (1) government expenditure, 
(2) tax revenue, (3) budget balance, and (4) share of social welfare spending. Persson and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
infrastructure with the aim to exclude them and associated risks from the government’s balance sheet). The 
description of fiscal gimmicks is based on Koen and van den Noord (2005). 
20
  In order to meet the numerical fiscal targets, policy-makers are occasionally required to cut spending. 
Typically, the capital investment is the category of spending where reductions can be pursed easily from a 
political point of view. Note that, contrary to people, “roads” cannot protest against spending reduction. 
21
  See footnote 11 for the description of the fiscal common problem. 
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Tabellini demonstrate that presidential and majoritarian systems have significantly lower 
government expenditure than parliamentary and proportional regimes, but also lower tax revenue, 
smaller budget deficit, and spend less on social and welfare programs. 
The form of government and the electoral systems are not the only political institutions which are 
important for fiscal outcomes. For instance, the literature argues that the prevalence of a bicameral 
legislature might decrease the size of government (Crepaz and Moser, 2004) and negatively 
influence fiscal discipline (Schwarz, 2006). Some positive effect of the direct democracy 
mechanisms on fiscal discipline is found, on the other hand, by Blume and Voigt (2006) as well as 
Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996). Moreover, Eslava (2006) shows that the stronger the involvement of 
constitutional courts in policy-making, the harder it is for the government to undertake fiscal 
adjustment to reduce budget deficit. Evidence of judiciary shaping fiscal outcomes is also found 
in Tridimias (2006), Vaubel (2009) and Kantorowicz (2014). In addition to that, a secular trend 
towards decentralization triggered a debate on fiscal effects of decentralization and federalism 
(Stegarescu, 2005). In this context, Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) show that vertical fiscal 
imbalances (hereinafter VFI) – mismatch between local spending and local revenue – are 
associated with higher general government deficit and consequently also greater public debt. On 
average, the general government deficit is found to deteriorate by 1% of GDP for each 10 
percentage point increase in VFI (Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013, p. 571). 
Although, as presented, a plethora of research exists linking the elements of fiscal constitutions 
with fiscal outcomes, their credibility is questionable as they rarely find a causal relationship 
between institutions and outcomes (Eslava, 2011). Most of the research linking institutions and 
fiscal outcomes relies on correlations between the two. However, correlations do not always mean 
causality, due to omitted variable bias or self-selection (see section 1.4). Also whereas research on 
numerical fiscal rules and to some extent on the procedural fiscal rules is abundant, the political 
institutions seem to be less well-researched in the context of fiscal outcomes, largely due to the 
fact that they affect fiscal outcome only indirectly. 
Another problem with the studies linking institutions with outcomes is that they rarely analyse the 
interaction between institutions comprehensively, thereby neglecting that the manner in which 
various arrangements fit together might be crucial for outcomes. Indeed, certain combinations and 
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interactions of building blocks might be more conducive to achieving policy objectives such as 
sustainable fiscal outcomes or crisis prevention (Eslava, 2011; Voigt, 2011a; 2011b; 2013).  
There are three further under-researched analytical dimensions of the fiscal constitutions. First, 
fiscal constitutions are rarely studied in a dynamic – historical – context. Therefore, the literature 
almost entirely ignores the question: how are distant historical events able to influence the 
contemporary fiscal outcomes? Second, most of the research concentrates on the horizontal fiscal 
relations i.e. fiscal relations within the same tier of government (i.e. central or sub-central level). 
A vertical dimension of fiscal constitution, which focuses on relations between the levels of 
government (i.e. relation between central and sub-central level) is examined to a lesser extent. 
Lastly, the vast majority of the research on fiscal constitutions is interested in finding the effects 
of fiscal arrangements. Questions regarding the origins and the driving-forces behind reforms of 
the fiscal constitutions are rarely asked.  
Given the overarching question of this dissertation – “why does the public debt grow, and why are 
fiscal crises repetitive?” – as well as gaps in the literature on the fiscal constitutions, four sets of 
narrow and precise questions are selected. These questions help shed some light on the 
overarching question. Occasionally, as explicitly mentioned, they also touch upon some other 
fiscal phenomena. The narrow questions asked in this dissertation are as follows: 
• Question 1: What is a genuine causal relationship between the electoral systems and 
fiscal outcomes? How do electoral systems influence vertical fiscal imbalance, i.e. 
mismatch between local spending and revenue? Additionally, is there any relation 
between the electoral regimes and the composition of public spending? 
• Question 2: Does history matter for fiscal outcomes? More precisely, can distant 
historical events impact vertical fiscal imbalance in a causal way? 
• Question 3: How do judges adjudicate in fiscal cases (cases with some budgetary 
implications) as opposed to other cases? Is the judiciary able to shape fiscal outcomes, 
such as for instance fiscal deficits, in any systematic way?  
• Question 4: How do the building blocks of fiscal constitutions interact? Does the 
manner in which the building blocks are combined influence a growth of public 
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expenditure and public debt as well as the likelihood of fiscal crises? Also, what are 
the driving forces behind the reforms of the fiscal constitution? 
Overall, the main purpose and scientific contribution of this dissertation is threefold. First, this 
dissertation establishes a genuine causal relationship between the selected elements of fiscal 
constitutions and outcomes by applying cutting-edge econometric tools (question 1 and 2). 
Second, it sheds some light on largely neglected institutions and institutional interactions that 
might play a role in shaping fiscal outcomes (question 2, 3 and 4). Third, this dissertation is 
interested in examining the effects of fiscal constitutions in the intergovernmental context 
(question 1, 2 and 4). The detailed structure of this dissertation is given in section 1.6. 
 
1.3. Societal and scientific relevance 
 
Before the Keynesian revolution, i.e. in the pre-World War II period, the national budgets around 
the world were generally managed in a fiscally responsible manner (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977, 
pp. 13-16). An overarching philosophy was that the federal budget is like a household budget, 
which should be managed in a sustainable manner. That is not to say that deficits did not occur at 
all. The departures from fiscal discipline were, however, justified publicly and analytically. 
Typically, the budget deficits were emerging in the aftermath of the economic crises and wars. 
However, the subsequent debts were usually repaid shortly after these unforeseen circumstances. 
After World War II, the fiscal prudence largely deteriorated. According to Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977, pp. 21-22), the main reason for fiscal deterioration was a new legacy of aggregate demand 
management by the government (the Keynesian approach). The demand management, instead of 
being neutral for the budget in the medium-term, has resulted in a permanent increase in public 
expenditure that outpaced revenue collection (Kopits, 2001). It turned out that politicians were 
very eager to use their mandate to spend excessively or reduce taxation during recessions in order 
to stimulate aggregated demand. However, the political incentives set in the fiscal constitutions to 
offset the deficits in the time of economic prosperity were very weak. The overall result of this 
switch in the “fiscal philosophy” was a pro-cyclical budgeting, enduring deficit and debt, which 
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triggered a chain of social and welfare implications. Selected social and welfare implications are 
as follows. 
First, the maturing debt and its servicing costs, i.e. the interest rate for borrowing, need to be paid 
off. This can be done by two means: firstly, through an increase in taxation and, secondly, 
expenditure reduction (Ball et al., 1995). A politically easier method to cover debt and its 
servicing costs is usually through a revenue (tax) increase (Rzońca, 2008). A spending reduction 
might cause protests by strong interest groups benefiting from particular expenditure categories 
that are meant to be cut. A revenue increase may be even greater once the debt reaches an 
unsustainable level, i.e. when financial markets require greater risk premia for lending. High taxes 
imposed due to debt and its servicing cost might have negative economic consequences. They 
may discourage people from work, from pursuing a high level of education and from saving 
(Rzońca et al., 2008). Due to increased taxation, some people may also transfer their activity to 
the black market where the level of business uncertainty is relatively high (Rzońca et al., 2008). 
Second, deficits might deepen the income inequality between high and low-income persons 
(Mankiw, 2000). On the one hand, the interest payments go to the wealthy individuals who have 
sufficient resources to purchase government treasuries. On the other hand, higher taxes due to 
interest payments on debt are imposed on general taxpayers and, hence, also on the low-income 
individuals. In order to mitigate the social inequality, the government may decide to increase taxes 
only for the rich and, therefore, to overburden this social group with excessive taxation. However, 
excessively high taxes have negative effects, which were already mentioned above.  
Third, deficits, which are covered by private savings, may crowd out private investments (Fischer 
and Easterly, 1990; Friedman, 2005). Competition between government and investors for savings 
might result in higher interest rates. Higher interest rates, in turn, eliminate a pool of private 
projects that could have been pursued once the interest rate was lower.  
Fourth, if the deficit is covered (even partially) by foreign capital, this may lead to higher 
exchange rate volatility (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). Yet, currency fluctuations make return from 
exportation unpredictable and thus may discourage business from undertaking export activity. The 
result might be a lower international integration of the indebted country (Rzońca, 2008).  
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Fifth, an increase in debt is typically inflationary in countries with large indebtedness (Fischer and 
Easterly, 1990; Kwon et al., 2006). If financial markets deny loans or require too high risk 
premiums, countries might be tempted to finance their deficits by money printing, i.e. deficit 
monetization.  
Lastly, the excessive public debt can materialize in the sovereign debt crisis, which usually leads 
to an ad hoc decrease in public expenditure, and an increase in taxation or sovereign default. 
Fiscal crisis frequently coincides with recession, which leads to even greater cuts in public 
spending and/or increase in taxes. The final outcome is growing unemployment rate and declining 
consumption, which negatively influence economic welfare (Huntley, 2010).  
The research on fiscal constitutions, which can be traced back to the 1970s, is primarily focused 
on detecting which institutions cause profligate fiscal outcomes, and also which institutions are 
able to correct for the “political deficit bias”. Therefore, the societal relevance of this dissertation 
stems from the fact that it aims at deepening the knowledge regarding the effects of the fiscal 
constitutions, which – as convincingly shown above – might translate into non-negligible social 
and welfare effects. 
Since the vast majority of this dissertation deals with questions that are relevant for the multitier 
or intergovernmental settings, it therefore provides a valuable addition to an ongoing debate on 
the fiscal union for the EU – the union comprising 28 sovereign countries and more than half a 
billion inhabitants22. This dissertation contains dedicated sections where tentative policy 
implications for the EU are discussed. Issues pertaining to the fiscal union are not only discussed 
within the EU political institutions but are also at the core of academic research and debate 
internationally.23 International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter 
IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter OECD) have 
important contributions in that respect.  
 
 
                                                    
22
  See, for instance, “Facts and figures about the EU and the G20” available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/priorities/docs/g20-brisbane_en.pdf (accessed on February 28, 2015). 
23
  See, for instance, Cottarelli and Guerguil (2014) and Bordo et al. (2011). 
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1.4. Methodology 
 
This dissertation is mostly driven and based on empirical research. All narrow questions put forth 
in section 1.2 are about “cause and effect”. However, disentangling the effect of fiscal 
constitutions from the other causes of fiscal outcomes is a nontrivial task in empirical analysis. 
Aghion et al. (2004, p. 568) rightly points out that it is controversial in the empirical analysis of 
the institutions to include institutional variables on the “right-hand side” of the regression 
equation, due to the serious and non-negligible self-selection issues or omitted variable bias 
(hereinafter OVB).24 Self-selection or OVB refers to the situation when a researcher cannot 
control for all confounding variables, which are associated both with potential cause and with 
possible outcome (Dunning, 2012, pp. 5-6). The following example illustrates the problem. As 
argued in section 1.2, numerical fiscal rules are the most researched fiscal institutions and are 
shown to be effective in reducing the deficit bias. However, is this research fully credible? An 
often raised caveat against these studies is that the researchers often overlook a basic fact that 
enactment of fiscal rules might be a mere reflection of deep social preferences for fiscal discipline 
(Debrun et al., 2008). The fact that deep social preference for fiscal discipline is not controlled for 
in the econometric models has profound statistical implications. Namely, the numerical fiscal 
rules are shown to be associated with improved fiscal outcomes, while in reality both the fiscal 
rules and improved fiscal outcomes are caused by the third (omitted) factor – deep social 
preference for fiscal discipline (fiscal conservatism). In other words, fiscal discipline is not caused 
by the rule itself but by fiscal conservatism, which also led to the enactment of the fiscal rules. 
The fiscal rules in that context might serve as a mere signaling device of fiscal discipline. 
According to Poterba (1996, p. 12), to alleviate the self-selection or OVB problem in the 
empirical studies on fiscal institutions, it is necessary to control for some measures of the 
electorate’s fiscal preferences. This would eliminate potential spurious correlation between the 
fiscal constitutions and the fiscal outcomes. To measure social preferences is certainly not a trivial 
task, however. This is not even the entire story as in practice the identification of all confounding 
factors (social preferences being one of them) is practically impossible. Consequently, due to 
OVB or self-selection, the conventional empirical models lack credibility.  
                                                    
24
  Both the omitted variable bias and self-selection are terms which describe the same phenomenon. Hence, 
there are used interchangeably. 
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Given a recent revolution in empirical economics (Angrist and Pischke, 2010), or law and 
economics for that purpose, this dissertation attempts to “take the con out of econometrics” and 
rely – where possible – on credible empirical designs (Leamer, 1983). By credible empirical 
designs, it is understood that they should allow for a genuine causal inference from fiscal 
constitutions to outcomes. The genuine causal inference is possible only in a situation when the 
researcher has full control over the confounding factors, such as social preference for fiscal 
discipline in the context of fiscal constitution, or when the researcher does not need to control for 
confounders. A key concept which obviates the need to control for confounders is a random or as-
if random assignment (Dunning, 2012, pp. 6-8). The following example should provide a good 
illustration. The numerical fiscal rules are enacted by the governments in countries which have an 
appetite for fiscal discipline (fiscally conservative countries). If that is the case, any link between 
the numerical fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes is spurious. Now imagine the situation in which 
numerical fiscal rules are randomly distributed across jurisdictions, randomly in the sense that 
both jurisdictions with and without taste for fiscal discipline enact numerical fiscal rules with the 
same chance. In that situation, nobody can argue that the enactment of the numerical fiscal rules is 
associated with preferences for fiscal discipline. The randomization therefore enables the breaking 
of a link between confounding factors and causal variable of interest, here numerical fiscal rules. 
If in a randomized setting any correlation is found between the fiscal rules and fiscal discipline, 
this correlation can be interpreted in a causal fashion. As in medicine and clinical trials, also in 
social science the way to reassure randomization is through experimentation. Likewise, the 
terminology for experiments in social science is drawn from medicine, such as control, treatment 
and treatment effect. In the context of fiscal constitutions, those treated are for instance those 
jurisdictions which get the numerical fiscal rules and control jurisdictions are those without the 
rules. The (average) treatment effect (hereinafter ATE) refers to the causal effect of numerical 
rules on fiscal discipline, i.e. the difference between the average fiscal deficit in the treated 
jurisdictions and control jurisdictions.  
While laboratory experiments are widely used nowadays in law and economics research to 
unravel a causal relationship between institutions and outcomes, this dissertation does not resort to 
them. Particularly in the politicized area of public finance, experiments would simply lack an 
external validity. An immanent drawback of the laboratory experiments is that outside the specific 
experimental context they do not have too much of the predictive value (Angrist and Pischke, 
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2009, p. 151). For instance, it is very unlikely that the results on the numerical fiscal rules 
obtained in the laboratory would be able to convince the policy-makers to change their fiscal 
strategy as the environment in the laboratory has nothing to do with the real, day-to-day fiscal 
policy or fiscal politics. For that reason, this dissertation, wherever possible, employs so-called 
natural or quasi-experiments, i.e. experiments which are delivered by the real world conditions 
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001). This design-based approach not only allows for data-driven causal 
inference but also allows focusing of investigators’ attention on the institutional details (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2010).  
A natural experiment or, in other words, design-based approach is applied in chapters 2 and 3, 
which aim at finding the causal relationship between fiscal constitutions and selected outcomes. 
These two chapters employ a rigorous methodology of regression discontinuity (hereinafter RD) 
design. A standard RD research design exploits precise knowledge of the rules (laws) defining 
treatment. RD identification relies on the fact that in a vastly rule-based world, some rules are 
discretionary and, hence, provide a good experimental framework as they imitate randomization 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 251). For instance, in the Polish municipalities the assignment of 
electoral rules (majoritarian or proportional) is a deterministic function of the population size. 
Since the population threshold chosen for delineating majoritarian and proportional system 
(20,000 inhabitants) was set rather arbitrarily, this allows for a local randomization of treatment 
and obviates the need to control for confounding factors. The fact that a municipality with 19,950 
inhabitants obtained a majoritarian system and municipality with 20,050 inhabitants and is 
exposed to proportional system is simply by chance. The municipalities close to the 20,000 
thresholds are considered similar and the major difference between those municipalities just 
below and just above the threshold is that they apply a different electoral system. As a result, 
jumps in the relationship between population size and fiscal outcomes in the neighborhood of the 
population threshold are taken as evidence of a treatment effect of various electoral systems. This 
so-called “electoral experiment” is applied in chapter 2. Chapter 3, in turn, employs a spatial RD 
or so-called “partition experiment”. It allows testing for a break (jump) in the fiscal outcomes in 
today’s Poland exactly at the border between former empires, i.e. Prussia, Russia and Austria. The 
spatial RD relies on the fact that the frontiers between empires were imposed exogenously. The 
borders were a consequence of the political bargaining and – as historical narrative shows – were 
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set in a rather discretionary manner. Thus, the municipalities located very close to the border were 
exposed to as-if random assignment to Prussia, Russia or Austria. 
Natural experiments are rare, they cannot be planned and to discover them often involves a dose 
of luck (Dunning, 2012, p. 3). For that reason, chapters 4 and 5 do not apply the design-based 
approach. As a result, their outcomes are not interpreted in a definite causal framework. They 
demonstrate rather suggestive evidence and invite further research to disentangle causal effects. 
The main asset of chapters 4 and 5 relies, however, on their novel institutional approach and 
unique datasets, which were collected and coded for the purpose of these chapters. While chapter 
4 investigates judges’ behavior in adjudicating cases that impose a budgetary burden, chapter 5 
studies interactions between the buildings blocks of federal fiscal constitutions and coins the term 
of coherent (aligned) fiscal constitution, i.e. whether building blocks “fit” well together. 
Institutional novelty can also be found in chapter 3. It shows how history matters, or more 
precisely, how an institutional feature might persist for decades and shape contemporary fiscal 
outcome. 
 
1.5. The case of Poland and federal countries 
 
Three chapters of this dissertation are devoted to studying the case of Poland. One chapter of this 
dissertation deals solely with federal and quasi-federal countries. Two out of three chapters that 
deal with the case of Poland relate, in one way or another, to the intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, i.e. relations between central and local governments. One chapter on Poland deals 
exclusively with fiscal constitution at central level. The attention given to Poland does not stem 
from the fact that the author of this dissertation wants to find solutions specifically for Poland; but 
rather because Poland delivers credible empirical designs (see section 1.4), which have never been 
applied before or never applied in the fiscal context. One could argue that Poland as a former 
socialist country might provide a rather biased image or that effect found for Poland might hold 
only for the post-socialist countries. It is argued here that it is not the case. Since the outset of 
transition, the post-socialist countries – and Poland in particular – have grown swiftly. Their 
citizens today live wealthier, lengthier, and happier lives. In most terms they look nowadays like 
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other countries at comparable levels of economic prosperity. As argued by Shleifer and Treisman 
(2014), post-socialist countries became normal. A closer look at Poland is taken in chapters 2-4 
(see section 1.6). 
Chapter 5 investigates fiscal constitutions of 15 federations. These are members of the OECD, 
such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland and the 
United States; and developing economies, such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Republic of South 
Africa and Russia. Besides Argentina, all developing economies under investigation are OECD 
partners. Argentina, however, serves as a good counterfactual to Brazil. Also, its inclusion 
contributes to a more equal balance in the sample between developed and emerging economies. 
Some of the countries under investigation in chapter 5 may not be federations from the 
constitutional (de jure) point of view. Those quasi-federations in a sample are, for example, Italy 
and Spain. Nevertheless, the distinct feature of these countries is that they all have an intermediate 
(state) level of government between the central and the local level, which is given relatively broad 
fiscal autonomy. The relations between the central government and the state level government in 
countries under investigation are thus qualitatively different from those observed in unitary 
countries. For the limited purpose of this dissertation, this feature allows for the classifying of 
some of the countries as de facto federations (Italy, South Africa and Spain). 
 
1.6. Structure of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation consists of four stand-alone content chapters and original contributions, which 
are related to the narrow questions asked in section 1.2. The chapters are as follows. 
Chapter 2 examines electoral systems and their impact on selected fiscal variables, such as 
vertical fiscal imbalance (mismatch between local spending and revenue) and allocation of public 
spending. The political economy literature theorizes various channels through which electoral 
systems might determine fiscal outcomes. Empirical evidence supporting or rejecting theoretical 
arguments is not abundant and not sufficiently robust, however. It is vastly recognized that the 
existing empirical literature linking electoral systems and fiscal outcomes does not identify the 
causal relationship. Reasons for this are omitted variable bias (see section 1.4), infrequent 
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institutional changes and small samples. Chapter 2 tries to overcome these problems. It uses a 
quasi-experimental empirical setting and provides evidence that electoral systems influence 
selected fiscal outcomes. The empirical design employed in chapter 2 rests on a discontinuity in 
the application of electoral rules in Polish municipalities in the period 2002-2012. The results 
presented confirm existing theoretical arguments only to some extent. As compared to the 
majoritarian regimes, proportional electoral systems tend to promote broad public expenditure and 
undermine narrow public spending.25 However, these effects seem to be weaker as compared to 
previous findings in the cross-country studies. More crucially, proportional systems lead to a 
larger VFI, which is measured as a share of local expenditure covered through intergovernmental 
transfers and borrowings. The average treatment effects of electoral rules on fiscal imbalance are 
not only statistically significant but also non-negligible from the economic point of view and 
robust to numerous alternative specifications and falsification tests. This result is important 
forasmuch as larger VFI leads to greater general government deficits and, consequently, to larger 
public debt. 
Chapter 3 subscribes to the literature stream that attempts to answer the question regarding 
whether history matters. However, in chapter 3 a more specific question is asked concerning 
whether history matters for fiscal outcomes. In the context of the Polish municipalities the answer 
is positive. To confirm it, this chapter exploits a natural experiment, which was provided by 
Poland’s partition. After Poland lost its independence in 1795, its territory was divided between 
three empires (Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary), was governed by foreign institutions, and 
was influenced by the culture and norms of these countries for more than 120 years. By means of 
spatial RD, it is shown that municipalities from the former Prussian empire impose 
contemporarily higher property tax rates as compared to municipalities that were exposed to the 
Russian ruling. Higher property tax rates lead to larger own revenue and higher fiscal autonomy. 
As a consequence of it, there is a smaller VFI in the municipalities belonging to the former 
Prussian partition than in the municipalities from the former Russian part. A discontinuity in the 
property tax rates is not observed at the Austria-Russia border. Chapter 3 offers potential 
explanations for the occurrence of the discontinuity at the Prussia-Russia border and the lack 
thereof at the Austria-Russia border. Given the link between VFI and general government deficits 
                                                    
25
  See section 2.2 for theoretical underpinnings of association between the electoral system and types of 
spending. 
  24  
 
and debt, these results can shed some light on the overarching question: “why is the public debt 
growing?” 
 
Chapter 4 analyzes overall judicial behavior and contrasts it with the judicial behavior in 
adjudicating fiscal cases. Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the US, 
to explain judicial decision-making.26 In this respect, there is an important ongoing debate over 
whether judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology. The analysis of the decision-
making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal seems to support the existence of some party 
alignment. That is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because 
judges’ preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are 
incentivized to show their loyalty to the nominating party. The party alignment exists but is 
subject to institutional constraints. These results are in line with previous findings for other 
Kelsenian constitutional courts in Europe27. Crucially, although to a lesser extent, the ideological 
vote is also cast in fiscal cases. The identified institutional constraints28 limit the ideological vote 
in fiscal cases but are not able to entirely eliminate it. The fact that ideological bias is also present 
in fiscal cases might have important implications for public finance. Given that the majority of 
judges in the adjudicating benches are occasionally politically aligned with petitioners (typically 
opposition parties), it might be harder for the governing party to pursue major reforms of public 
finance, such as fiscal consolidation and public debt reduction. For instance, in times of economic 
distress necessary fiscal adjustments might be severely delayed or entirely damped by the 
Tribunal. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal can be perceived as a veto player biasing fiscal 
policy towards a status quo, hampering fiscal adjustments and leading to the accumulation of 
public debt. 
 
                                                    
26
  See section 4.1 for an overview of the different theories on judicial decision-making. 
27
  In the Kelsenian tradition, a constitutional court is explicitly designed to intervene in politics (Kelsen, 
1942). The Kelsenian approach views the court as a negative legislator able to reject a legislation from an 
ex ante perspective, thus executing the right of an abstract review. 
28
  There are two important institutional restraints which might mitigate politicization in fiscal cases. First, the 
Tribunal case law mentions the budget balance as one of the constitutional principles, which judges should 
respect. Second, in adjudicating the cases with budgetary implications judges are procedurally obliged to 
officially question the government about fiscal consequences of potentially voting the legislation 
unconstitutional. Being fully aware of fiscal consequences and being under strict public and media 
scrutiny, judges should have more reservations regarding voting the legislation unconstitutional as their 
decisions might lead to budget imbalance. For a more systematic account of these institutional constraints 
see section 4.3.   
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Chapter 5 provides an empirical assessment of federal fiscal constitutions and the interaction 
between constitutional arrangements. It demonstrates that federal fiscal constitutions differ in the 
degree of constitutionally guaranteed decentralization. More specifically, two types of fiscal 
constitutions can be distinguished: decentralized and integrated. Decentralized federations are 
those federations where states (sub-central units) enjoy high tax and spending autonomy; face 
high responsibility for their own fiscal policy29, have little co-determination power at the federal 
level30; and have intergovernmental budget rules and frameworks that are relatively weak. The 
opposite is the case in integrated federations. A cluster analysis suggests that the United States, 
Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Argentina and Mexico feature decentralized fiscal constitutions, 
while Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Russia, South Africa and Spain feature 
integrated fiscal constitutions. An important contribution of this chapter is to show that fiscal 
constitutions vary in terms of coherence (or alignment) of institutional arrangements31. Coherent 
(aligned) fiscal constitutions combine arrangements in a balanced manner or in a way that “fits 
well” together32. For instance, an aligned fiscal constitution provides similar degrees of autonomy 
for various budget items (taxation and spending); or the fiscal constitution aligns a certain level of 
autonomy with a similar level of responsibility. Incoherent fiscal constitutions combine 
arrangements in an unbalanced manner, for instance by combining low tax autonomy with high 
spending autonomy or low responsibility for fiscal policy with high fiscal autonomy. There is 
some preliminary evidence that the degree of decentralization of fiscal constitutions is hardly 
associated with economic and fiscal outcomes, but alignment (or coherence) of fiscal constitutions 
is correlated with the selected outcomes. Over the period 1980-2010, less coherent fiscal 
constitutions were correlated with higher debt and spending growth, and more economic and 
sovereign debt crises. Moreover, federations with less coherent fiscal constitutions had somewhat 
                                                    
29
  Responsibility refers to the extent to which states have to bear the consequences of their fiscal actions. 
While autonomy means the extent of states’ freedom to conduct their policies, responsibility measures 
whether states internalize the costs of these policies. 
30
  Co-determination is the extent to which states can shape fiscal policy-making at the federal level. While 
state autonomy refers to a state’s power to legislate for its own jurisdiction, co-determination refers to the 
scope of a state or a group of states to influence fiscal policy of the whole country. 
31
  Unlike indicator values which have no normative connotation, “alignment” contains a value judgment 
insofar as “more” alignment is considered better than “less”. “Alignment” is measured as the variance 
around indicator values applying a technique called random weights 
32
  In technical terms, the notion “fits well” means that the values of indicators capturing certain institutional 
arrangements are similar. The larger one is the difference between the values of indicators, the smaller is 
coherence between the institutional arrangements. 
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lower GDP growth between 1980 and 2010. In addition, chapter 5 examines causes and driving-
forces of reforms and amendments of fiscal constitutions since their inception. The findings 
suggest that reforms of fiscal constitutions usually follow events like economic and fiscal crises, 
the establishment or fall of authoritarian regimes or separatist threats. Overall, it is shown that 
autonomy and responsibility of states declined over the last 100 years, while co-determination and 
budget frameworks were strengthened. In addition, the coherence of fiscal constitutions increased 
over the last three decades. 
 
Chapter 6 comprises the conclusions. However, it not only summarizes the overall content but 
also sets a general agenda for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND FISCAL OUTCOMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM POLISH MUNICIPALITIES33 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Electoral systems are part of the fiscal constitution and as such belong to broadly conceived 
political institutions. Electoral systems are legal tools (often enshrined in the country’s 
constitution), which help aggregate conflicting public preferences and reflect them through the 
representation in the political institutions, such as legislature (Persson and Tabellini, 2006, p. 
730). The institutional details of electoral systems matter for how public preferences are actually 
translated into political representation and further into policy-making. The main institutional 
details, which shape electoral rules, are district magnitudes34 and electoral formulas (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003, p. 16). Based on those two criteria, the most frequent distinction of electoral 
systems is made between majoritarian and proportional systems. The former combines small 
district magnitude (often single-member districts) with plurality vote35. The proportional system, 
on the other hand, relies on large districts (i.e. multi-member districts) and proportional 
representation36. One more crucial dimension that differentiates electoral systems is a ballot 
                                                    
33
  This chapter under the same title is submitted to the European Journal of Political Economy. Currently, it 
has a ‘revise and resubmit’ status. I would like to thank Mateusz Trojanowski for his valuable assistance in 
merging datasets used in this project, to Kaj Thomsson for giving comments on this paper during the 2014 
Future of Law and Economics Conference held in Maastricht, to participants of the workshop on the 
European Union Decision-Making and Challenges to Economic and Financial Governance held at the 
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study and to participants of the inner seminar at the University of 
Hamburg, in particular to Matthias Dauner, Marek Endrich, Jerg Gutmann, Rahul Sapkal, Agnes Strauss 
and Stefan Voigt. I am also grateful to Alessio Pacces for his valuable comments on this chapter. Yet again 
special thank goes to Elena Kantorowicz for her valuable feedback and constant support. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
34
  District magnitude refers to a number of candidates being elected from a single electoral district. 
35
  Candidates that gather the largest amount of votes are elected. 
36
  Mandates are distributed among candidates in proportion to the votes gathered by their political parties. 
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structure37, i.e. whether votes are cast for individual candidates or for party lists. The ballot 
structure is not of interest here since the electoral systems studied in this chapter do not vary with 
this respect.38 The primary attention is given therefore to only two institutional elements of 
electoral systems – district magnitude and electoral formula. 
It is well recognized in the literature that different electoral systems induce various incentives for 
politicians and, therefore, lead to different economic outcomes. The public choice literature39 is 
particularly interested in studying the impact of electoral systems on fiscal outcomes. This interest 
was boosted by Persson and Tabellini’s (2003) seminal book on the economic effects of 
constitutions. In this book, the authors investigate both theoretically and empirically the impact of 
electoral systems on fiscal outcomes, such as the composition of public expenditure, the size of 
government, and the budget balance. In the cross-country setting, Persson and Tabellini 
demonstrate three important results. They show that the majoritarian electoral system, as 
compared to the proportional system leads to (1) smaller welfare states by 2-3% of GDP, (2) 
smaller governments by 5% of GDP, and (3) smaller fiscal deficits by 1-2% of GDP. 
Although being the first reference for students of (constitutional) political economy, Persson and 
Tabellini’s contribution did not avoid criticism. The most powerful criticism of their book was 
provided by Acemoglu (2005) who rightly claims that the empirical methods used by the authors 
do not allow for the identification of causal effects. First, due to relatively infrequent changes in 
the electoral systems40, the identification relies mostly on cross-country variation in electoral 
systems leaving researchers with a small number of observations. Second, the choice of electoral 
rules might be endogenous and causally related to other determinants of fiscal outcomes 
(confounding factors; recall discussion in section 1.4). If this holds, omitted variables bias the 
estimates. For these reasons, estimates and conclusions presented by Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
should be treated with some caution.  
                                                    
37
  Some residual and less discussed attributes of electoral systems are electoral thresholds, total membership 
of the legislative body and district malapportionment (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 140-144). 
38
  In the Polish municipalities voters only vote for the individual candidates. 
39
  Public choice is a branch of economics. It applies rational choice theory to the political sphere and 
therefore assumes that politicians as any other individuals try to maximize their own well-being. 
40
  Electoral rules are often enshrined in the constitutions which are subject to quite infrequent changes. Yet, 
the local electoral systems in Poland are enshrined in the ordinary statutory law (see section 2.3).  
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This chapter attempts to overcome the abovementioned problems. The approach in this chapter is 
novel as it provides for a causal inference of the impact of electoral systems on selected fiscal 
outcomes by using exogenous variation in the electoral rules in the Polish municipalities and by 
dealing with an unusually large dataset. The data collected for this chapter covers the total of 2479 
Polish municipalities over the period 2002-2012. The employed empirical approach exploits a 
local randomization41 of the electoral systems or, in different words, a sharp discontinuity in the 
application of two distinct electoral rules. The local randomization is imposed exogenously by the 
law, which prescribes quite discretionary the following rule. In municipalities up to 20,000 
inhabitants the representatives to local councils are elected through the majoritarian system (i.e. 
small electoral districts42 combined with plurality rule). The proportional system (i.e. large 
electoral districts43 and proportional rule) is applied in municipalities with a population above 
20,000. The assumption of the random assignment of the electoral systems at the threshold of 
20,000 inhabitants and its proximity is the cornerstone for the analysis pursued in this chapter. 
The results demonstrated in this chapter confirm existing theoretical arguments in the 
constitutional political economy literature (see section 2.2) only to some extent. For instance, it is 
shown that proportional systems lead to a larger vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI)44, which is a 
crucial feature in intergovernmental fiscal relations. The average treatment effects (ATE)45 of 
electoral regimes on VFI are not only statistically significant but also non-negligible from an 
economic point of view and robust to the alternative specifications and falsification tests. 
However, the link between electoral systems system and composition of public spending46 is very 
weak as this relationship is sensitive to various robustness checks.   
                                                    
41
  Due to the fact that 20,000 threshold delineating majoritarian and proportional elections was set arbitrarily, 
the municipalities with the number of inhabitants close to this threshold can be perceived as having 
electoral system assigned at random. 
42
  Small electoral district means that only few candidates are elected from the district. 
43
  Large electoral district refer to a district from which many candidates are elected. 
44
  Mismatch between local spending and local revenue. 
45
  Average treatment effect is defined in section 1.4. 
46
  As shown in section 2.2, there are theoretical arguments and some empirical evidence supporting the 
association between the electoral systems and the allocation of public spending. According to these 
contributions, proportional electoral systems tend to promote broad public expenditure (for instance social 
policy and education expenditure) and undermine narrow public spending (for instance 
transport/infrastructure expenditure) as compared to the majoritarian regimes. 
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a conceptual framework and a concise 
literature review. Section 2.3 explains the political and electoral regimes at the municipal level in 
Poland together with their main reforms. The data and the estimation approach are presented in 
section 2.4. Internal validity checks follow in section 2.5. Section 2.6 and section 2.7 demonstrate 
estimation results and robustness checks, respectively. Section 2.8 derives tentative policy 
implications based on the results of this chapter. Finally, closing remarks of chapter 2 are 
comprised in section 2.9. 
 
2.2. Conceptual framework and literature review 
 
In this section, the main transmission channels from electoral systems to fiscal outcomes are 
elaborated together with a brief literature review of empirical evidence (largely based on Persson 
and Tabellini, 2006). Overall, three fiscal outcomes are discussed in this section, i.e. the 
composition of public expenditure, the size of the government and budget balance. A slightly 
modified hypothesis is presented for the context of the Polish municipalities as it takes into 
account the intergovernmental realities. 
Electoral systems and composition of public expenditure 
Theoretical deliberations suggest that a plurality rule and single-member districts47 tend to 
promote “narrowly targeted spending benefiting relatively small geographical areas and 
constituencies” (Persson and Tabellini, 2004, p. 730). One example of narrowly targeted spending 
could be public investment in local road infrastructure. On the contrary, a proportional rule and 
multi-member districts induce incumbents to favor broad groups of electorate. A good example of 
expenditure, which covers the interests of broad constituencies, is that on social policy and 
education. The arguments supporting these relationships are threefold.  
The first argument is based on the fact that the minimum fraction of votes required to win the 
elections differ in proportional and majoritarian systems. Under the plurality rule with single-
                                                    
47
  Single-member district means that only one candidate is elected from this district. 
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member districts48 (the winner-takes-all49), a party can control the legislature with only 25% of 
the total vote (Persson and Tabellini, 2006, p. 731). The logic is straightforward as in winner-
takes-all systems the party needs to gather half of the votes in half of the districts. Under the 
proportional rule with one electoral district, 50% of the national votes is required to win the 
election (Persson and Tabellini, 2006, p. 731).50 The difference in the minumim winning coalition 
between majoritarian and proportional systems results in a diverse composition of the public 
expenditure in majoritarian and proportional systems (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003 p. 17; 2006, p. 731). Under the former rule the incumbents focus on more specific 
expenditure, which target relatively narrow groups of voters, to win elections. Under the 
proportional rule re-election-seeking incumbents promote broad programs, which benefit larger 
groups of voters, such as welfare state programs.  
The second argument stems from the fact that electoral systems induce different types of electoral 
competition (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; 2000, p. 206; 2006, p. 731). Single-member districts 
and plurality rule typically make each party an undisputable winner in some of the districts and 
concentrate electoral competition in the other (marginal) districts where the winner is not certain. 
Hence, parties have a strong motivation to target voters in these marginal districts through 
expenditure which has a local specification, such as “pork barrel” expenditure51. In contrast, 
multimember districts and proportional rule diffuse electoral competition and incentivize the 
parties to promote expenditure which benefits broad coalitions of voters. 
The third, and last, argument considers the partisanship of political parties elected through 
different electoral systems. It is recognized that progressive governments tend to rule more often 
under proportional systems, whereas conservative governments are more frequent under 
majoritarian systems. For theoretical underpinning of this association see Iversen and Soskice 
(2006). The evidence from 14 developed countries in the period 1945-1998 demonstrates that in 
the proportional systems right-of-center governments ruled 26% of the time, while in the 
                                                    
48
  For instance, in the United Kingdom, representatives to the House of Commons are elected in the single-
member districts through plurality rule (winner-takes-all or first-past-the-post system). 
49
  Only one candidate with the largest amount of individual votes is elected. 
50
  This kind of electoral system is present in Israel for electing the Knesset. 
51
  “Pork barrel” refers to the expenditure which funds projects that benefit a particular constituency in return 
for that constituency's support. This expenditure mostly benefits the needs of small and geographically 
concentrated groups. 
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majoritarian systems 75% of the time (Iversen and Soskice, 2006, p. 166). One can presume 
therefore that the jurisdictions with proportional representation and more frequent left-of-center 
governments should observe higher redistribution and, thus, larger spending on welfare state as 
compared to the jurisdictions with majoritarian elections. This argument does not hold in the 
context of the Polish municipalities, however. The reason for this is that at the local level parties 
and political associations are not clearly aligned with left or right ideology. 
Some empirical support of the effects of electoral systems on the composition of public spending 
can be found in the literature. For instance, without controlling for other determinants of welfare 
spending, countries with legislative bodies elected under proportional regimes spend more by 
approx. 8% of GDP on welfare state as compared to jurisdictions with legislatures elected by the 
majoritarian rule. When adding other covariates, such as for instance, demographics, GDP per 
capita, and the quality of institutions, the estimated effect shrinks to 2-3% of GDP but remains 
statistically significant. This result seems to be robust to the selection of different samples of 
countries (see Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002 and Persson and Tabellini, 2003, p. 169; 2004; 2006, p. 
731). A similar pattern is also found in the federal context of Switzerland (Funk and Gathmann, 
2013). The Swiss cantons with proportional system tend to have larger broad expenditure 
(precisely on social policy and education) and lower narrow expenditure (such as on local road 
infrastructure) than cantons which apply a majoritarian system. It is important to note that none of 
these studies establishes the genuine causal link between institutions and outcomes as they are not 
based on “natural experiments” (see section 1.4). 
Electoral systems and the size of government 
The composition of public expenditure is not the only fiscal outcome influenced by the electoral 
systems. The size of the government, measured as the country’s spending or revenue to GDP, is 
yet another fiscal variable shaped by the electoral systems. According to the so-called Duverger’s 
law, “plurality rule and small district magnitude produce fewer parties and more concentrated 
distribution of seats than proportional representation and large district magnitude” (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2006, p. 732). Fewer parties in the parliament, in turn, lead to more frequent single-
party majorities, and less often coalitions (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Persson and Tabellini, 
2006, p. 732). Evidence presented in Persson et al. (2003) suggests that in most of the 
parliamentary democracies, majoritarian systems are indeed more associated with concentrated 
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party systems, and less frequent coalitions than proportional systems. The difference in party 
systems induced by electoral rules should not be irrelevant for fiscal outcomes. 
The “fiscal common-pool problem” (see section 1.2) is particularly relevant in explaining various 
fiscal outcomes under different party systems. Public revenue or general tax fund is often referred 
to as the fiscal common-pool. “Grazers” (users) of the common pool are able to internalize 
benefits of spending programs (by satisfying their own constituencies) but they are also able to 
externalize most of the cost of these programs. Importantly, by extracting resources from the 
general tax fund, the incumbent’s constituencies cover only a fraction of costs of the programs 
that benefit them. This causes a mismatch between the benefits and the costs of the public 
programs for incumbents and, consequently, induce overspending and over-taxation. Coalition 
governments face a more severe “fiscal common-pool problem” than single party governments. 
More fractionalized party systems and, hence, multi-party coalitions present under proportional 
systems lead to a greater overall size of government (spending and revenue) as the number of 
“grazers” exploiting the common-pool (general tax fund) is larger. Theoretical underpinnings of 
this logic are presented, for instance, by Persson et al. (2003). 
There is some conventional empirical evidence in favor of a larger government size under 
proportional system vis-à-vis majoritarian system. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2003, p. 
168; 2004) deal with a sample of 80 democracies in the 1990s and an empirical approach that 
allows conditioning on a variety of other determinants of the size of government. Their estimates 
lead to the conclusion that a proportional system increases central government expenditure by 
around 5% of GDP as compared to a majoritarian system. In more recent publication, Blume et al. 
(2009) confirm the results obtained by Persson and Tabellini (2003) based on an extended sample. 
Earlier empirical work also finds evidence that larger parliamentary coalitions spend more (see, 
for instance, Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999; Baqir, 2002, Persson and Tabellini, 2006, p. 733). 
However, some other works question the link between electoral systems and the government size. 
For instance, Funk and Gathmann (2013), who have studied historical developments of electoral 
rules in the Swiss cantons since 1890, do not find any evidence in favor of a positive association 
between a proportional system and larger governments.  
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Electoral systems and fiscal balance 
The third fiscal policy outcome under investigation is budget balance (i.e. net lending/borrowing 
or budget surplus/deficit). An over-exploitation of the fiscal common-pool by coalition 
governments, once put in the dynamic context, leads to a constant mismatch between the 
expenditure and the revenue, causing budget deficits (Velasco, 1999). In the dynamic setting, 
spending can be also covered through public borrowing. As compared to single party 
governments, coalition governments consist of numerous “grazers” who might to a larger extent 
exploit the borrowings to finance current public expenditure. By means of the current borrowing, 
governments externalize the cost of present policies to future generations (future general tax fund) 
and then-governing coalitions. In other words, current spending is financed through taxes imposed 
on future generations. 
There is, however, another reason why coalitions tend to run budget deficits. Numerous veto 
players are prone to lock-in fiscal policy and reduce its ability to respond to external shocks. In 
other words, many veto players involved in policy-making result in the status quo bias, i.e. 
reduced policy flexibility (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 2). Since coalitions have more players who can 
possibly veto a policy change, coalition governments are less able to adapt fiscal policies during 
the adverse economic shocks (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina and Drazen, 199152; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2006, p. 734). Proportional electoral regimes cause therefore more persistent budget 
deficits as coalition members cannot agree promptly on consolidation and deficit reducing policies 
(tax increases or spending reduction). 
Very suggestive empirical evidence confirms that jurisdictions with proportional electoral systems 
observe greater budget deficits by about 2% of GDP as compared to jurisdictions with 
majoritarian systems (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, p. 180). If one controls for self-selection 
(Heckman procedure), the effect drops to approx. 1% of GDP and the estimate is statistically 
significant in a large sample of countries (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, p. 182). There is also some 
                                                    
52
  Alesina and Drazen (1991) refer to the “war of attrition” argument (see also appendix 1.2). The argument 
goes as follows. In time of fiscal distress, the coalition members engage in a long-lasting bargaining on a 
consolidation (austerity) measures. These prolonged negotiations arise since none of the coalition partners 
want to impose burden of the fiscal adjustment on its own constituency. The heterogeneity in the 
government coalition might lead to even longer negotiations and delays in the austerity measures. This 
inevitably leads to persistence and a gradual increase of public deficits. 
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conventional evidence that in proportional systems expenditure as a share of GDP rises in 
recessions but is not reduced in upturns (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). 
Testable hypotheses 
In this chapter, two hypotheses are offered with respect to fiscal outcomes in the Polish 
municipalities. The first hypothesis relates to the composition of public spending. It is proposed 
that broad public expenditure, such as that on welfare and education, is larger in municipalities 
with proportional electoral systems than in the municipalities with majoritarian systems. It is due 
to a larger minimal coalition of voters required to win election under the proportional rule as 
compared to the majoritarian rule and more diffuse political competition in a proportional system. 
For the narrow public expenditure (e.g. local road infrastructure), the reverse logic applies. 
The second hypothesis relates to the common-pool problem of multi-party coalitions and their 
status quo bias. However, this hypothesis does not refer explicitly to the size of government or 
fiscal balance but is slightly modified to account for the intergovernmental twist and realities 
studied in the Polish context. Notice that intergovernmental structure induces more complexity; 
particularly external funds do not refer only to borrowings but also to intergovernmental grants. In 
the country or central government context, the external funds mean solely borrowings.  
As a result – in the context of the Polish municipalities – the argument goes as follows. The 
municipal councils (local legislatures) finance programs from three main revenue sources. They 
use their own revenue (revenue generated on the territory of the municipality), the central revenue 
(intergovernmental transfers and subsidies) and borrowings. It is hypothesized, however, that the 
central revenue should be subject to much larger over-exploitation than the own revenue. By 
financing local programs from the central revenue, the cost of a program is entirely externalized to 
the general (national) taxpayers. This is not the case with financing through own revenue as it 
comes from taxes and fees imposed on the local population, and thus potential local voters. Thus, 
the cost of financing programs via own revenue is to a large extent internalized by the municipal 
councils, or precisely voters who reside in the given municipality. Yet another way to externalize 
the cost of financing the program is via borrowing in the financial markets. Through borrowing, 
the local council can externalize the cost of programs to the future generations and the prospect 
municipal authorities. The extent of external financing in the form of central revenue and 
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borrowing is crucial in determining the VFI, which increases with larger external financing.53 In 
the proportional systems one should observe larger VFI as those systems generate more “grazers” 
of the common-pool (here namely central and future revenue) than majoritarian systems. Owing 
to the “lock-in” effect in the proportional electoral systems, it is likewise more difficult for 
coalitions to decide on tax increases or spending cuts in time of economic stress, when 
consolidation efforts are needed. Instead of cutting expenditure or increasing taxes, a multi-party 
coalition might be more eager to cover fiscal deficit by borrowings or claim for additional 
transfers from the central government. This is a further argument to reinforce the hypothesis that 
VFI should be larger in the municipalities with proportional electoral systems than in 
municipalities with majoritarian representation. 
As VFI is one of the key variables studied in this chapter, it is crucial to highlight its negative 
consequences and how it impacts general government finance. High reliance on 
intergovernmental transfers and borrowings induces moral hazard on the side of municipalities 
and distorts their tax enforcement (Baretti et al. 2002). According to Rodden (2003, p. 14), 
“transfer [municipalities]54 face weak incentives to be fiscally responsible, since it is more 
rewarding to position themselves for a bailout”. Municipalities endowed with high transfers from 
the federal level and borrowings usually do not have a sufficient tax capacity to cope with 
idiosyncratic economic shocks (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). Since resources anyway 
come mainly from the central transfers and borrowings, municipalities may claim that they are not 
responsible for coping with the crisis and, thus, shift the burden to the central level derailing the 
position of the whole general government. As recently shown by Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013), 
vertical fiscal imbalances are positively associated with deficit of the general government. It does 
not come as a surprise as local governments with high imbalance are likely to externalize the 
negative consequences of their fiscal policy to the central government. 
 
                                                    
53
  VFI is measured as a share of spending covered by central (intergovernmental) transfers and borrowings 
from the financial markets (Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013). Alternatively, one could think of an indicator 1-
VFI as a share of the public expenditure covered through own revenue. 
54
  In the original quotation “governments”. 
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2.3. Institutional background 
 
There are 2479 municipalities (gmina) in Poland, which constitute the lowest tier of government. 
By international standards, Polish municipalities enjoy relatively large independence and high tax 
autonomy.55 On average, around 40% of the municipal revenues come from taxes and fees 
collected in the municipality (Guziejewska, 2008). Municipalities can set their own property, 
forest and agricultural taxes as well as user fees. In addition, municipalities are eligible to almost 
40% of the personal income tax collected on their territory and 7% of the corporate income tax.56 
The residual resources come from the central (intergovernmental) grants and subsidies, and from 
borrowings in the financial markets. The amount of debt the municipality can incur is legally 
constrained, however. The borrowing rule imposed by the central government dictates that the 
municipal debt may not be larger than 60% of the total revenue.57 However, indebtedness of 
individual municipalities occasionally exceeds this level. Besides the borrowing rule, Polish 
municipalities have no institutional incentives to keep their debt at a low level. Specifically, 
municipalities cannot go bankrupt and in critical situations the Ministry of Finance is obliged to 
rescue local units by offering loans.58 On the expenditure side, municipalities are important 
providers of public goods and services. Municipalities finance and decide, among others, on local 
road infrastructure, primary education, and social and health services. Some of the municipalities 
have special status and their spending obligations differ from those of regular municipalities 
(miasto na prawach powiatu). This special status is given to medium and large cities. As of 2014, 
there are 66 cities (municipalities) with special status. Due to the lack of comparability to other 
municipalities, they are excluded from the analysis. 
The municipalities have the constitutionally guaranteed right of self-management. Since 2002, a 
political system that has been applied was the mayor-council system. This system features direct 
elections of the mayor and council members, which are held every four years. However, the 
                                                    
55
  Out of 24 unitary countries in the OECD, Poland ranks 9th with respect to the value of local taxes as a share 
of the total tax revenue (12.4%). See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisation 
database.htm (accessed March 5, 2015). 
56
  See Article 4 of the Law on Financing of Self-governance Units 2003. 
57
  See Article 242 and article 243 of the Public Finance Law 2009. 
58
  See Article 6 of the Bankruptcy and Resolution Law 2003. 
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position of the mayor is weak from a de jure point of view and limited to the execution of laws 
enacted by the council.59 Over time, the mayor’s institutional position did not change 
significantly. Even though before 2002 the mayor was not elected directly but was chosen 
indirectly from the council representatives, his duties and functions were not meaningfully 
reformed.  
The council – the legislative body of the municipality – comprises mostly representatives of the 
local associations and to a much lesser extent national parties.60 In the local elections ideology 
plays much less important role than in the national elections and, consequently, it is impossible to 
define ideological commitments of the local parties (associations). An important feature of the 
political system is that the council representatives are elected directly by voters through two 
different electoral systems depending on the population size of the municipality. In municipalities 
with a population of up to 20,000 inhabitants (for simplicity called small municipalities) the 
council members are elected in majoritarian elections. The members of the council in large 
municipalities (with more than 20,000 inhabitants), on the other hand, are elected through 
proportional elections. This electoral setting was introduced by the law on Elections to Municipal 
councils, District Councils and Regional Assemblies from July 1998.61 It was applied for the first 
                                                    
59
  The position of a mayor vis-à-vis the council is weak for several reasons. First, the council decides on the 
mayor’s salary (see Article 18(2) of the Law on Local Self-governance 1990). Second, the council might 
defeat the mayor with a motion of no confidence, which leads to a referendum on the mayor’s recall (see 
Article 28a of the Law on Local Self-governance 1990). Third, the council determines the course of the 
mayor’s action and controls the execution of actions (see Article 18(2) and 18a of the Law on Local Self-
governance 1990). Fourth, the council is the main body to vote on the municipal budget, bonds issuance, 
and borrowing (see Article 18(2) of the Law on Local Self-governance 1990). 
60
  At the local level, national parties are mostly present in large cities. 
61
  In the period of 1990-1998, representatives to the municipal councils were elected by the winner-takes-all 
rule in the municipalities of up to 40,000 inhabitants and through proportional elections in the 
municipalities with population above 40,000. By setting a cutoff point on 20,000 inhabitants in 1998, the 
legislators decided to expand the application of proportional elections. The main argument supporting this 
expansion was that in the middle range municipalities the municipal election are already anonymous in a 
sense that voters might prefer to identify themselves with local associations and parties rather than with 
individual candidates. The drafters of the new rule argued that only in case of the small municipalities it 
makes sense to maintain the majoritarian system where local communities know well individual candidates 
and associate with them rather than with associations and political parties. Nevertheless, a threshold of 
20,000 inhabitants was picked up rather arbitrary without a specific rationale behind this number. The 
comprehensive administrative reform of 1998, besides changing the electoral rules in the municipalities, 
introduced one more tier of regional government, i.e. districts (powiat), and reduced the number of 
voivodeships (województwo) from 49 to 16. 
  
41 
 
time in the municipal election in October 1998.62 It is worth noting that during each election 
around 85% of municipalities are subject to the majoritarian system, and the rest to the 
proportional systems. 
In the small municipalities, the majoritarian elections of council representatives combine plurality 
rule with small district magnitude. According to the electoral law, the council representatives in 
municipalities of up to 20,000 inhabitants should be elected from districts where 1 to 5 candidates 
with the largest amount of votes are elected. In practice most of the municipalities tend to set 
single or two-member districts. For instance in the 2002 elections, in approx. 75% of 
municipalities the average district magnitude was less than two. In single-member districts the 
representatives are elected via a winner-takes-all rule. In the larger districts, which count 2 to 5 
members, the representatives are elected through plurality at large voting (block vote). Under this 
voting system, voters are requested to tick as many boxes as candidates being elected from a 
given district. Block voting is not a system for obtaining proportional representation. Instead, the 
typical result is that the most popular party wins all seats leading to even higher disproportionality 
than in the majoritarian systems with single-member districts (Flis, 2009; Lijphart, 2012, p. 138).  
In large municipalities, council representatives are elected through a proportional rule from multi-
member districts. Since 2002, a d’Hondt formula has been applied to assign council seats to the 
political associations and parties (recall that in the proportional system mandates are distributed 
according to the vote share of political associations and parties). As compared to the Sainte-Laguë 
method which was in use before 2002, the d’Hondt method tends to favor winning political 
associations and parties63 (Lijphart, 2012, p. 135). Crucially, in large municipalities 5 to 8 
representatives need to be elected from each district. However, differently than in the small 
municipalities, voters are allowed to tick the name of only one candidate. A clear discontinuity in 
the average district magnitude at the threshold of 20,000 inhabitants is illustrated in figure 2.1. 
Some further differences in the electoral systems are presented in table 2.1. 
                                                    
62
  Since 2014, the electoral rules have been standardized across all municipalities. Precisely, all council 
representatives are elected through the plurality rule with single-member districts. The first election under 
the new regime was scheduled for November 2014.  
63
  Sainte-Laguë and d’Hondt are methods (formulas) according to which votes for political parties are 
translated into seats in the legislative bodies. The d’Hondt method is the most common and it tends to favor 
the winners, i.e. to assign relatively more seats as a share of votes would justify. The Sainte-Laguë method, 
on the other hand, offers the most equal relationship between share of votes and seats distribution. For a 
more detailed description of these two methods see Lijphart (2012, p. 135).  
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It needs to be clear at this point that the main difference between the two electoral regimes boils 
down to the differences in application of electoral formula and district magnitude (i.e. how many 
candidates are elected to the council from the particular district). The municipalities of up to 
20,000 inhabitants combine a plurality voting and small districts, whereas the municipalities 
above this threshold use a proportional formula and large districts. Both the application of the 
proportional formula and large districts lead to more proportional electoral outcomes, i.e. the 
share of vote for a given association/party corresponds well with the share of seats allocated to 
this association/party. The plurality voting and small district lead to the opposite effect, i.e. the 
electoral outcomes are more disproportional in the sense that the share of votes for a given 
association or party, does not correspond well with the share of seats gained by this association or 
party. 
Figure 2.1. Discontinuity in the average district magnitude in 2002 at the threshold of 20,000 
inhabitants 
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Table 2.1. Some characteristics of proportional and majoritarian electoral systems in 2002 
and 2006 
 2002 2006 2002 2006 
 Proportional  
election 
Majoritarian  
election 
Number of districts 1,245 1,226 20,692 20,556 
Number of elected representatives 7,374 7,273 32,205 32,265 
Average district magnitude 5.9 5.9 1.6 1.6 
Average number of candidates per 
one council mandate 
11.5 11.5 4.4 3.4 
Source: Ptak (2010, pp. 144-145). 
The empirical investigation in this chapter is performed on the data from 2002 to 2012. The 
reforms in 2002 led to the last major changes of the political and electoral systems at the 
municipal level. In 2002 the current mayor-council system was introduced, replacing the old 
system where mayor was elected indirectly from the council representatives. In addition, the 
d’Hondt method replaced the Sainte-Laguë method for allocating seats in the proportional system 
and most crucially the number of council representatives was scaled down. After 2002, the 
institutional setup in the Polish municipalities was rather stable. Thus, the risk that the electoral 
systems are confounded by other policy changes is minimized. The last year of the analysis is 
delineated by the availability of the fiscal data. In the period under investigation three elections at 
the municipal level took place, consecutively in 2002, 2006 and 2010. It is important to emphasize 
that the electoral rules applied in the elections in 2002, 2006 and 2010 depended on the population 
size at the end of the year prior to the election. Hence, the electoral rules were determined by the 
population size in 2001, 2005 and 2009, respectively.  
It needs to be stressed that the population size determines also some other institutional shifts at the 
municipal level. Most importantly, population size governs the number of representatives elected 
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to the councils.64 Whereas in the small municipalities (up to 20,000 inhabitants) councils comprise 
15 representatives, in the large municipalities (above 20,000 inhabitants) they consist of 21 
representatives. This arrangement has been in place since 2002. Before that, there were six 
different thresholds determining council size. The overall aim of this reform was to radically 
reduce the number of municipal representatives. Consequently, in the election of 2002 the number 
of elected representatives dropped by nearly 13,000 as compared to the 1998 election (Ptak 2010). 
A theoretical argument presented by Weingast et al. (1989) states that larger councils are 
associated with larger size of government. The authors base their argument on the assumption that 
the larger number of legislators as such aggravates the common-pool problem. In contrast, Primo 
and Snyder (2008) and Petterson-Libdom (2012) present quite a different theoretical argument. 
They argue that the larger number of legislators essentially reduce the size of government. 
According to these authors, a growing size of government is caused by the bureaucrats (the public 
administration)65 and not legislators. A larger number of legislators actually reduces the size of 
government since more legislators are able to better monitor the public administration 
(bureaucrats) and, hence, exert a better control over the public spending. 
The empirical evidence does not provide a clear answer to those theoretical divagations. On the 
one hand, Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) find a positive influence of the council size on the 
total public spending in the Bavarian municipalities. On the other hand, Petterson-Libdom (2012) 
finds a negative relationship between public expenditure per capita and the council size in the 
Finnish and Swedish municipalities. This chapter does not resolve the discussion regarding the 
council members and the size of government but rather asserts that both abovementioned 
contributions overlooked taking into account the intergovernmental realities (interactions between 
central and sub-central governments) in Germany, on the one hand, and Finland and Sweden, on 
the other hand. Contradicting results might be therefore the result of this omission. Crucially, in 
                                                    
64
  There are some minor rules that abruptly change at the 20,000 threshold. For instance, in the municipalities 
of up to 20,000 inhabitants there is only one deputy-mayor, while in the municipalities above 20,000 
inhabitants there are maximum two deputy-mayors. The 20,000 cut-off determines also the maximum 
number of assistants a mayor can employ, i.e. maximum three persons in the municipalities of up to 20,000 
inhabitants and maximum five persons in the municipalities above 20,000 inhabitants. These changes 
might influence personnel expenditure, they should not, however, have any effect on the dependent 
variables of interest, i.e. braod and narrow public expenditure or vertical fiscal imbalance. 
65
  Niskanen (1971) was the first to put forth the argument on bureaucracy that tends to maximize its own 
budget. 
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the empirical part of this chapter, some robustness checks are provided in order to demonstrate 
that the number of council representatives has no effect on the underlying dependent variables, 
particularly on the composition of public expenditure and, more importantly, on VFI. 
 
2.4. Data and estimation approach 
 
The dataset constructed for the purpose of this chapter originates from two sources. Data on the 
population size and elections were officially requested from the National Election Commission. 
The fiscal data on different categories of expenditure and revenue as well as on VFI was extracted 
from the Bank of Regional Data, which is publicly available at the Central Statistical Office 
website.66 The dataset covers the years 2002-2012. For some dependent variables only shorter 
time series are available, however. This applies to the broad expenditure (social and education 
expenditure) for which the dataset covers timespan of 2008-2012.67 Data on the narrow 
expenditure (local road infrastructure spending) and on VFI are available for the whole period 
under consideration. Descriptive statistics are presented in appendix 2.1. 
Disentangling the effect of electoral rules from other causes of fiscal policy outcomes is a 
nontrivial task in empirical analysis. Ideally, causal inference relies on a randomized experiment 
where the electoral rules are assigned randomly across jurisdictions. Such an experiment does not 
exist for electoral systems. The second best option is to adopt a quasi-experimental design to 
approximate real randomization. The discontinuous relationship of population size and electoral 
rules in the Polish context allows exploiting one of these quasi-experimental designs. Since in the 
Polish municipalities the assignment of electoral rules (majoritarian or proportional) is a 
deterministic function of the population size, the application of a regression-discontinuity (RD) 
design seems natural.68 In this chapter, the relationship between population size and electoral rules 
                                                    
66
  Data available at www.stat.gov.pl (last accessed on November 14, 2014). 
67
  Consistent long time series could not be obtained for social expenditure since in some sub-periods social 
expenditure aggregate takes into account also “other social expenditure”, which according to the budgetary 
classification should constitute separate spending block. To assure comparability of time series only sub-
period 2008-2012 was extracted. 
68
  A couple of recent studies apply similar research design to estimate the effect of various political 
institutions which are determined by the population size: Petterson-Libdom (2008, 2012), Egger and 
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entails a sharp RD design. The assignment of a municipality to different electoral rules in election 
years (i.e. 2002, 2006 and 2010) and four year thereafter, is solely determined by the population 
size in the years prior to the elections (i.e. 2001, 2005 and 2009).  
The RD model for a pooled cross-section of data around a single discontinuity is as follows. 
Denote by 	a population size based on which municipality  was qualified to certain electoral 
rule at time t, then define an indicator variable for observations  such as: 
 = 1					
	 > 20,0000					
	 ≤ 20,000 
Consequently, the RD model for observations  may be formulated as: 
 =  +  +  + ⋯+  
where  is a selected fiscal outcome in municipality  (i.e. composition of public expenditure 
or VFI) at time t;  is a polynomial function of , which captures the continuous relationship 
between  and ;  is a constant;  corresponds to a discontinuous effect of the proportional 
system at the cutoff of 20,000, and  is an error term. Inference about the discontinuity at the 
cutoff of 20,000 for all  is therefore made by means of polynomial regressions where the 
polynomial function, , is based upon degree-1 (linear specification), degree-2 and degree-3 
polynomials. Application of different polynomials should ensure that the findings are not driven 
by a particular functional form. In addition, in the baseline specification different slopes of the 
regression functions on both sides of the cutoff are permitted. 
Since a major institutional shift, which occurs at the 20,000 threshold, is the change in the 
electoral regimes, any discontinuity (jump) in outcome variables at this threshold should be driven 
by the switch in electoral regimes. To estimate  and, hence, the causal impact of a change from 
majoritarian to proportional at the threshold of 20,000 inhabitants, one may use all data or data 
within a more or less narrowly defined window only. Using data only within a certain window 
around 20,000 exhibits the advantage that misspecification of the functional form of the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Koethenbuerger (2010), Barone and de Blasio (2013), Arnold and Freier (2013), Litschig and Morrison 
(2013), Brollo et al. 2013, and Eggers (2014). Methodological concerns of RD design are well developed 
by Ade and Freier (2011). 
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polynomial is less likely than when using all data. For that reason, in the baseline regression, two 
narrow bandwidths are used, i.e. bandwidth of 10,000-30,000 inhabitants, and 15,000-25,000 
inhabitants, respectively. The main estimation approach is therefore to use polynomial regressions 
in narrow samples around the discontinuity of 20,000 inhabitants. 
Compared to other observational studies RD analysis enjoys relatively high internal validity69. 
This comes at the expense of external validity70 as a treatment effect is calculated for the sub-
sample located at the cutoff. Hence, the effects presented in this chapter (as in any RD analysis) 
apply to the units near the relevant cutoff – in this chapter, to the municipalities near the 
population threshold of 20,000. It is up to the researcher and reader, however, to decide whether 
these narrow results carry some more general meaning. Lastly, it is worth noting that neither 
covariates nor state fixed effects are needed for identification. In some robustness checks, some 
baseline covariates are inserted, however, to substantiate the results. 
 
2.5. Internal validity checks 
 
An extensive and precise manipulation of the population data71, on which electoral rules 
assignment is based, would cast serious doubts about the internal validity of the RD analysis. 
Therefore, it is crucial to check for any evidence of sorting, i.e. for any discontinuous population 
distributions. Figure 2.2 plots the histograms with different bins for the municipal population size 
at the end of 2001, 2005 and 2009. Visual inspection of figure 2.2 demonstrates that the 
                                                    
69
  A high internal validity means that a given empirical model successfully identifies causal effects for the 
population being studied (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 151). 
70
  The external validity uncovers the predictive power of the outcome outside the given context (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009, p. 151) – here outside the context of the Polish municipalities. 
71
  A priori, it is not clear which electoral system should be preferred by the politicians at the municipal level. 
While for the popular local politicians a majoritarian system could be more beneficial, less popular 
politicians could favor a proportional election as it increases their chances of being elected to the council 
even with a moderate support. Less popular politicians might also favor proportional system for some other 
reason. Coincidentally, in the municipalities above 20,000 inhabitants 21 representatives are elected to the 
council, i.e. by six more than in the municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. A larger number of 
elected representatives increases the chance that less popular and less recognized politicians are elected to 
the council. Lastly, it seems that all municipalities should be interested in overestimating the number of 
inhabitants as the higher population size determines the higher amounts of some intergovernmental grants. 
This, however, goes beyond a manipulation at the specific threshold. 
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distribution is positively skewed and that a small positive increase in the probability mass is 
observed just after the cutoff of 20,000. Nevertheless, no substantial discontinuity can be 
identified. This serves as an initial identification that the local officials do not precisely 
manipulate the population size. Another way of checking the validity of the RD involves testing 
for a jump in the density of the forcing variable at the cutoff (McCrary, 2008). The result of 
McCrary density test reassures that manipulation of the population size does not occur at the 
threshold (see Appendix 2.2). 
Policy-makers at the municipal level cannot significantly manipulate the size of the population 
due to two reasons. First, although the population registrations and records are the responsibility 
of the municipalities, these records are verified by local delegations of the National Electoral 
Commission.72 Second, the population records are also collected by the independent Central 
Statistical Office.73 Significant disparity between population size reported by the municipalities 
and the Central Statistical Office would raise serious concerns. This double check by the Central 
Statistical Office minimizes therefore a chance that the population data are subject to significant 
manipulation. The comparison of the municipal data with those of the Central Statistical Office in 
the bandwidth 19,000-20,000 inhabitants leads to the conclusion that municipalities did not 
manipulate their population records in order to be on one or the other side of the threshold, 
although reported numbers differ partially.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
72
  See Article 25(3) of the Electoral Code 2011. 
73
  The population data of the Central Statistical Office is available http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/ 
app/dane_podgrup.dims?p_id=421295&p_token=0.5047641049515861 (accessed on February 28, 2015). 
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Figure 2.2. Population density around the threshold at the end of 2001, 2005, and 2009 
(different bins applied) 
Panel A. Bin = 250 inhabitants Panel B. Bin = 400 inhabitants 
  
Panel C. Bin = 500 inhabitants Panel D. Bin = 1,000 inhabitants 
  
It is also important to verify whether municipalities just below and just above the threshold of 
20,000 inhabitants were similar before the introduction of new electoral regime. Table 2.2 
demonstrates the estimations for several pre-treatment covariates74 (values registered in between 
1995 and 1998). The results show that around the cutoff point there is no statistical evidence of 
discontinuities in pre-treatment covariates capturing economic activity (number of registered 
                                                    
74
  In the context of this chapter, pre-treatment covariates are – demographic, institutional, fiscal – variables 
which allow verifying whether major qualitative differences between the municipalities close to 20,000 
inhabitants were present prior to the experiment. This helps rule out the possibility that legislators were 
driven by certain qualitative differences between municipalities when deciding the threshold of 20,000 
inhabitants.  
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economic units in column 1) or demographic structure (share of working age population in 
column 2). Neither there is evidence of discontinuity in pre-treatment values of the selected fiscal 
outcomes, such as expenditure on administration (column 3), expenditure on social welfare 
(column 4), expenditure on transportation (column 5) and, lastly, VFI (column 6). In other words, 
from a statistical point of view, there is no evidence that treated (municipalities with the number 
of inhabitants above 20,000) and control groups (municipalities with the number of inhabitants up 
to 20,000) were systematically different in fiscal, economic and demographic terms before the 
new electoral system was introduced in 1998. This confirms the claim that threshold was set 
arbitrary by the legislators. 
Table 2.2. Balancing properties for the pre-treatment variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
 
VARIABLES 
 
Economic units 
 
Share of 
population in 
working age 
 
Expenditure on 
administration per 
capita 
 
Expenditure on 
social welfare per 
capita  
 
Expenditure on 
transport per 
capita 
 
Vertical fiscal 
imbalance 
       
Proportional (D) -86.89838 -0.00322 -10.26525 14.69743 -3.85248 0.04362 
 (149.86314) (0.00765) (10.66239) (10.22025) (7.11918) (0.03230) 
Constant 1,110.36699*** 0.58360*** 86.96864*** 76.82660*** 25.30155*** 0.63644*** 
 (122.59075) (0.00573) (9.39059) (7.79165) (6.00403) (0.02782) 
       
Observations 2,203 2,203 2,203 2,203 2,203 2,203 
R-squared 0.51218 0.16768 0.01289 0.03719 0.07243 0.04081 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 (corresponding parameters are not reported). All columns 
employ the bandwidth of 10,000-30,000 inhabitants. All regressions use pooled OLS estimation method. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The break in the fiscal outcomes at the cutoff can be unquestionably attributed to the role of the 
electoral systems only if no other policy shifts occur at the threshold of 20,000 inhabitants. This is 
a cause of concern forasmuch as many other regulatory changes for the Polish municipalities are 
implemented as a function of the population size. Crucially, as it was already mentioned, at the 
threshold of 20,000 inhabitants one more important change occurs beyond the local electoral 
rules. At this cutoff, the council size increases from 15 to 21 members. Two responses to this 
potential problem are offered. First, with respect to one dependent variable (i.e. composition of 
the public expenditure) there is no theoretical argument that council size might affect it. Second, 
in the robustness check section (section 2.7) some further tests are performed to exclude the 
possibility that an increase in the council size confounds the results. 
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2.6. Estimation results 
 
The main empirical part of this chapter starts with some graphical evidence for the discontinuity 
in fiscal policy outcomes at the 20,000 cutoff. The plots in figure 2.3 show the means of the 
outcome variables using different bin sizes75 (250 and 500 inhabitants) for the municipalities 
whose distance from the cutoff is no more than 10,000 inhabitants. The plots superimpose the fit 
of a polynomial function (degree-1, degree-2 and degree-3 polynomials) allowing for the 
discontinuity at the cutoff and different slopes of polynomials on both sides of the cutoff. The 
visual evidence presented in figure 2.3 suggests that the change in the electoral rule induces a shift 
in fiscal outcomes. In panel A of figure 2.3, one can observe that there is a raise in broad 
expenditure per capita at the cutoff. That means that in municipalities with proportional 
representation broad expenditure per head of population is higher than in the municipalities with 
majoritarian representation. In panel B of the same figure, it is noticeable that the change of the 
electoral rule at the cutoff induces a drop in narrow expenditure per capita. Thus, narrow 
expenditure (local road infrastructure expenditure) is lower in the municipalities with proportional 
representation than in the municipalities with majoritarian electoral system. Lastly, in panel C of 
figure 2.3, one should be able to identify a jump in VFI at the 20,000 cutoff. The meaning of the 
jump is that VFI is much more pronounced in the municipalities with proportional electoral 
system than in the municipalities with the majoritarian representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
75
  Bins are intervals for which averages of certain variables are calculated. The bin size of 500 inhabitants 
means that, for instance, average VFI is calculated for the intervals (19,500;20,000>, (19,000;19,500>, 
(18,500;19,000> and so on. 
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Figure 2.3. The effect of the proportional electoral system on underlying fiscal policy 
outcomes 
Panel A. The effect of the proportional electoral system on broad expenditure per capita 
 
Bin = 500 
 
Bin = 250 
Panel B. The effect of the proportional electoral system on narrow expenditure per capita 
 
Bin = 500 
 
Bin = 250 
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Panel C. The effect of the proportional electoral system on vertical fiscal imbalance 
 
Bin = 500 
 
Bin = 250 
Note: Each dot represents the sample average of the dependent variables in a given bin. The bin width is 250 or 500. 
The black line represents degree-1 polynomial function (linear); the red curve stands for degree-2 polynomial 
function; and the blue curve represents degree-3 polynomial function. Bandwidth of 10,000-30,000. 
A further step encounters a more formal estimation of the effect of the electoral rules. Table 2.3, 
2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate the RD estimates of the effect of change in electoral rules on the fiscal 
policy outcomes (i.e. broad expenditure, narrow expenditure and VFI, respectively) at the 
threshold of 20,000. The reported coefficients can be interpreted as the average treatment effect 
(ATE) of the proportional system (see section 1.4). Standard errors reported in the tables are 
clustered at the municipality level and are robust to unknown heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation.76 Columns 1-3 of table 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 report the results for degree-1, degree-2 
and, lastly, degree-3 polynomials for the bandwidth 10,000-30,000 inhabitants. Columns 4-6 
present the polynomials of the same degrees, however, for a narrower bandwidth of 15,000-
25,000 inhabitants.  
Table 2.3 presents the average treatment effects of proportional system on broad public 
expenditure (i.e. expenditure on social policy and education). Coefficients have the expected 
signs. By browsing through the coefficients, one can infer that the proportional electoral system 
                                                    
76
  Whereas heteroscedasticity refers to the situation where the errors do not have the same variance, 
autocorrelation means that errors are correlated with one another (Kennedy, 2008, p. 41). Without 
correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, one risks that hypothesis testing cannot be trusted 
(Kennedy, 2008, p. 113). A standard remedy to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation is to 
apply the so-called “robust” or “clustered” standard errors (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 293). 
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leads to an increase in broad expenditure by as much as 128 PLN (the Polish złoty) per capita as 
compared to the majoritarian system. This value represents approximately 8% of the average 
broad spending per capita. Besides two specifications (columns 2 and 4), the reported coefficients 
are statistically significant at the conventional level of at least 10%. 
Table 2.3. The effect of proportional electoral system (ATE) on broad public expenditure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Degree-1 Degree-2 Degree-3 Degree-1 Degree-2 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Broad pc Broad pc Broad pc Broad pc Broad pc 
       
Proportional (D) 46.96480* 31.19937 116.23208** 57.81313 122.75911** 128.38588* 
 (28.04417) (45.62426) (54.21652) (38.39814) (55.54442) (72.64050) 
Constant 1,384.23067*** 1,353.14131*** 1,334.28974*** 1,366.84356*** 1,334.71190*** 1,345.69896*** 
 (16.97836) (24.53307) (27.71837) (21.66119) (29.15277) (35.60759) 
       
Observations 2,718 2,718 2,718 1,099 1,099 1,099 
R-squared 0.01845 0.02100 0.02378 0.01125 0.01585 0.01653 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in columns 1 and 4, of degree-2 in columns 2 and 5, and 
of degree-3 in columns 3 and 6 (corresponding parameters are not reported). Columns 1-3 employ the bandwidth of 
10,000-30,000 inhabitants and columns 4-6 the bandwidth of 15,000-25,000 inhabitants. All regressions use pooled 
OLS estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
The average treatment effects of proportional system on narrow public expenditure (i.e. 
expenditure on local road infrastructure) are presented in table 2.4. They have the expected sign 
and could be interpreted as follows. A switch from majoritarian to proportional electoral regime 
leads to a decrease in narrow public expenditure by as much as 51 PLN per capita. This amount 
represents approx. 30% of the average road spending per capita. However, the coefficients in table 
4 are statistically significant at the 10% level only in three specifications (columns 2, 3 and 4). In 
remaining specification coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Table 2.4. The effect of proportional electoral system (ATE) on narrow public expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Degree-1 Degree-2 Degree-3 Degree-1 Degree-2 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Narrow pc Narrow pc Narrow pc Narrow pc Narrow pc Narrow pc 
       
Proportional (D) -21.00277 -34.43684* -48.53179* -33.25191* -45.73298 -50.89698 
 (13.00827) (20.31532) (28.09908) (18.17035) (30.25158) (44.53767) 
Constant 175.72189*** 183.46789*** 193.10284*** 187.46206*** 187.65249*** 202.25420*** 
 (8.61212) (13.84874) (18.82161) (13.20147) (20.44311) (28.52230) 
       
Observations 7,263 7,263 7,263 2,964 2,964 2,964 
R-squared 0.00106 0.00129 0.00151 0.00259 0.00314 0.00401 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in columns 1 and 4, of degree-2 in columns 2 and 5, and 
of degree-3 in columns 3 and 6 (parameters are not reported). Columns 1-3 employ the bandwidth of 10,000-30,000 
inhabitants and columns 4-6 the bandwidth of 15,000-25,000 inhabitants. All regressions use pooled OLS estimation 
method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Lastly, table 2.5 reports average treatment effects of proportional regime on VFI. Coefficients 
suggest that change from a majoritarian to a proportional system leads to an increase in VFI by as 
much as 10 percentage points. That means that the share of local expenditure covered by the 
central (intergovernmental) transfers and borrowings of municipalities is noticeably larger in 
proportional systems than in majoritarian systems. Besides one estimate, all remaining reported 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level. 
Table 2.5. The effect of proportional electoral system (ATE) on vertical fiscal imbalance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Degree-1 Degree-2 Degree-3 Degree-1 Degree-2 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Fiscal  
imbalance 
Fiscal  
imbalance 
Fiscal  
imbalance 
Fiscal  
imbalance 
Fiscal  
imbalance 
Fiscal  
imbalance 
       
Proportional (D) 0.04657*** 0.06250*** 0.07846*** 0.05004*** 0.10132*** 0.07696** 
 (0.01292) (0.01880) (0.02461) (0.01782) (0.02636) (0.03394) 
Constant 0.49263*** 0.48560*** 0.47147*** 0.48957*** 0.46183*** 0.48134*** 
 (0.00853) (0.01361) (0.01911) (0.01306) (0.02087) (0.02803) 
       
Observations 7,298 7,298 7,298 2,977 2,977 2,977 
R-squared 0.09826 0.09865 0.09914 0.01944 0.02573 0.02717 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in columns 1 and 4, of degree-2 in columns 2 and 5, and 
of degree-3 in columns 3 and 6 (corresponding parameters are not reported). Columns 1-3 employ the bandwidth of 
10,000-30,000 inhabitants and columns 4-6 the bandwidth of 15,000-25,000 inhabitants. All regressions use pooled 
OLS estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
2.7. Robustness checks 
 
In the current section, numerous robustness checks are performed. Firstly, to exclude the 
possibility that the estimates presented in section 2.6 are driven by the change in the council size 
instead of the change in the electoral systems, RD analysis is performed at the population cutoffs 
that determined council sizes in years 1990-2002. In that period, population size defined six 
different council sizes from 12 to 32 representatives. The analysis is run for three thresholds 
which determined the council sizes similar to the current council sizes, i.e. 15 and 21 
representatives.  
In table 2.6, columns 1-2 provide estimates of degree-3 polynomial functions at the cutoff of 
4,000 inhabitants in 1998-2002. In that period, the 4,000 threshold was crucial as it was 
delineating the council size of 16 representatives (below that threshold) and 20 representatives 
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(above that threshold). Columns 3-4 reports RD estimates of the degree-3 polynomials at the 
cutoff of 7,000 in the timespan 1998-2002. Until 2002, in the municipalities of up to 7,000 
inhabitants the council was composed of 20 representatives; above this threshold 24 
representatives were elected. Lastly, columns 5-6 contain the RD coefficients for degree-3 
polynomials at the 10,000 threshold in the same period of 1998-2002. Below this threshold there 
were 24 representatives in the council; and above it 26 representatives. The dataset available at the 
Central Statistics Office’s website does not contain consistent information on the local social 
policy and education expenditure in years 1998-2002. Thus the estimations are run only for 
narrow public expenditure per capita and VFI for which data are available. As seen in table 2.6, 
the changes in the council size have no impact on the dependent variables of interest. The 
estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero. This result can be used as an 
argument substantiating the ATE of the proportional system at the cutoff point. An initial concern 
was that a council size could bias the underlying ATE. It is convincingly shown, however, that 
similar council sizes at different population thresholds did not affect the dependent variables of 
interest (VFI and narrow public expenditure per capita) in the years 1998-2002. 
Table 2.6. Robustness check: effect of council size at the thresholds of 4,000, 7,000 and 
10,000 inhabitants in 1998-2002 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3   
VARIABLES Fiscal imb Narrow pc Fiscal imb Narrow pc Fiscal imb Narrow pc   
         
Fake treatment 0.00229 -26.07500 0.01250 15.39596 -0.01193 1.81793   
 (0.01934) (18.80048) (0.01392) (14.81786) (0.02984) (17.17908)   
Constant 0.69398*** 84.52559*** 0.66576*** 57.09875*** 0.63748*** 60.09755***   
 (0.01597) (17.77772) (0.01044) (7.08388) (0.01916) (10.28849)   
         
Observations 5,753 2,280 5,461 1,338 2,994 734   
R-squared 0.01824 0.00265 0.00907 0.01281 0.02918 0.00867   
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 in all columns (corresponding parameters are not 
reported). Columns 1-2 exploit the cutoff of 4,000 inhabitants and the bandwidth of 0-7,000 inhabitants. Columns 3-4 
employ the cutoff of 7,000 inhabitants and the bandwidth of 4,000-10,000 inhabitants. Lastly, columns 5-6 employ 
the cutoff of 10,000 inhabitants and the bandwidth of 7-13,000 inhabitants. All regressions use pooled OLS 
estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
The second robustness check concerns the functional form of the econometric model. In table 2.7 
the results are reported for models which exclude a possibility of different slopes of the 
polynomial functions on both sides of the cutoff. Baseline regressions assume various slopes of 
polynomials at both sides of the cutoff. The results remain undisputed, i.e. coefficients of degree-3 
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polynomial functions for two different bandwidths are statistically significant at least at the 10% 
level and preserve the expected signs. 
Table 2.7. Robustness check: the same slopes at both sides of the cutoff  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance 
       
Proportional (D) 55.86229* -125.20706*** 0.12150*** 62.26327* -29.27587* 0.04790*** 
 (31.84909) (15.12765) (0.01305) (36.33755) (16.03583) (0.01659) 
Constant 1,403.60825*** -251.96471*** 0.79293*** 1,221.39430*** -383.73194*** 0.90794*** 
 (70.71944) (37.16888) (0.02493) (120.89993) (67.15114) (0.03848) 
       
Observations 2,718 7,263 7,298 1,099 2,964 2,977 
R-squared 0.01835 0.09288 0.14851 0.01667 0.17986 0.12559 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 in all columns (corresponding parameters are not 
reported). All columns assume the same slopes of the function at both sides of the cutoff. Columns 1-3 employ the 
bandwidth of 10,000-30,000 inhabitants and columns 4-6 employ the bandwidth of 15,000-25,000 inhabitants. All 
regressions use pooled OLS estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
The third type of a robustness check applies different windows/bandwidths around the threshold 
of 20,000 inhabitants. Table 2.8 demonstrates the estimates for two different bandwidths. 
Columns 1-3 present estimates of degree-1 polynomials for the narrow bandwidth of 17,500-
22,500 inhabitants. In turn, columns 4-6 show estimates of degree-3 polynomials for the 
negatively skewed bandwidth of 15,000-45,000 inhabitants. The aim of this last bandwidth is to 
include more treated municipalities, i.e. those with a proportional system. As seen from the table, 
the results are still confirmed, i.e. besides one estimate for narrow expenditure (column 2), 
coefficients are statistically significant at least at 10% level.  
Table 2.8. Robustness check: different bandwidths applied 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Degree-1 Degree-1 Degree-1 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance 
       
Proportional (D) 140.20459*** 0.27196 0.06843*** 54.21913* -26.65683* 0.05735*** 
 (52.23191) (26.42464) (0.02314) (31.38231) (15.00494) (0.01469) 
Constant 1,076.10356*** -491.55930*** 0.94552*** 1,261.20293*** -552.79809*** 0.94518*** 
 (200.23683) (117.26484) (0.06010) (114.80497) (71.50157) (0.04398) 
       
Observations 499 1,334 1,346 1,566 4,237 4,251 
R-squared 0.03696 0.16066 0.13782 0.03386 0.17260 0.16757 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 (Columns 1-3) or degree-3 (Columns 4-5).  
Corresponding parameters are not reported. Columns 1-3 employ the narrow bandwidth of 17,500-22,500 inhabitants 
and columns 4-6 employ the bandwidth of 15,000-45,000 inhabitants. All regressions use pooled OLS estimation 
method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The fourth robustness check relies on showing the effects of local electoral rules at a fake cutoff. 
These are called placebo (falsification) experiments as no treatment should take place at the fake 
threshold. Four different placebo thresholds are selected. They are as follows: (1) 19,000 
inhabitants (threshold being sufficiently close to the investigated threshold); (2) 15,983 
inhabitants (the average of the population size); (3) 7,873 inhabitants (the median of the 
population size after considering a sub-sample below 20,000 inhabitants); and (4) 33,367 
inhabitants (median of the population size after considering a sub-sample above 20,000 
inhabitants)77. All estimations are performed for degree-3 polynomial function and are reported in 
table 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13, respectively. Besides one case, in all the remaining cases, the 
treatment effects are never significantly different from zero. This substantiates the empirical 
design and suggests that treatments are correctly identified. 
Table 2.9. Robustness check: placebo experiment at the threshold of 19,000 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance 
    
Proportional (D) 39.60004 -4.32351 -0.00855 
 (49.94220) (24.28498) (0.02414) 
Constant 1,359.03231*** 182.02344*** 0.49725*** 
 (33.36205) (17.23868) (0.01601) 
    
Observations 3,223 8,701 8,752 
R-squared 0.02643 0.00056 0.11391 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 in all columns (corresponding parameters are not 
reported). All columns employ the fake cutoff of 19,000 inhabitants and the bandwidth of 9,000-29,000 inhabitants. 
All regressions use pooled OLS estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
77
  The strategy of selecting fake threshold at average or median of sub-samples is suggested by, for instance, 
Imbens and Lemieux (2007). 
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Table 2.10. Robustness check: placebo experiment at the threshold of 15,983 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance 
    
Proportional (D) -33.92119 -21.59090 0.01480 
 (39.26876) (19.38878) (0.02009) 
Constant 1,451.50872*** 180.89136*** 0.54832*** 
 (26.42967) (13.12976) (0.01329) 
    
Observations 6,636 18,316 18,429 
R-squared 0.03227 0.00079 0.12460 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 in all columns (corresponding parameters are not 
reported). All columns employ the fake cutoff of 15,983 inhabitants and the bandwidth of 5,000-25,000 inhabitants. 
All regressions use pooled OLS estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 2.11. Robustness check: placebo experiment at the threshold of 7,873 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance 
    
Proportional (D) -9.13340 11.21368 -0.01888 
 (30.00604) (16.84875) (0.01493) 
Constant 1,514.83987*** 170.88474*** 0.67486*** 
 (22.52767) (15.02319) (0.01291) 
    
Observations 8,242 22,566 22,679 
R-squared 0.01164 0.00248 0.05031 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 in all columns (corresponding parameters are not 
reported). All columns employ the fake cutoff of 7,873 inhabitants and the bandwidth of 0-17,000 inhabitants. All 
regressions use pooled OLS estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 2.12. Robustness check: placebo experiment at the threshold of 33,367 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance 
    
Proportional (D) -1.69804 -67.89824* -0.01563 
 (67.12831) (36.03708) (0.02201) 
Constant 1,266.94432*** 233.82882*** 0.42739*** 
 (44.51576) (29.97493) (0.01706) 
    
Observations 1,566 4,237 4,251 
R-squared 0.03111 0.00571 0.09181 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 in all columns (corresponding parameters are not 
reported). All columns employ the fake cutoff of 33,367 inhabitants and the bandwidth of 15,000-45,000 inhabitants. 
All regressions use pooled OLS estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The last (fifth) robustness check augments baseline specifications with a number of additional 
covariates (control variables). Regressions are augmented by the following variables: 
unemployment rate, demographic burden, number of registered economic units per 1,000 
inhabitants. As discussed by Lee and Lemieux (2009), because of its local randomized 
experimental nature it is not necessary to include additional controls in a RD setting to obtain 
consistent estimates. However, doing so might reduce the sample variability and therefore 
increase the precision of an estimator. For VFI, the identification strategy is validated as 
coefficient in column 3 of table 2.14 remains statistically significant at the 5% level. Much less 
robust results are observed for broad and narrow public expenditure, casting one more time some 
doubts about causal relationship between the electoral rules and the composition of public 
spending.  
Table 2.13. Robustness check: augmenting baseline regressions by adding covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Degree-3 Degree-3 Degree-3 
VARIABLES Broad pc Narrow pc Fiscal imbalance 
    
Proportional (D) 39.27025 -0.86089 0.05133** 
 (53.34691) (19.21859) (0.02186) 
Constant 681.17712*** 119.09698** 0.12808*** 
 (125.04487) (46.81873) (0.03959) 
    
Observations 664 4,577 4,597 
R-squared 0.14604 0.18151 0.53817 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-3 in all columns (corresponding parameters are not 
reported). All columns employ the bandwidth of 10,000-30,000 inhabitants. All regressions use pooled OLS 
estimation method. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
2.8. Policy implications 
 
This chapter furthers our understanding on causal effects of electoral regimes on selected fiscal 
variables. First of all, it is demonstrated that the link between the electoral regimes and the 
composition of spending is weaker than it is argued in the existing literature. Most importantly 
however, in the intergovernmental context, it is shown that proportional electoral regime causes 
larger VFI. The effect is statistically significant and non-negligible from an economic point of 
view as the proportional regime causes an increase in VFI by approx. 10 percentage points. At a 
minimum, policy-makers should be aware of these effects since once in place the electoral 
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regimes might prove to be difficult to amend – especially if they are enshrined in the constitution 
– leading to persistent inefficiencies. For instance, large VFI results in a soft budget problem and 
poor fiscal performance of the whole general government. To be more specific, the general 
government fiscal balance is found to deteriorate by 1 percent of GDP for each 10 percentage 
point increase in VFI (Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013). 
Furthermore, as underscored by Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013), VFI will likely be at the center of 
the policy discussions concerning the prospect fiscal integration in the EU (so-called fiscal union 
project). If the project of fiscal union for the EU gets momentum and a fully-fledged fiscal union 
is created, it will necessitate major shifts in the vertical fiscal relations between “Brussels” and the 
EU member states. Particularly, transfers from the EU budget to individual countries may need to 
be increased to provide for a better insurance against idiosyncratic shocks or even redistribution of 
income with the aim of eliminating economic disparities between countries (Guiso et al., 2014a). 
This chapter gives a potential prediction that the member states with a proportional electoral 
system will tend to cover a larger portion of local spending through intergovernmental transfers 
leading to larger VFI, and, in consequence, to larger deficits in an expanded EU budget. Knowing 
that, “Brussels” might like to prevent this sort of cost externalization by the member states a 
priori by establishing rules-based and stringent system of intergovernmental transfers.  
 
2.9. Closing remarks for chapter 2 
 
The results presented in this chapter confirm, to some extent, the theoretical arguments found in 
the (constitutional) political economy literature. Although empirical investigation exists on the 
topic at hand, due to the lack of credible empirical designs, up-to-date hypotheses could be tested 
only in a suggestive manner. The lack of those credible designs is fully understandable as the 
assignment of electoral systems cannot be randomized across the jurisdictional units and quasi-
experimental designs are rarely available.  
This chapter used the unique empirical setting allowing for as-if random assignment and provided 
a causal inference of electoral systems on selected fiscal policy outcomes. It exploited the 
discontinuity in assignment of the electoral systems in Polish municipalities and, thus, applied the 
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RD analysis. The estimates demonstrate that the relationship between electoral system and 
spending composition is weak. There are no robust results suggesting that proportional systems 
lead to larger broad public expenditure (proxied by welfare and education expenditure) or lower 
narrow public expenditure (proxied by local road infrastructure expenditure) as compared to the 
majoritarian system. This therefore casts some doubts about a causal relationship between 
electoral rules and the composition of public spending found in the previous literature. More 
importantly, however, it is shown that a proportional system leads to a larger VFI than 
majoritarian representation. The average treatment effects of electoral rules on VFI are not only 
statistically significant but also non-negligible from the economic point of view and robust to 
numerous alternative specifications and falsification tests. Results on VFI are crucial as larger VFI 
influences negatively the budget balance of the general government leading in the long run to a 
higher public debt. The chapter also derives some tentative policy implications in the context of 
the EU. 
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Appendix 2.1. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Broad public expenditure per capita 12425 1548.027 332.2248 691.8394 16351.61 
Local road infrastructure expenditure per capita 29858 190.5043 250.0354 0 11936.33 
Vertical fiscal imbalance 37659 .6270113 .1671281 0 .9638877 
Population size 28096 15983.67 56806.41 1246 1598724 
Economic Units 29740 64.48846 30.22202 14.19044 438.7198 
Unemployment 24783 .1094301 .0514746 .009 .512 
Demographic burden 27260 .6177088 .088568 .362 1.213 
Total revenue 37659 3.60e+07 2.04e+08 1714053 1.19e+10 
Total expenditure 37659 3.73e+07 2.16e+08 1778986 1.26e+10 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.2. McCrary density test 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SHADOWS OF HISTORY FOR TODAY’S FISCAL OUTCOMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM POLISH MUNICIPALITIES78 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Does history matter? Do institutions, customs and norms have a persistent effect? Do institutions 
of former conquerors have any long-lasting effects on countries which regained their 
independence? Particularly in the context of Poland, historians tend to answer these questions 
affirmatively.  
The economic and political decline of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (hereinafter 
Poland) throughout the 18th century triggered partition of the country by three empires: Prussia 
(Germany since 1871), Russia and the Habsburg monarchy (Austria-Hungary, hereinafter 
Austria). In 1795 these three empires completed the third and last partition of the Polish state 
(Davies, 2001, p. 139). After the third partition, Poland and its institutional environment ceased to 
exist for 123 years – a period of roughly five generations. Conquerors’ institutions were 
subsequently transplanted, i.e. Prussian institutions in the North-West, Russian institutions in the 
East and Austrian institutions in the South-East (see figure 3.1). Poland lost its independence not 
only for a very long period of time but also at a very crucial moment. Europe in the 19th century 
experienced numerous events, which changed the face of the old continent. This was a time of 
                                                    
78
  This chapter was accepted to the 19th Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional 
Economics, which takes place at the Harvard University in Cambridge on June 18-20, 2015. I would like to 
thank Mateusz Trojanowski who coded the distances from the municipalities to the former partition 
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development of national identities, modern states and their institutions such as legal systems and 
constitutions (Davies, 2001). Moreover, the economic and social foundations were rapidly 
changed by the Industrial Revolution and the abolishment of serfdom (Markevich and 
Zhuravskaya, 2015).  
Figure 3.1. The borders between Prussian, Russian and Austrian empires established after 
Vienna Congress in 1815 
 
Source: bezgranica.pl (accessed on December 27, 2014). 
Historians agree that empires varied significantly in terms of their policies toward Polish 
territories (Davies, 2001). For more than a century, Poles living in different regions were therefore 
exposed to significantly different institutions, customs and norms. As a result, the Polish 
population – particularly those located close to the newly established empires’ borders – could be 
considered as being subject to a large-scale “institutional and cultural experiment”. Since the 
partition borders were rather an outcome of political bargaining and were irrelevant with respect 
to the geographical and economic conditions (see section 3.4 for details), the assignment of 
subjects in this partition experiment could be perceived as-if it was random. Given this empirical 
framework, the underlying question is whether the differences in institutional performance 
observed under empires can be transmitted through centuries and shape the fiscal outcomes in 
today’s Poland. In other words, it is to be verified whether past experience with different 
Prussia 
Russia 
Austria 
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institutions continues to influence fiscal outcomes contemporarily, that is, to produce a kind of 
path-dependency of fiscal outcomes.  
While the novelty of chapter 2 relies on the fact that it applies a causal framework to a relatively 
well established research question, the novelty of chapter 3 is twofold. First, similarly to chapter 2 
it applies a design-based framework which enables the inferring of a genuine causality. Second, it 
analyses how history and institutional path-dependence might matter for the fiscal outcomes. This 
channel of influence of fiscal outcomes is up to date entirely neglected in the literature. More 
precisely, this chapter is interested in revealing whether there are any differences in fiscal 
outcomes between the Polish municipalities which were ruled by different empires and therefore 
were exposed to different institutional environments. The attention is given to the institution of 
property tax as municipalities in Poland have a major autonomy in setting the rates of this tax 
subject to the ceiling imposed by the Ministry of Finance (see section 3.3 for details). Specifically, 
it is argued here that due to the differences in empires’ legacies, partitions are responsible for 
differing property tax rates (high in the Prussian part and low in the Russian part), and the 
resulting policy outcomes, such as fiscal autonomy and vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI). Similarly 
to chapter 2, the latter variable is measured as a share of spending covered by external resources 
such as subsidies and borrowings and it approximates the soft budget constraints of 
municipalities. As already mentioned in chapter 2, VFI is positively associated with the deficit of 
the general government. It is because local governments with a high VFI are likely to externalize 
the negative consequences of their fiscal policy to the central government. 
This chapter not only shows that the difference in property tax rates and resulting fiscal outcomes 
between municipalities – due to the partition of Poland – exists. It also presents the most probable 
transmission channels to explain those differences. Three transmission channels are discussed as 
possible explanations regarding why in the former Prussian municipalities the property tax rates 
should be higher and, consequently, VFI lower as compared to Russian and Austrian partition. 
First, the empires significantly differed with respect to the tax system imposed and the functioning 
of the cadaster, with Prussian tax administration and the cadaster being the most developed, 
particularly when property taxes are considered. Moreover, in the Prussian partition the property 
tax was local in nature and not imposed by the central government. It is different than in Austrian 
and Russian parts where property tax was a competence of the central tier of the government. 
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Both the effectiveness and the local character of the property tax could shape the favorable 
perception of citizens and, hence, their willingness to pay this tax, which persisted for decades.  
The second transmission channel relates to institutions and cultural traits influencing the general 
tax morale, such as for instance religiosity and social capital. Tax morale is relevant inasmuch as 
public authorities might be more willing to impose high tax burdens on individuals with high tax 
morale (Dorrenberg et al. 2014). Individuals with high tax morale face high costs of evading 
taxation, and therefore are less responsive to higher taxes. Given that particular institutions and 
norms (described in details in section 3.3) persisted over the period of a century, it is expected that 
the highest tax morale and, thus, the highest property taxes in the Prussian partition prevail.  
The third transmission channel is linked to infrastructural differences of land and building 
properties. These infrastructural differences due to variances in water, electricity and gas supply 
as well as sewerage might influence the value of the property (see section 3.3 for details). Given 
the infrastructural differences, public authorities might levy higher taxes on more valuable land 
and buildings, i.e. those with municipal service providers. Based on this argumentation, it is yet 
again expected that the highest property tax rates in the former Prussian partition prevail as, 
historically, this partition was the most fully developed in terms of utility supply. All channels and 
their interactions might have some merit in explaining the difference in the property tax rates and 
fiscal policy outcomes in Polish municipalities nowadays. Yet, as it is argued later in the chapter, 
the most robust seems to be the first channel.  
This chapter analyzes the difference in fiscal institutions and outcomes between Polish 
municipalities from the former Prussian, Russian and Austrian partitions. However, the greatest 
effects are presumably to be found at the Prussian-Russian border. At this border, the socio-
economic and institutional differences were the most encompassing. “Prussian Poland” was not 
only much more industrialized than “Russian Poland” but there were also large differences in the 
access to education, efficiency of the public administration (also in taxation and cadaster), 
religiosity, urbanization, centralization of power, agricultural reform and social capital. However, 
it should be acknowledged that the political and cultural freedom of Poles in Prussia was not as 
high as under Austrian ruling (see section 3.3). However, Prussian oppression was not as severe as 
Russian coercion, under which many freedom-seeking Poles lost their lives in Siberia. Even 
though special attention is given to the Prussia-Russia border, the results for the Austria-Russia 
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border are also reported and they serve as a robustness or placebo check79. At the Austria-Russia 
border, there should be no differences in property tax rates and other resulting fiscal variables or 
at least these differences should be much smaller than those observed at the Prussia-Russia 
border. Due to a limited number of observations, this chapter does not report the results for the 
Austria-Prussia border. This border was the shortest and the least stable (see figure 3.1). 
This chapter employs a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design, which allows testing for a 
break (jump) in the outcome variables exactly at the border between the former empires. RD 
design relies on the fact that the partition frontiers between empires were imposed exogenously 
(Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). The borders were the consequence of the political bargaining 
and were set – at least to some extent – arbitrarily (see section 3.4 for details). Importantly, the 
drawing of the border was neither pursued according to any geographical feature of the land, nor 
according to economic development at that time. An assumption of exogeneity of the border is 
crucial and it allows the inferring of causality. Under this assumption, any sharp break in the 
outcome variable at the partition border should be interpreted as a causal effect of the partitions. 
The RD offers a clean evaluation of the historical legacies, simply because estimates are not 
blurred by omitted variables or the self-selection problem (see section 1.4). Importantly, the 
partition borders established by the Vienna Congress in 181580 coincides neither with the borders 
of the previous Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, nor with the borders of the newly established 
Polish state in 1918 and then in 1945 (see map in appendix 3.1). This substantiates the result as 
the partition border is not confounded by any other frontier and can be uniquely subscribed to the 
effect of empires. To further strengthen the causal inference, the analysis is confined to the 
territories with relatively steady conditions on both sides of the Prussia-Russia and Austria-Russia 
borders before and after the partition. For instance, territories which experienced huge population 
shifts after the World War II, such as North part of Poland (namely Mazuren) and New Territories 
(Pommern) and Lower Silesia (Niederschlesien) are explicitly excluded from the analysis (see the 
map in appendix 3.1). 
                                                    
79
  Since historical narratives suggest that the differences on the Austria-Russia borders are less appealing, 
there should be no effect on the Austria-Russia border or those effects should be smaller.   
80
  Although the three empires annexed Poland already in 1795, the final frontiers among them were set only 
in 1815 (Davies, 2001, pp. 142-143). 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 concisely discusses the literature related to historical 
persistence. Section 3.3 provides a short description of the property tax regime in Poland as well 
as giving a brief historical overview of institutions in the former Prussian, Russian and Austrian 
empires and derives main hypotheses along with transmission channels. The data and the 
empirical method applied in the chapter – namely spatial RDD – are described in section 3.4. The 
baseline results on the effects of empires on property tax rates are subsequently demonstrated and 
discussed in section 3.5. Section 3.6 presents results on further fiscal outcomes, such as fiscal 
autonomy and VFI. Some tentative policy recommendations which stem from this chapter are 
discussed in section 3.7. Lastly, section 3.8 concludes. 
 
3.2. A concise literature review 
 
This chapter contributes to a recently growing body of empirical literature that points toward 
important long-term effects of historical events on currently observed economic outcomes (Nunn, 
2009). For instance, early studies such as La Porta et al. (1998), Acemoglu et al. (2001) as well as 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) examine the persistent impact of Europe’s colonization on the 
development of former colonies. More specifically, they look at the impact of colonial legacy on 
the local institutions that persisted after the colonized countries became independent. Dell (2010) 
provides an important contribution on the methodological ground. By utilizing a spatial RDD, she 
finds an adverse effect of forced mining labor in Peru and Bolivia in the period 1573-1812 on 
household consumption and the prevalence of stunted growth in children.  
Although historical determinants of institutions in the former European colonies received most of 
the attention, the persistence of empires’ legacies in Europe was also researched. For instance, 
Becker et al. (2014) argue that populations from territories previously occupied by the former 
Habsburg monarchy display on average higher trust in government institutions than territories 
which did not experience the Habsburg’s ruling. A great deal of empirical research uses the 
German context to study the long-term persistence of institutions and customs. For example, 
Voigtländer and Voth (2012) analyze the historical roots of anti-Semitism in interwar Germany. 
They show the persistence of interethnic hatred as medieval pogroms of Jews appeared to be a 
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good predictor of the Nazi party’s share of votes in 1928. Furthermore, Schumann (2014) shows 
the persistent difference in the size of the population between the German municipalities occupied 
by France and the US after the Second World War. Contrary to the US decision, France refused to 
admit German expellees who were forced to resettle after the new borders were set after the war. 
This setting allows for quasi-experiment at the former borders of occupational zones. 
Furthermore, Hornung (2014) finds substantial long-term effects of Huguenot settlement in the 
17th century on the productivity of textile factories in Germany in the 19th century. For the Italian 
context, Guiso et al. (2014b) constitutes an important input. They ascertain that today’s notable 
differences in civic capital between the North and South of Italy are the legacy of the medieval 
free city-state experience. 
The persistence of historical institutions in the Polish context has recently been studied by 
Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015). They provide evidence of some ideological and customary 
differences at the borders of the former empires. For instance, the authors demonstrate variations 
in the religious practices (attending mass) and beliefs in democratic institutions at the partition 
borders. They also find that empires have an effect on the political outcomes in modern Poland. 
Precisely, the number of votes for the post-communist party in the parliamentary election is 
systematically higher in the municipalities from the former Russian occupation. Despite common 
wisdom, Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya do not find, however, any differences in economic 
development between municipalities occupied by the three empires. Nonetheless the authors find 
some systematic differences in the density of the railway network between former Prussian and 
Russian occupation zones. The difference in ‘hard’ infrastructure seems to be persistent. Besides 
Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), the effects of empires in contemporary Poland are also studied 
by Wysokińska (2011). She documents a higher average generalized trust, voter turnouts and 
economic development on the Prussian side of the Prussia-Russia border in today’s Poland. 
Although this chapter employs methodological designs from Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), it 
differs significantly with respect to the phenomenon it tries to explain. This chapter is one of the 
first attempts to isolate history’s influence on the fiscal institutions and outcomes. Besides this 
contribution, the persistence of the tax morale in the UK has been studied very recently by Besley 
et al. (2015).   
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3.3. Institutional background, historical framework and hypotheses 
 
As already mentioned in section 2.3, by international standards, Polish municipalities enjoy high 
or moderately high fiscal autonomy. On the expenditure side, they are responsible, among other 
aspects, for a provision of important public goods and services, such as primary education, health 
care, police services and local public infrastructure and transportation. On the revenue side, Polish 
municipalities are eligible to shares of personal and corporate incomes taxes levied on their 
territories. However, municipalities are also allowed to set rates of selected types of taxes, of 
which property tax is the most important. Property tax income constitutes approximately 10% of 
all municipal revenue in Poland – the largest share of all taxes imposed by the municipalities and 
similar to the revenue from personal income tax, for which municipalities are eligible.81  
Considering property tax, municipalities are free to set the tax rates on land and building 
properties up to the ceiling established by the Ministry of Finance, which amends the rates on a 
yearly basis.82 Rate ceilings on buildings are higher, however, than rate ceilings on land, giving 
more leeway to the municipalities to levy building taxes. There are two main categories of 
taxpayers of property tax: individuals and companies. As of 2013, the maximum rates on 
individuals are 0.73 PLN per square meter for residential building and 0.45 PLN per square meter 
of land. Companies, on the other hand, are charged with a maximum of 22.82 PLN per square 
meter of building space and 0.88 PLN per square meter of land.83 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, an overarching question posed by this chapter is 
whether the empires’ legacy can explain the differences in rates of property taxes levied 
contemporaneously by the municipalities in Poland. Based on historical narratives, three 
transmission channels are described that can potentially explain path-dependence between 
empires’ legacy and current fiscal outcomes.  
                                                    
81
  Own calculations based on the data from the Moja Polis (http://www.mojapolis.pl/, accessed on February 
25, 2015). 
82
  Article 5 § 1 of the Act on Local Taxes and Fees 1991.  
83
  The maximum taxes rates for 2013 were set by the Statement of the Minister of Finance dated 02.08.2012 
r. on the upper limits of rates of local taxes and fees in 2013. 
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First, it is argued that Poles in different empires had diverse reference points regarding the 
property tax institution, which shaped their perception and preferences regarding these taxes 
(Kahneman, 1992).84 Perception and preferences with reference to property taxes could, in turn, 
persist over time through the intergenerational transmission of perception and preferences. Yet, 
what are the causes of differing perceptions and preferences for property taxes?  
Before the partition of Poland, the property tax was known under the name ‘chimney’ tax 
(podymne) and it was imposed centrally on dwellings possessing a chimney (Owsiak, 2000). 
Chimney tax was abolished and replaced by the various institutional arrangements of the 
conquerors after the partitioning of Poland. The most modern property tax system was established 
in “Prussian Poland”, where this tax together with the income tax generated the largest share of 
government income. In other parts, i.e. Russian and Austrian partitions, the indirect taxes 
prevailed, particularly those concerning consumption, such as excise (Jaśkiewiczowa and 
Jaśkiewicz, 1969, p. 81). In Prussian partition, the property tax system was also more formalized 
and had a more local character as compared to the property tax regimes in the Russian and 
Austrian parts. The local character of the Prussian system relied on the fact that property taxes 
were set and levied by the local governments and the income from these taxes constituted local 
income (Rembikowska, 2009, p. 31; Stankiewicz, 2013, pp. 199-200; Tarnowska, 2013). 
Formalization of the property tax in Prussia stemmed from the fact that tax rates were set based on 
the cadastre (both land and building cadastre85) (Mika, 2010). A cadastre contains a detailed 
description (measures and maps) of all lands and capital inventory which is located on the land, 
and hence contains the information on the estimated value of the property, which serves as a basis 
to set the property tax. Cadastre facilitated acquisition of the land and buildings as property rights 
were clearly defined, increasing the legal certainty of the transactions (Centralne Stowarzyszenie 
Państwowych Inżynierów Mierniczych we Lwowie, 1933). Cadastre also facilitated the 
procurement of credits and loans as cadastre eased the estimation of the value of the property 
which could be used as collateral. In contrast to the Prussian partition, in Austria and in Russia, 
                                                    
84
  Alternatively, one could employ the ‘imprinting’ concept to explain persistence of certain characteristics 
(see for instance Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). 
85
  Historically, a rationale for the establishment of cadastre was to properly define the borders/limitations of 
the property rights. For instance, in the ancient Rome, only this property was respected in a legal sense 
which was measured. 
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property taxes were set centrally and, particularly in Russia86, they were not based on the cadastre 
(in Austria only the land cadastre was established, not the building cadastre) (Centralne 
Stowarzyszenie Państwowych Inżynierów Mierniczych we Lwowie, 1933; Mika, 2010). 
Based on this discussion, it is hypothesized that today’s property tax rates are higher in the 
municipalities from the former “Prussian Poland” than in municipalities with a Russian and 
Austrian legacy. Different property tax regimes imposed by empires87 served as reference points 
shaping people’s perception and preferences for property taxes (Kahneman, 1992), which were 
transmitted vertically from generation to generation. In municipalities with a Prussian legacy, 
taxpayers should persistently have a more positive perception of property taxes than in the 
Russian and Austrian parts. It is because the Prussian property tax system had a more local 
character, i.e. tax revenue was spent locally and was not just a contribution to the general (central) 
tax fund (taxpayers could internalize the benefit of this tax). In addition, the Prussian property tax 
system was based on the cadastre which enhanced legal certainty over the property as property 
rights were well defined, protected and more easily transferable. In Prussia, paying property taxes 
was therefore associated with more protection over the property. This more positive perception of 
property tax in Prussia should further be reflected in the willingness to pay higher taxes on 
properties.  
While the first argument refers to institutional differences in property taxation among empires, the 
second argument relates to other institutional and cultural traits – beyond the tax system itself – 
that can influence the general tax morale. Certain individual features tend to be associated with 
higher tax morale. Recent literature on tax morale investigates the determinants of people’s 
willingness to pay taxes.88 Among others, it is claimed that income, religiosity, education, 
generalized trust (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Torgler, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007), the 
                                                    
86
  Moreover, in Prussia the property tax on buildings was introduced already in 1861 – much earlier than in 
Russian part of Poland, where the property tax on building was introduced at the outset of the 20th century. 
87
  Although after regaining independence in 1918, much effort was put to unify the property tax system in 
Poland, a great deal of institutional differences persisted until the mid-1940 (Stankiewicz, 2013, p . 197). 
After 1918, some legal harmonization was achieved only with respect to the property tax regime in the 
former Austrian and Russian partitions, while the Prussian system remained quite distinct until after the 
World War II. The unification of the property tax system was accomplished by the socialist regime, which 
introduced in 1951 standardized and centrally set property tax rates across the country both for land and 
buildings. The current property tax system was established after restoring democracy in 1991. 
88
  It is not an abstract idea not to comply with property taxes. First, registration of the buildings might be 
delayed. Second, declaration of the property surface or the way surface is used might be misspecified.  
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efficiency of public administration (Frey, 1997; Barone and Mocetti, 2011) are positively 
associated with tax morale. According to Doerrenberg et al. (2014), there are three main reasons 
why higher tax morale might be associated with higher tax rates. First, in order to minimize tax 
evasion public officials tend to levy high rates on groups with less elastic responses to tax rates 
changes (high tax morale individuals) and lower rates on groups with elastic responses (low tax 
morale individuals). Second, politicians facing re-election might impose higher taxes on high tax 
morale groups since these groups oppose less high rates and, hence, it is less politically costly to 
charge them high rates. Third, imposing high rates on high tax morale groups is also cost-efficient 
since enforcement costs are lower in case of collecting taxes from groups with high tax morale. 
Those three arguments suggest that – from an economic and political point of view – it is 
beneficial to levy high tax rates on high tax morale groups of people. 
Based on the historical account of institutional and cultural differences between empires, one can 
hypothesize that in Prussian municipalities, individuals have higher tax morale as compared to 
municipalities with Russian and Austrian legacy in particular. The following differences could 
have implications for tax morale and, hence, for the level of property tax rates. 
Economic development and income: Both Russia and Austria were lagging behind Prussia in 
terms of industrializing their territories. Hence, the differences were visible in the scale and 
depth of industrialization. Those differences had an important effect on economic 
development at the Polish territory (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). Consequently, at the 
outset of World War I – after which Poland regained independence – the average income of 
Poles from the Prussian territory was 79% higher than of Poles from the Russian part and 
roughly twice as compared to Poles from the Austrian partition (Zdrada, 2005, p. 693; Wolf, 
2007).  
Education: The education systems also varied in the empires (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 
2015). In the ‘Russian Poland’ there was no mandatory secondary education and 
consequently at the beginning of the 20th century, on average, pupils spent only 3-4 years in 
schools. In the “Prussian Poland”, eight years of education were mandatory and strictly 
enforced. In Austria, school was proscribed for six years in rural regions and for seven years 
in urban areas. Consequently, illiteracy differed considerably across partitions. The illiteracy 
rates amounted to 65% in the Russian partition, 56% in the Austrian part and only 0.6% in 
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the Prussian partition (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Gawryczewski, 2005, p. 319). The 
Prussian education system was superior not only vis-à-vis the Russian and Austrian systems 
but was also path-breaking for the Western world at that time. In Prussia, there was one 
teacher for every six pupils. In France this ratio was 1:9 and in Russia 1:66 (Wysokińska, 
2011).  
Public administration: In Prussia, Poles were subject to an administration (including 
judiciary) that was effective, candid, well-organized, predictable and based on neutral and 
impersonal procedures (Davies, 2001; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). A similar type of 
administration was present in the Austrian partition. Poles under Russian rule, on the other 
hand, were often exposed to inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy without rule-of-law 
procedures (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). In Russia, bureaucrats were characterized by 
a high degree of conformism and loyalty toward the Russian regime. The administration 
was strictly controlled by the State by means of police and army (Davies, 2001; 
Wysokińska, 2011).  
Social capital (trust) and religiosity: The Russian part was the most repressive to Poles 
among the three empires. The Polish land was never treated equally to other Russian 
territories. Rather colonial type of relationship prevailed, with Polish territory constituting a 
buffer between the West and the East (Davies, 2001). Polish territories were under the full 
control of the Russian Tsar, who launched policies aimed at complete integration without 
regard to Polish culture and customs (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). The Polish 
language was banned, teaching was entirely in Russian and the Catholic church was 
oppressed. Poles under the Russian administration had no opportunity to formalize their 
activities in associations and social networks. The main political and social activity was of a 
conspiratorial type, with underground political structures, organizations and press. 
‘Russification’ was fiercely opposed by Poles as the Russian regime was perceived as a 
backward and underdeveloped (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). Contrary, the influence of 
‘Germanization’ on Poles was more compound. Many Poles found themselves struggling. 
On the one hand, they wished to preserve their Polish identity and, on the other hand, they 
recognized the superiority and efficiency of the German political and economic institutions 
(Hryniewicz, 2003). Importantly, the Prussian constitution granted legal equality, individual 
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freedom of faith, education, association and press (Wysokińska, 2011). Therefore, Poles 
often successfully appealed on the decisions which violated their rights in independent 
Prussian courts. The possibility to fully participate in a social and economic life boosted 
economic and social self-organization of Poles and led to the creation of numerous formal 
and informal associations (Bielecka, 2006). It is of note also that Poles had some 
representation in the Prussian Landtag (parliament) (Slavenas, 1974). Therefore, at least 
formally they could demand more rights for the Polish population. The conditions of Poles 
deteriorated after the introduction of Kulturkampf in 1871 (Davies, 1991; Davies, 2001, p. 
150). For a short period of time, the Prussian occupation became culturally and politically 
somewhat more oppressive towards Poles. The Kulturkampf of 1871 introduced restrictions 
on the religious practices and state surveillance of the church internal affairs (Grosfeld and 
Zhuravskaya, 2015). In contrast to the Prussian and Russian parts, in Austria Poles were 
subject to the most liberal law. The Habsburgs in the Austrian part gave large governmental 
and cultural autonomy to their Polish territories (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). From 
this discussion it should be clear that social capital and religiosity of Poles in the previously 
Prussian and Austrian regions should be higher than in the Russian partition. The reason for 
this is that Poles from the Austrian and Prussian partitions received a wide range of rights of 
self-organization and formation of associations, which were banned in ‘Russian Poland’. 
Poles from Prussian and Austrian partitions also experienced personal freedom of religion. 
In ‘Russian Poland’ religious organizations (particularly the Catholic church) were 
annihilated.  
As mentioned earlier in this section, theory suggests that income, education, public administration 
effectiveness, religiosity and social capital positively associates with tax morale (for theoretical 
underpinnings see Frey and Torgler, 2007; Torgler, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). Given 
that described institutional and cultural differences among partitions persisted, it could be argued 
that tax morale is the highest in the Prussian partition, moderate in the Austrian partition and 
rather low in the Russian partition. Levying higher taxes from high tax morale individuals has 
both economic and political economy rationale. According to this rationale, higher taxes should 
be imposed on individuals that are less likely to evade taxes and less likely to politically punish 
parties by voting them out of office when taxes are increased. 
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The third hypothesis explaining differing property tax rates relates to the extent of utility supply at 
the properties from former Prussian, Russian and Austrian partitions. Since the drawing of the 
partition borders was not driven by any geographical or economic features (see section 3.4), 
initially there should have been no difference in utility supply at the borders. These differences 
could emerge afterwards, given particularly the fact that the 18th century was marked by the 
process of industrialization. The extent of utility supply is crucial because it could impact the 
value of property (more utility supply resulting in higher value) and legitimize higher taxes in 
case of higher value properties. In Prussia, the utility supply, such as water, gas, sewerage, was 
the most extensive, i.e. the share of population using these utilities was the largest (Jezierski and 
Leszczyńska, 2003, p. 164; Tarnowska, 2013). Prussia had the highest number of cities with 
access to sewerage. Gdansk (Prussian partition) was the first city with sewerage already 
established in 1869. In Warsaw, sewerage began being constructed in 1881. However, up to 1890 
only 4% of all housing had access to sewerage (Jezierski and Leszczyńska, 2003, p. 164). Since 
the mid-1850s gas supply to households also started to become wide-spread. In 1913, in the 
Prussian partition one gasworks was covering approx. 40 thousands inhabitants, in the Austrian 
partition 700 thousands inhabitants and in the Russian partition 1.7 million inhabitants (Jezierski 
and Leszczyńska, 2003, p. 164). Water supply was densest in the cities from the Austrian and 
Prussian partition, and the least dense in the Russian partition (Jezierski and Leszczyńska, 2003, 
p. 164). Additionally, the phone network differed greatly across partitions. In the Prussian 
partition 9.3 households per one thousand were equipped with a phone, in Russia 3.4 and in the 
Austrian partition 0.9 (Jezierski and Leszczyńska, 2003, p. 164). Given the differences in the 
utility supply at the end of a partition and given that these differences persisted, one should 
observe higher property taxes in the municipalities from the former Prussian partition (high utility 
supply) as compared to the municipalities from the Austrian partition (moderate utility supply) 
and the Russian partition (low utility supply). This is due to the fact that dense utility supply 
increases the value of the property and, therefore, the property tax rate. 
Summarizing the discussion in the current section, it is likely that municipalities with varied 
empires’ legacy set property tax rates differently. Overall, there are three arguments (hypotheses) 
put forward to explain the potential differences: (1) the differences in the institutional 
environment of property taxation between the empires which shaped perception and preferences 
for property taxes; (2) differences in the determinants of tax morale such as income, education, 
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effectiveness of administration, religiosity and social capital, and (3) differences in utility supply 
that influence the value of properties and, therefore, the property taxes. The basic assumption is 
that the differences between the partitions existed but also that they persisted for more than a 
century. It is expected that the municipalities with the Prussian legacy levy higher rates of 
property taxes as compared to the municipalities with the Russian partition. Given the institutional 
dissimilarities one could also presume that differences also exist between the Austrian and 
Russian municipalities. However, the differences, if any, should be much smaller than those 
between the Prussian and Russian partitions. 
It is further argued that once differences in property tax rates are found, this should have an 
impact on fiscal autonomy and VFI in the Polish municipalities. As such, higher property tax rates 
should influence positively municipalities’ own income, increasing fiscal autonomy and leading to 
lesser VFI. Smaller VFI means that a larger share of spending is covered from own revenue.  
 
3.4. Data and empirical identification 
 
The dataset constructed for the purpose of this chapter originates from different sources. Below, 
the detailed description of fiscal, economic and demographic variables follows, as well as 
geographical data. Since the unit of observation in this study is a municipality, all relevant data 
are collected for this tier of government. Summary statistics are demonstrated in appendix 3.2. 
Property tax rates: The main fiscal variables to be explained in this chapter are property tax rates. 
As explained in section 3.3, there are two main types of property taxes, i.e. on land and buildings. 
In the context of the Polish tax system, the latter are clearly defined on residential and business 
(commercial) buildings. The tax on land is levied on land used for business purposes and on land 
used for “other purposes”. The data on the property tax rates in 2013 are extracted from the 
municipal resolutions on tax rates, which are available through the Voivodeship Law Journal.89 
Other fiscal variables: Measures of the property tax income to total income, fiscal autonomy and 
VFI are extracted from the Moja Polis website, which relies on the data from the Ministry of 
                                                    
89
  The Voivodeship Law Journal can be accessed via http://www.dziennikiurzedowe.gov.pl/dzienniki-
wojewodztw.html (accessed on December 28, 2014). 
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Finance.90 The longest time series available for these indicators encompasses the years 2006-
2013. For each municipality the average value within this period is calculated.  
Economic development: Two measures of economic development of municipalities are offered. 
The first measure refers to the number of companies91 per 10,000 inhabitants. For each 
municipality the average values for the time period of 2006-2013 are calculated based on the 
Moja Polis dataset. The second variable to proxy economic development is luminosity in the 
municipalities. This variable is extracted from Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015). Luminosity is 
nowadays the most common proxy for economic development in case the measure of GDP per 
capita is not available or if there are doubts about the precision of GDP per capita estimates (Chen 
and Nordhaus, 2010). The level of economic activity can also be grasped by the unemployment 
rate. Since the unemployment rate measures economic activity and not economic development, 
this is only an alternative indicator.  
Education: Census data is used to gauge the education level of the municipal population. 
Specifically, the percentage of the population with at least secondary education in 2002 was 
extracted from the Bank of Regional Data (Central Statistical Office). Although a Census was also 
conducted in 2011, the municipal data on education attainment for municipalities are not 
available. 
Public administration: To approximate the efficiency of public administration, the results of the 
“Friendly municipality” survey conducted by an independent association are employed. Based on 
public records, administration is graded in four areas: (1) cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations, (2) outsourcing of tasks to non-governmental organizations, (3) consultation of the 
municipality’s policy and legal acts with local stakeholders and information availability, (4) 
municipal support of non-governmental organizations. The grades vary from 0 to 5. The results of 
the 2010 report on “Friendly municipality” are extracted from the Moja Polis dataset and are 
taken to proxy efficiency (friendliness) of the public administration at municipal level.  
                                                    
90
  Moja Polis is a watchdog monitoring the municipalities’ performance in different areas. 
91
  Companies are mainly corporations and individuals engaged in business activity. All economic entities 
need to be registered in the REGON system. The Moja Polis dataset relies exactly on official REGON data. 
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Social capital and religiosity: As a proxy of social capital, the number of foundations and 
associations per 1,000 inhabitants is used. This variable is extracted from the Moja Polis dataset. 
For each municipality the average for the period of 2006-2013 is calculated. Additionally, the 
level of social capital is captured by the voter turnout in the European accession referendum in 
2004. Religiosity is captured by the declared number of mass attendances per month collected 
through the ‘National Diagnose’ survey. 
Geographical data: Based on the map of partition borders prepared by the BezGranica project92, 
the shortest distance (straight line) from the central points of municipalities to the closest borders 
are readily calculated. The data on altitude and geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude) 
are extracted from http://www.bazamiejscowosci.pl/ (accessed on March 1, 2015) and 
http://www.wysokosc.mapa.info.pl/ (accessed on March 1, 2015), respectively. 
In order to identify the impact of the empires on property tax rates, spatial RD methodology is 
employed. The main logic behind the RD identification strategy is that in case of the absence of a 
causal influence of empires, the spatial pattern of outcomes should be smooth at the previous 
Prussia-Russia and Austria-Russia border (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). If the empires 
matter then a sharp discontinuity in the outcomes should be detected exactly at the previous 
partition borders. Consequently, one could consider all variables that display a significant jump at 
the borders as an outcome of the empires’ influence. Of course, the existence of a discontinuity 
must be supported by the historical narratives. 
An important assumption is that borders are not associated with any pre-existing discontinuous 
changes. This assumption is in essence untestable as historical data to support it are not available 
(Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). The historical narrative supports, however, the claim that the 
frontiers were set rather arbitrarily by the empires. As historical narratives reveal, there is no 
reason to believe that any social or economic outcomes at that time determined the delineation of 
the border. For instance, during the negotiation process none of the empires ever referred to 
economic development of a territory as an argument for partition (Lukowski, 1999). All empires 
wanted to receive as much of the former Polish land as possible, irrespective of the conditions on 
the ground. The process of establishing borders was political in nature with the bargaining 
                                                    
92
  The map of the partition borders is available at http://bezgranica.pl/mapy (accessed on December 15, 
2014). 
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position of Russia strengthened after the Napoleonic wars (Nicolson, 2000). There are further two 
anecdotal proofs of the arbitrariness of the partition border. First, in many cases the frontier 
divided the agrarian areas of landowners (Lukowski, 1999). Second, the historical region of 
Wielkopolska was separated and governed by two empires: Prussia and Russia (Wysokińska, 
2011). Therefore, empires did not respect previous administrative-historical borders within 
Poland. Moreover, with respect to geographical variables, Grosfeld and Zhuravkaya (2015) 
demonstrated that geographical indicators change smoothly at the empire borders, besides altitude 
at the Austria-Russia border. Therefore, in general there is no risk that due to some geographical 
characteristics (latitude, longitude, precipitation, temperature and large city dummy) some regions 
could be economically favored or disadvantaged. However, in order to make the estimates more 
precise and controlled for sporadic discontinuous changes in geographical parameters, variables 
such as altitude, longitude, latitude, and large city dummy are used in the regression analysis. 
Similarly to Dell (2010) as well as Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), two main empirical models 
are applied, i.e. one-dimensional and two-dimensional spatial RD models. The one-dimensional 
model employs Euclidean distances93 to the empires’ frontier as the forcing variable. The cross-
sectional one-dimensional RD specification is as follows:  
 =  +  +  ! + " × ! + $% +     (1) 
where  stands for municipality,  is the outcome variable, such as property tax rate but also other 
variables such as VFI.  is a dummy informing that the municipality lies at the former 
Russian territory. ! captures (the shortest) Euclidean distance from each municipality to the 
partition frontier and allows controlling for a continuous relationship between distance and 
outcome variable . Interaction  × ! allows specifying different slopes of the 
regression functions at both sides of the partition border. Vector % contains baseline control 
variables such as altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy. Standard errors  are robust 
to unknown heteroscedasticity (see section 2.4). The most crucial is the estimation of  as it tells 
about the discontinuous jump in the outcome variable at the partition border. 
                                                    
93
  Euclidean distance refers to the length of a straight line between two points. In the context of this paper, the 
distance is measured from the central point of municipality to the closest point on the former border of 
empires. 
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The two-dimensional RD model allows flexible controlling for the geographical location instead 
of employing Euclidean distance to the frontier as a forcing variable (Dell, 2010; Grosfeld and 
Zhuravskaya, 2015). The model is of the following form: 
 =  +  + 
& , ' + $% +          (2) 
where 
& , ' is a third-order polynomial of geographic coordinates (latitude, longitude) such as 

& , ' = & + ' +& + ' +&' +&" + '" + &' +& '. The rest of the notation is as 
presented above. 
In order to estimate a discontinuity at the frontiers of empires, one also have to select the 
bandwidth (see section 2.4). Restraining the sample to only the municipalities that are located 
sufficiently close to the border allows linear functions to provide a good fit to the data. On the 
other hand, the samples should be relatively large to have enough statistical power to estimate the 
jump. Similarly to Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) – who study the effects of empires on 
political outcomes in the contemporary Poland – a bandwidth of 60 km from the partition frontier 
is chosen. 
 
3.5. Results: property tax rates 
 
The central question of this chapter is whether the differences in property tax rates in Polish 
municipalities are caused by the empires’ legacy. Existence of the discontinuous jump in tax rates 
at the Prussia-Russia or Austria-Russia borders would be a direct proof confirming this 
hypothesis. A standard procedure in RD is to start the investigation by visual inspection of the 
discontinuity at the threshold, here, at the border.  
Figure 3.2 and figure 3.3 for Prussia-Russia and Austria-Russia borders respectively allows for 
this graphical representation of discontinuity. The graphs present the average level of property tax 
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rates by a distance bin of 5- and 3-km94 on both sides of the border with superimposed polynomial 
functions of degree-1 (linear function), degree-2 (quadratic function) and degree-3.95  
As for the Prussia-Russia border (figure 3.2), it is evident that property tax rates on residential and 
business buildings as well as on land used for business purposes are higher in the former Prussian 
municipalities as compared to their Russian counterfactuals (see section 1.4. where a concept of 
counterfactuals is explained). The rates of these three types of property taxes discontinuously 
change at the former partition border between Prussia and Russia, which is not the case for the tax 
on a land that is used for “other purposes”. In the case of these three categories of taxes, for which 
a sharp jump is identified, municipalities have more leeway to act arbitrarily. The tax rates 
ceilings in their case are higher as compared to the tax rate imposed on land that is used for “other 
purposes”.96 Figure 3.2 also demonstrates that the relationship between the outcomes and the 
distance to the former empires’ border is relatively well approximated by the linear relationship 
within 60 km of the borders.  
Besides the tax levied on land that is used for “other purposes”, less clear-cut results are observed 
at the Austria-Russia border (figure 3.3). Although graphs with 5-km bins suggest that the 
municipalities from the former Russian partition levy higher tax rates than Austrian counterparts, 
the figures with 3-km bins are ambiguous. This calls for more formal investigation, which is done 
in the next step. Notice also that in the figures depicting the Austria-Russia border, linear function 
has a much worse fit as compared to the figures for the Prussia-Russia border. Using high level 
polynomials in RD is, however, sometimes discouraged (Gelman and Imbens, 2014). This further 
complicates deriving any conclusions for the Austria-Russia border.97 
 
                                                    
94
  Bins refer to intervals for which the average of selected variables is calculated. For instance, the bin size of 
5 km means that averages are calculated for the intervals (0; 5>, (5; 10>, (10; 15> and so on. 
95
  The application of polynomial functions in the context of RDD is discussed, for instance, by Imbens and 
Lemieux (2007) or Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
96
  Statement of the Minister of Finance dated 08.02.2012 r. on the upper limits of rates of local taxes and fees 
in 2013. 
97
  As argued by Gelman and Imbens (2014), high-degree polynomials are sensitive to the degree of the 
polynomial and there are no tools to choose the “optimal degree”. Likewise, high-degree polynomials offer 
poor inference, i.e. they result in too frequent detection of the jump. 
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Figure 3.2. Mean property tax rates by 5- and 3- km distance and parametric regression 
lines at the Prussia-Russia border 
Tax on residential buildings 
Panel A. Bin = 5 km 
 
Panel B. Bin = 3 km 
 
Tax on business buildings 
Panel C. Bin = 5 km 
 
Panel D. Bin = 3 km 
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Tax on land used for business purpose 
Panel E. Bin = 5 km 
 
Panel F. Bin = 3 km 
 
Tax on land used for “other purposes” 
Panel G. Bin = 5 km 
 
Panel H. Bin = 3 km 
 
Note: Each dot represents the sample average of the dependent variables in a given bin. The bin width is 5 km or 3 
km. The black line represents degree-1 polynomial function; the red curve stands for degree-2 polynomial function; 
and the blue curve represents degree-3 polynomial function. Bandwidth of 60 km. 
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Figure 3.3. Mean property tax rates by 5- and 3- km distance and parametric regression 
lines at the Austria-Russia border 
Tax on residential buildings 
Panel A. Bin = 5 km 
 
Panel B. Bin = 3 km 
 
Tax on business buildings 
Panel C. Bin = 5 km 
  
Panel D. Bin = 3 km 
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Tax on land used for business purpose 
Panel E. Bin = 5 km 
 
Panel F. Bin = 3 km 
 
Tax on land used for “other purposes” 
Panel G. Bin = 5 km 
 
Panel H. Bin = 3 km 
 
Note: Each dot represents the sample average of the dependent variables in a given bin. The bin width is 5 km or 3 
km. The black line represents degree-1 polynomial function; the red curve stands for degree-2 polynomial function; 
and the blue curve represents degree-3 polynomial function. Bandwidth of 60 km. 
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A more formal investigation is presented in table 3.1 and table 3.2, which report the estimates of 
the discontinuous jump in property tax rates at the Prussia-Russia and Austria-Russia border, 
respectively. In both tables, panel A demonstrates estimates for the tax rates on residential 
buildings, panel B on business (commercial) buildings, panel C on land used for a business 
purpose and panel D on land used for “other purposes”. Columns 1 and 2 display results for one-
dimensional RD (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015) and columns 3 and 4 two-dimensional RD 
(Dell, 2010; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional 
covariates, whereas columns 2 and 4 contain baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and 
large city dummy). 
The results in table 3.1 confirm the graphical illustration from figure 3.2. Namely, at the Prussia-
Russia border, Russian legacy leads to lower rates in case of tax levied on residential and business 
buildings as well as on land used for business purposes. With one exception (column 2 in panel 
C), all estimates are significant at the 1% level. The average treatment effect of Russian partition 
on tax rates levied on residential buildings ranges between 0.09 and 0.11 PLN, which accounts for 
17-20% of the average tax rate for this tax. The rates of tax imposed on business (commercial) 
buildings are lower on average by 1.22-1.48 PLN on the Russian side, which is roughly 6-8% of 
the average rate for this tax. The average treatment effect for tax levied on land used for business 
purposes varies from 0.03 to 0.04, which is approx. 4-5% of this tax average. Therefore, the 
estimates are not only highly statistically significant but also meaningful from an economic point 
of view. The tax rate levied on land used for “other purposes” does not change discontinuously at 
the Prussia-Russia border, although the sign of estimates is always negative and significant in one 
case (column 1 in panel D).  
Regression analysis in table 3.2 also confirms a lack of discontinuity at the Austria-Russia border 
for a tax levied on residential and business (commercial) buildings as well as on business land. 
Statistically significant is, however, the average treatment effect for the tax imposed on land used 
for “other purposes”. Russian partition affects this tax rate positively by 0.05-0.06 PLN, which is 
16-20% of the average rate of this tax. This tax has, however, the lowest ceiling set by the 
Ministry of Finance of only 0.45 PLN, and therefore gives the least space for discretion. 
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Table 3.1. The effect of partitions on property tax rates at the Prussia-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Residential  
buildings 
Residential  
buildings 
Residential  
buildings 
Residential  
buildings 
     
Russia -0.10548*** -0.09586*** -0.11119*** -0.11426*** 
 (0.01977) (0.01842) (0.01825) (0.01841) 
Constant 0.62798*** 0.97556* -1,361.01670 340.58662 
 (0.01043) (0.52541) (989.10480) (464.54847) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.17405 0.25024 0.26086 0.25965 
 
PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Business 
buildings 
Business 
buildings 
Business 
buildings 
Business 
buildings 
     
Russia -1.47862*** -1.26063*** -1.26872*** -1.22423*** 
 (0.37839) (0.34777) (0.33108) (0.31614) 
Constant 19.65163*** 39.22353*** 29,087.10534 18,391.00933** 
 (0.29480) (10.74162) (19,462.02816) (9,348.53863) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.07972 0.18180 0.18181 0.21523 
 
PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Business  
land 
Business  
land 
Business  
land 
Business  
land 
     
Russia -0.03646*** -0.03084** -0.03563*** -0.03715*** 
 (0.01358) (0.01291) (0.01205) (0.01172) 
Constant 0.77061*** 1.92253*** 761.62819 45.03081 
 (0.00951) (0.38172) (742.02907) (365.57352) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.05911 0.12557 0.14705 0.16410 
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PANEL D 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Other purpose  
land 
Other purpose  
land 
Other purpose  
land 
Other purpose  
land 
     
Russia -0.03138** -0.02263 -0.01632 -0.01169 
 (0.01564) (0.01448) (0.01315) (0.01287) 
Constant 0.26089*** 0.88833** 1,079.39919 556.98763 
 (0.01191) (0.44302) (725.37996) (371.13739) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.05683 0.15565 0.14805 0.18133 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contain baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.2. The effect of partitions on property tax rates at the Austria-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Residential  
buildings 
Residential  
buildings 
Residential  
buildings 
Residential  
buildings 
     
Russia 0.02715 0.01031 0.01754 0.01084 
 (0.02756) (0.02843) (0.02491) (0.02631) 
Constant 0.50134*** 3.89154 -269.17332 -954.89216 
 (0.01906) (2.46916) (554.11132) (1,158.30547) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.01170 0.05146 0.13908 0.14116 
 
PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Business 
buildings 
Business 
buildings 
Business 
buildings 
Business 
buildings 
     
Russia 0.90884 1.31650** 0.43907 0.85389 
 (0.55949) (0.59307) (0.48759) (0.52579) 
Constant 17.63802*** 86.51159* -29087.67621*** -44686.15959** 
 (0.42049) (50.55532) (10,846.67895) (20,606.54820) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.01008 0.07409 0.16467 0.18727 
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PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Business  
land 
Business  
land 
Business  
land 
Business  
land 
     
Russia 0.03022 0.04167** 0.02774 0.03429* 
 (0.01992) (0.02062) (0.01782) (0.01843) 
Constant 0.70364*** 4.91807*** -722.40033* -1,238.15263 
 (0.01562) (1.85490) (413.41059) (821.06482) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.00639 0.06005 0.10669 0.11438 
 
PANEL D 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax Property tax Property tax Property tax 
VARIABLES Other purpose  
land 
Other purpose  
land 
Other purpose  
land 
Other purpose  
land 
     
Russia 0.05307*** 0.04897*** 0.05763*** 0.05625*** 
 (0.01762) (0.01883) (0.01712) (0.01844) 
Constant 0.21556*** 2.25858 -885.03467** -1,929.02951** 
 (0.01100) (1.75870) (415.97843) (870.88617) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.04696 0.07153 0.11091 0.11827 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contains baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Recall that the historical narratives suggest three transmission channels explaining how the former 
empires could influence the rates of property tax in the modern Poland: (1) the differences in 
perception of property taxes, (2) the differences in institutional and cultural features influencing 
tax morale, and (3) the differences in the extent of utility supply. Due to the data limitation, it is 
possible to verify two out of three transmission channels, namely channel (2) and (3). In fact, the 
“tax morale” argument (due to religiosity, social capital, effectiveness of administration) and the 
“utility supply” argument do not seem to be relevant in explaining the difference in tax rates. It is 
because at the Austria-Russia border similar differences occur as at the Prussia-Russia border in 
terms of tax morale determinants and utility supply but the tax rates differ substantially only at the 
Prussia-Russia border (see appendix 3.3). Since the first transmission channel cannot be verified 
empirically – due to the data constraints – and two other transmission channels are empirically 
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refuted, it is argued here that the first transmission channel might be the most valid in explaining 
the differences in the property tax rates. Namely, the initial differences in property taxes and 
infrastructure that enable their levy, such as cadastre, could shape people’s perception regarding 
the property tax and their willingness to pay this tax, which was transmitted through generations. 
Importantly, the largest differences in this respect were observed at the Prussia-Russia border. It is 
of note that the institutional settings of property taxes were somewhat similar between the 
Austrian and Russian partitions, which would suggest lack of discontinuity in regression analysis. 
Overall, the empirical investigation pursued in this section confirms that at the Prussia-Russia 
border empires’ legacy seems to be crucial in explaining the differences in tax rates. The 
differences in property tax rates at Austria-Russia border are not conclusive, however.  
 
3.6. Results: other fiscal outcomes 
 
Higher property tax rates might have further budgetary implications. Three implications are 
discussed below. First, higher property tax rates might result in a larger share of income coming 
from property taxes. Second, higher property tax rates might lead to a larger share of own revenue 
in the total municipal revenue, causing greater fiscal autonomy of municipalities. This concept of 
fiscal autonomy is suggested by Stegarescu (2005) and OECD/Korea Institute of Public Finance 
(2013). Own revenues are primarily generated by taxes and levies imposed on local residents and 
businesses but they can also originate from the municipality’s investment and loans. The share of 
own revenue in the total municipal income indicates the municipality’s independence from central 
subsidies. Municipalities with higher shares of their own revenue have more fiscal autonomy as 
they can arbitrarily decide how this revenue is spent. Subsidies are usually associated with 
conditions which prevent discretionary decision-making (Heller and Farelnik, 2013).   
The third budget implication is as fallows. Higher property tax rates by increasing own revenue of 
municipalities might result in smaller VFI, i.e. the share of spending covered by subsidies and 
borrowings. As mentioned in section 2.2, it is widely recognized in the literature on fiscal 
federalism that a high reliance on intergovernmental transfers and borrowings “softens” the 
budget constraint of local governments, induces moral hazard on the side of local governments 
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and distorts their tax enforcement (Baretti et al., 2002). Municipalities endowed with high 
transfers from the federal level and borrowing typically do not have sufficient tax authority to 
cope with idiosyncratic economic shocks (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). Municipalities 
with high VFI may claim that they are not responsible for coping with the crisis and, thus, shift 
the burden to central level. Furthermore, the pressure from voters and creditors is likely to be 
directed at central level, providing no choice but to bail out the municipalities. Expecting this 
chain of actions, municipalities have an incentive to engage in riskier fiscal policies (moral 
hazard).  
The main differences in the property tax rates are observed at the Prussia-Russia border, hence, 
discontinuity in aforementioned fiscal variables is expected to occur at this border. The Austria-
Russia border serves as a counterfactual as differences in tax rates at this border are much less 
prominent. Therefore, the analysis here is as follows. First, it visually investigates whether the 
discontinuity in fiscal outcomes exists at the Prussia-Russia frontier. Second, it verifies whether 
fiscal outcomes change smoothly at the Austria-Russia border, i.e. the border at which fiscal 
variables should not be affected. 
Figure 3.4 portrays graphically the existence of discontinuous jumps in several fiscal variables at 
the Prussia-Russia border. The lack thereof at the Austria-Russia border is shown in figure 3.5. 
Crossing the former partition border between Prussia and Russia from West to East (figure 3.4) 
decreases property tax income as a share of the total income and, hence, decreases fiscal 
autonomy, and consequently, increases VFI. Figure 3.5 shows, on the other hand, smooth 
distribution of fiscal outcomes at the Austria-Russia border. Yet again the graphs suggest that the 
outcomes at the Prussia-Russia border are fairly well approximated by the linear relationship 
within 60 km to the borders. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean property tax rates by 3- km distance and parametric regression lines: 
Prussia-Russia border 
Panel A. Property tax income to total local income Panel B. Fiscal autonomy 
  
Panel. C. Vertical fiscal imbalance 
 
Note: Each dot represents the sample average of the dependent variables in a given bin. The bin width is 3 km. The 
black line represents degree-1 polynomial function; the red curve stands for degree-2 polynomial function; and the 
blue curve represents degree-3 polynomial function. Bandwidth of 60 km. 
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Figure 3.5. Mean property tax rates by 3- km distance and parametric regression lines: 
Austria-Russia border 
Panel A. Property tax income to total local income Panel B. Fiscal autonomy 
  
Panel. C. Vertical fiscal imbalance 
 
Note: Each dot represents the sample average of the dependent variables in a given bin. The bin width is 3 km. The 
black line represents degree-1 polynomial function; the red curve stands for degree-2 polynomial function; and the 
blue curve represents degree-3 polynomial function. Bandwidth of 60 km. 
 
The formal regression analysis is consistent with the graphical illustration of discontinuity at the 
Prussia-Russia border and lack thereof at the Austria-Russia border. In the municipalities with the 
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Russian legacy, a share of property tax income in the total income is smaller by 2-3 percentage 
points as compared to municipalities from the former Prussian occupation (table 3.3 panel A). A 
lower property tax income in the Russian municipalities contributes to a smaller fiscal autonomy 
in these municipalities as compared to the municipalities from the former Prussian empire. As 
reported in table 3.3 panel B, in the former Russian municipalities the fiscal autonomy – share of 
own revenue in the total revenue – is smaller by approx. 5 percentage points. Lastly, due to a 
smaller own revenue in “Russian Poland”, VFI is consequently larger there. Estimates reported in 
table 3.3 panel C suggest that in municipalities located in “Russian Poland” the share of spending 
covered by own revenue is lower by approx. 4-5 percentage points as compared to municipalities 
from “Prussian Poland”. 
 
Table 3.3. The effect of partitions on various fiscal variables at the Prussia-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax income  
as a share of total 
Property tax income  
as a share of total 
Property tax income  
as a share of total 
Property tax income  
as a share of total 
VARIABLES income income income income 
     
Russia -2.04906** -1.90882** -2.64351*** -2.34247*** 
 (0.92520) (0.89789) (0.83143) (0.84620) 
Constant 11.51083*** 91.86725*** 105378.80585** -44496.15840** 
 (0.64441) (24.36807) (40,789.64042) (21,159.30598) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.04251 0.08512 0.14524 0.13242 
 
PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fiscal  Fiscal  Fiscal  Fiscal  
VARIABLES autonomy autonomy autonomy autonomy 
     
Russia -5.62221** -4.44728** -5.50328*** -4.64197*** 
 (2.19989) (1.92405) (1.74979) (1.76809) 
Constant 39.06428*** 314.20242*** 270399.12841*** -1.13532e+05** 
 (1.68568) (55.06126) (82,686.58187) (45,533.25234) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.12120 0.29731 0.39212 0.38480 
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PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Vertical  Vertical  Vertical  Vertical  
VARIABLES fiscal imbalance fiscal imbalance fiscal imbalance fiscal imbalance 
     
Russia 5.14404** 3.98518** 5.43076*** 4.57742*** 
 (2.22416) (1.93303) (1.72923) (1.75296) 
Constant 64.88170*** -218.19090*** -2.87924e+05*** 98,514.75187** 
 (1.70892) (56.93351) (84,316.21204) (48,610.70702) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.11823 0.30284 0.40323 0.39554 
 
 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contains baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In contrast to the Prussia-Russia border, where discontinuous jumps in outcome variables are 
observed, the fiscal variables change smoothly at the Austria-Russia border (see table 3.4). As 
there are no large differences in the tax rates between Austrian and Russian partitions, the 
property tax income is fairly similar on both sides of the partition border. This further implies that 
fiscal autonomy and VFI are comparable close to the partition border. This result substantiates the 
outcomes for the Prussia-Russia border, where differences in property tax rates have further 
implications with respect to other fiscal variables such as fiscal autonomy and VFI. Crucially, the 
latter variable is positively associated with general government deficit and, ensuing public debt 
(see, for instance, section 2.8). 
Table 3.4. The effect of partitions on various fiscal variables at the Austria-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property tax income  
as a share of total 
Property tax income  
as a share of total 
Property tax income  
as a share of total 
Property tax income  
as a share of total 
VARIABLES income income income income 
     
Russia -0.43099 -0.29787 -1.85137** -1.37860 
 (1.00291) (1.03342) (0.79767) (0.90932) 
Constant 7.90739*** -60.68855 -41451.37267** -63559.57631 
 (0.62593) (82.59759) (19,886.19578) (44,551.40838) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.01216 0.11308 0.20924 0.21994 
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PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal 
VARIABLES autonomy autonomy autonomy autonomy 
     
Russia 0.18284 0.53790 -4.11360** -2.36152 
 (2.40519) (2.22787) (1.71723) (1.83317) 
Constant 30.10418*** -67.10910 -2.25443e+05*** -3.77607e+05*** 
 (1.65455) (177.94949) (41,440.63287) (87,183.51180) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.00791 0.21591 0.36265 0.38620 
 
PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Vertical  Vertical  Vertical  Vertical  
VARIABLES fiscal imbalance fiscal imbalance fiscal imbalance fiscal imbalance 
     
Russia 0.16945 -0.16182 4.23405** 2.50495 
 (2.40309) (2.25000) (1.73495) (1.84948) 
Constant 72.64790*** 134.56889 208363.59180*** 342108.71476*** 
 (1.66604) (176.08389) (40,868.03048) (87,973.08463) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.00782 0.21309 0.35840 0.38131 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contains baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
3.7. Policy implications 
 
The findings from this chapter may have significant policy implications. When thinking about 
transplanting a tax system – or for that purpose also other institutions – it is important to bear in 
mind that outcomes of transplanting might depend on the rules and norms that prevailed in the 
past. This conclusion was already raised by other authors (see, for instance, Berkowitz et al. 
(2003)). Against this backdrop, some preliminary conjecture might be derived for the EU 
institutions. There are many areas of law which the EU wants to harmonize across the member 
states. It seems likely, however, that the path-dependence might hinder harmonization in a sense 
that rules that prevailed before the harmonization might continue to influence outcomes. Impact of 
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old rules and historical developments on outcomes might be persistent and durable (Bruttel and 
Friehe, 2014).  
To some extent, the implementation of the European “Fiscal Compact” is driven by these path-
dependencies and imprints. A recently ratified European “Fiscal compact” (formally the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union98) obliges countries 
to, inter alia, legislate in their national fiscal frameworks (preferably at the constitutional level) 
structural budget rules and strict corrective mechanisms for non-compliance99. The 
implementation of the “Fiscal Compact” into national legal systems is not fully satisfactory 
however. For instance, Greece – once again – lags behind in the implementation of the “Fiscal 
Compact”, notoriously missing deadlines for enacting the rules (Burret and Schnellenbach, 2013). 
Thus, even in times of a huge economic uncertainty and looming bankruptcy, Greece is not able to 
be “tough on deficit”, proving that it is difficult to overcome the persistent culture of fiscal 
profligacy.  
 
3.8. Closing remarks for chapter 3 
 
Overall, this chapter contributes to the discussion on the path-dependence and historical 
persistence of institutions, perceptions and preferences. It is shown that empires’ legacy in today’s 
Poland can still be observed. The novelty of this chapter is that it demonstrates that history 
matters for fiscal outcomes, namely for the property tax rates imposed by the municipalities. The 
historical narrative suggests that Prussian partition had the most “effective” property tax system 
among the empires. Prussia was unique for its cadastre, which included the building coordinates, 
and served to set the tax according to the real value of the property. The cadastre therefore did not 
only ensure property rights, as lands and building properties were officially registered in the 
                                                    
98
  Almost all European Union signed the fiscal compact with notable exception of the Czech Republic and 
the United Kingdom, which abstained from signing it (Burret and Schnellenbach, 2013). For a legal 
perspective on the fiscal compact see Amtenbrink (2012). 
99
  Article 3 paragraph 1(a), 1(b) and 1(e) of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union 2012. It is worth noticing that the “Fiscal Compact” and common 
principles on national fiscal correction mechanism (COM(2012) 342) do not precisely indicate how the 
rules and corrective mechanisms should be designed but instead leaves the precise legal wording to the 
signatory countries (Burret and Schnellenbach, 2013). 
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repository, but also made the property tax fairer as the tax rate depended on the value of the 
property, which was extracted from the cadastre. Importantly, in the Prussian part of Poland the 
property tax was a competence of the lower tier of government and income levied through this tax 
was used for a local purpose. In the Austrian and, particularly, Russian partition cadastre was used 
to a lesser extent and property taxes were centrally imposed. All these institutional details may 
have served as reference points and shaped perception and preferences over the property tax 
differently in the three empires. Namely, they increased the willingness to pay property taxes to a 
greater extent in “Prussian Poland” than in the Austrian and Russian partitions. This willingness 
to pay higher property tax seemed to persist as in the former Prussian municipalities the rates of 
the most common property taxes are higher as compared to their Russian counterparts. At the 
Austria-Russia border, where the differences in property tax institutions were less striking, the 
differences in rates are not systematically observed.   
The differences in property tax rates have further fiscal implications, particularly with regard to 
fiscal autonomy and VFI. Namely, larger property tax rates result in greater fiscal autonomy and 
smaller VFI. Consequently, the municipalities from former Prussian occupation impose smaller 
fiscal burdens on the central government, contrary to the municipalities from the “Russian 
Poland”, which exert more pressure on the central government finance. Larger VFI observed in 
the municipalities from the former Russian partition might have destabilizing effect on the general 
government budget balance and debt. Besides that, this chapter also tentatively demonstrated how 
historical persistence might matter in the European Union context. 
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Appendix 3.1. Former borders 
Borders of contemporary Poland, borders of the Second Polish Republic in 1918-1939 and 
partition frontiers in 1815-1918 
 
 
Source: own map based on several internet sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pommern 
Niederschlesien 
Mazuren 
Blue: contemporary borders of Poland (since 1945) 
 
Black: borders of the Second Republic (1918-1939) 
 
Green: partition borders (1815-1918) 
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Appendix 3.2. Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Property tax: residential buildings 1094 0.55787  .139774 .02         .73 
Property tax: business buildings 1094 18.3766 2.492789        9       22.82 
Property tax: land used for business 
purpose 
1094 0.73753 .0968916          .37         .88 
Property tax: land used for other purpose 1094 0.24658 .1026558         .02         .45 
Share of property tax income in total 
income 
2478         9.596184 5.933893    1.146481    51.22268 
Fiscal autonomy 2478     .3396254      .138855    .0878153    1.271392 
Vertical fiscal imbalance 2478      69.5917     14.86809    2.612559    94.5357 
Number of companies per 10,000 
inhabitants 
2478 736.5408     317.6458     280.778    3675.487 
Luminosity 2465     6.562086     10.83182        0 61.1271 
Unemployment rate 2478     9.438696     
 
3.781679    2.006725    26.80711 
Share of population with at least 
secondary education 
2478     21.90544     6.059679      7.6071        42.6 
Effectiveness of administration 2193    2.248974     1.066972           0 5 
Number of foundations and associations 
per 10,000 inhabitants 
2473   15.67147     8.242992           0 81.12563 
Voter turnout in the EU accession 
referendum 
2478    52.83171   7.272536     27.7397     5.5776 
Number of mess attendances (monthly) 1094  2.740867     .9526309          .5         6.6 
Share of houses connected to gas supply 2469     24.41798     31.07147           0 99.5307 
Share of houses connected to water 
supply 
2475     90.37644     8.795973     38.3085        100 
Share of houses connected to sewerage 2289   39.44828     26.09172           0 99.4393 
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Appendix 3.3. Testing for transmission channels 
 
Table 3.5 reports estimates for the determinants of tax morale at the Prussia-Russia border, such 
as income, education, effectiveness of administration, social capital and religiosity. Panels A, B 
and C suggest that there is no difference in economic development or economic activity between 
municipalities from the former Prussian and Russian partitions. Variables such as number of 
companies per 10,000 inhabitants, luminosity and unemployment rate change smoothly at the 
partition border. This largely confirms the hypothesis that Poland managed to mitigate the 
economic differences between the former Prussian and Russian empires. Furthermore, the share of 
population with at least secondary education does not change abruptly at the Prussia-Russia 
border (panel D). Neither does this come as a surprise as during the socialism in Poland much 
effort was put into levelling the education attainment of population. In panel E the estimates are 
reported for an indicator depicting how “effective” (friendly) public administration is at municipal 
level. Given that estimates reach a significant level, it seems plausible to conclude that the 
efficiency (friendliness) of administration persists as on the Russian side of the border the 
efficiency of administration is significantly lower. Social capital is proxied by two variables – 
number of foundations and associations per 10,000 inhabitants as well as voter turnout in the EU 
accession referendum in 2003. In the case of both variables estimates are significant, suggesting 
that social capital is lower on the Russian side of the frontier (panel F and G). Lastly, religiosity 
too changes discontinuously at the partition border, with significantly lower mass attendance in 
the municipalities from the former Russian part. Table 3.6, in turn, reports estimates for the same 
variables but at the Austria-Russia border. Besides estimations for the unemployment rate 
suggesting that economic activity is higher on the Russian side, all other variables display the 
same pattern as at the Prussia-Russia border. Given that at the Prussia-Russia frontier a change in 
property tax rate is identified and not at the Austria-Russia border, tax morale transmission 
channel seems to be unsuitable to explain the shift in tax rates. It is because similar determinants 
of tax morale are present at the Austria-Russia border but a switch in property tax rates is not 
observed there. 
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Table 3.5. The effect of partitions on tax morale determinants at the Prussia-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number of companies Number of companies Number of companies Number of companies 
VARIABLES per 10,000 inhabitants  per 10,000 inhabitants  per 10,000 inhabitants  per 10,000 inhabitants  
     
Russia 3.54749 18.41168 6.81848 11.94208 
 (36.26164) (32.14501) (29.93923) (28.47786) 
Constant 744.11245*** 1,061.54855 -3.10361e+06** -2.20575e+06*** 
 (27.89534) (977.42785) (1.53450e+06) (823973.08920) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.10292 0.24853 0.29933 0.35060 
 
PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Luminosity Luminosity Luminosity Luminosity 
     
Russia -4.06060 -1.75244 -2.07511 -0.56824 
 (2.57237) (1.79190) (1.80030) (1.56318) 
Constant 12.04408*** 296.10410*** 264891.87534*** -1.60374e+05*** 
 (2.20609) (43.80417) (83,555.45094) (43,353.20203) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.05378 0.48420 0.39878 0.55607 
 
PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment 
VARIABLES rate rate rate rate 
     
Russia 0.78090 0.55243 0.31280 0.50069 
 (0.54222) (0.38223) (0.33920) (0.34571) 
Constant 8.69173*** -122.45192*** 74,676.37897*** 9,051.44203 
 (0.42441) (11.57044) (17,716.62652) (9,175.61728) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.11752 0.51653 0.58966 0.57954 
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PANEL D 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of population  Share of population  Share of population  Share of population  
VARIABLES with at least secondary  
education 
with at least secondary  
education 
with at least secondary  
education 
with at least secondary  
education 
     
Russia -1.14163 -0.38822 -1.05297 -0.83202 
 (0.97455) (0.80396) (0.81727) (0.77532) 
Constant 23.52138*** 74.95557*** -83951.09761* -68193.69427*** 
 (0.71536) (23.06155) (48,777.82486) (24,806.89966) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.04652 0.29383 0.23889 0.32059 
 
PANEL E 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Administration  Administration  Administration  Administration  
VARIABLES effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness 
     
Russia -0.64748*** -0.54886*** -0.44837*** -0.35440** 
 (0.18293) (0.16311) (0.16858) (0.16119) 
Constant 2.59173*** 3.30341 2,509.83904 -1,921.20714 
 (0.14305) (4.97707) (9,784.01514) (4,572.66327) 
     
Observations 475 475 475 475 
R-squared 0.10170 0.26513 0.18786 0.26658 
 
PANEL F 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number of foundations Number of foundations Number of foundations Number of foundations 
VARIABLES per 10,000 individuals per 10,000 individuals per 10,000 individuals per 10,000 individuals 
     
Russia -2.99091*** -2.92719*** -2.50689** -2.34452** 
 (1.08671) (1.01663) (1.01332) (0.97087) 
Constant 16.09043*** 7.56686 -73792.37095 -37124.33714 
 (0.79107) (27.00661) (49,527.83267) (24,887.42945) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.09266 0.19126 0.14535 0.19881 
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PANEL G 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Referendum Referendum Referendum Referendum 
VARIABLES turnout turnout turnout turnout 
     
Russia -4.13523*** -3.62758*** -4.20713*** -4.09926*** 
 (0.98126) (0.82842) (0.82627) (0.81480) 
Constant 56.50591*** 172.26337*** -1.15752e+05** -1.10298e+05*** 
 (0.72021) (27.19133) (48,909.35175) (26,231.56371) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.31283 0.47759 0.48729 0.50890 
 
PANEL H 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Religiosity Religiosity Religiosity Religiosity 
     
Russia -0.59627*** -0.58204*** -0.38331*** -0.43033*** 
 (0.15612) (0.13752) (0.11819) (0.11282) 
Constant 3.16464*** 27.70245*** -18801.47425*** -5,938.66235* 
 (0.12094) (3.45251) (6,251.72063) (3,137.65108) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.11313 0.34117 0.38578 0.40248 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contains baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.6. The effect of partitions on tax morale determinants at the Austria-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number of companies Number of companies Number of companies Number of companies 
VARIABLES per 10,000 inhabitants  per 10,000 inhabitants  per 10,000 inhabitants  per 10,000 inhabitants  
     
Russia 40.97176 -7.64538 -9.42003 -8.14768 
 (45.82902) (40.34609) (35.01888) (36.39205) 
Constant 632.48700*** -2,205.02128 -26637.27897 166656.10935 
 (34.09851) (3,397.38185) (843355.94486) (1.71142e+06) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.02168 0.30882 0.32672 0.36418 
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PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Luminosity Luminosity Luminosity Luminosity 
     
Russia -0.04406 0.31674 -2.92001** -1.43392 
 (1.96725) (1.70052) (1.40682) (1.44358) 
Constant 8.84920*** -30.82913 -2.05472e+05*** -3.07383e+05*** 
 (1.33111) (123.55303) (41,830.37696) (79,752.94559) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.04856 0.31602 0.25473 0.39477 
 
PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment 
VARIABLES rate rate rate rate 
     
Russia -0.64316 -0.98969** -1.23727*** -1.91384*** 
 (0.54346) (0.45931) (0.40851) (0.42041) 
Constant 9.06453*** -196.98792*** 40,066.33422*** 54,610.35694* 
 (0.41379) (37.08802) (14,527.91362) (29,607.82452) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.03039 0.33590 0.42654 0.45307 
 
PANEL D 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of population  Share of population  Share of population  Share of population  
VARIABLES with at least secondary  
education 
with at least secondary  
education 
with at least secondary  
education 
with at least secondary  
education 
     
Russia 0.94745 1.13979 -0.65661 -0.06658 
 (1.06272) (1.05415) (0.90888) (0.97096) 
Constant 22.43078*** -53.83633 -87174.59766*** -1.33848e+05*** 
 (0.72830) (87.81820) (21,602.01287) (46,572.66475) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.02301 0.13058 0.14095 0.19425 
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PANEL E 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Administration  Administration  Administration  Administration  
VARIABLES effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness 
     
Russia -0.34237* -0.37648** -0.53536*** -0.43755** 
 (0.18321) (0.18356) (0.16335) (0.17736) 
Constant 2.54242*** -10.84058 -3,549.74935 -700.36786 
 (0.14159) (15.81256) (3,725.04585) (7,866.98718) 
     
Observations 432 432 432 432 
R-squared 0.06885 0.15291 0.13863 0.16681 
 
PANEL F 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number of foundations Number of foundations Number of foundations Number of foundations 
VARIABLES per 10,000 individuals per 10,000 individuals per 10,000 individuals per 10,000 individuals 
     
Russia -4.51784*** -3.88133*** -4.45913*** -3.83777*** 
 (1.20037) (1.25004) (1.12245) (1.17108) 
Constant 16.75593*** 16.16449 -9,134.81874 19,589.79319 
 (0.97943) (124.93197) (33,032.94874) (61,254.45442) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.07733 0.11682 0.09727 0.13955 
 
PANEL G 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Referendum Referendum Referendum Referendum 
VARIABLES turnout turnout turnout turnout 
     
Russia -4.42986*** -5.18811*** -6.26000*** -5.99394*** 
 (1.19191) (1.22248) (0.92804) (1.02125) 
Constant 53.72488*** -219.75334** -36376.26978 -56623.54601 
 (0.74448) (98.65190) (24,886.04329) (53,564.96172) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.25289 0.34420 0.50350 0.51941 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contains baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The same conclusion as for the ‘tax morale’ argument can be derived for the ‘utility supply’ 
argument. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 suggest that at both borders important differences in utility supply 
persisted, with the notable exception of the water supply at the Austria-Russia border. Yet again, 
given that at both borders changes in utility supply are identified but change in property tax rates 
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is observed only at the Prussia-Russia border, this makes the ‘utility supply’ argument ineffective 
to explain the difference in tax rates.  
Table 3.7. The effect of partitions on utility supply at the Prussia-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of houses  Share of houses  Share of houses  Share of houses  
VARIABLES equipped with gas 
installation 
equipped with gas 
installation 
equipped with gas 
installation 
equipped with gas 
installation 
     
Russia -12.54899*** -8.98315** -10.88174*** -8.49515** 
 (4.45825) (3.67535) (3.56109) (3.28696) 
Constant 25.31209*** 11.52337 15,104.26668 -4.02263e+05*** 
 (3.76444) (127.39846) (178335.03998) (89,074.63863) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.12755 0.34695 0.37462 0.45613 
 
PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses 
VARIABLES equipped with water 
installation 
equipped with water 
installation 
equipped with water 
installation 
equipped with water 
installation 
     
Russia -2.86704*** -2.56831*** -3.34818*** -2.74184*** 
 (0.65091) (0.60891) (0.66885) (0.63757) 
Constant 96.37452*** 95.79351*** 19,308.97937 -59172.79106 
 (0.34431) (18.85062) (68,742.73166) (38,203.28976) 
     
Observations 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.42321 0.46608 0.43964 0.45089 
 
PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses 
VARIABLES equipped with  
sewerage 
equipped with  
sewerage 
equipped with  
sewerage 
equipped with  
sewerage 
     
Russia -14.72872*** -12.76815*** -14.48787*** -13.23600*** 
 (4.13822) (3.81378) (3.89730) (3.69361) 
Constant 51.63370*** 84.39973 -2.09311e+05 -3.60045e+05*** 
 (3.09418) (114.75688) (211119.76411) (106980.40648) 
     
Observations 509 509 509 509 
R-squared 0.11816 0.22963 0.15742 0.24960 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contains baseline covariates. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.8. The effect of partitions on utility supply at the Austria-Russia border 
 
PANEL A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of houses  Share of houses  Share of houses  Share of houses  
VARIABLES equipped with gas 
installation 
equipped with gas 
installation 
equipped with gas 
installation 
equipped with gas 
installation 
     
Russia -28.91264*** -26.37195*** -37.20405*** -31.79213*** 
 (5.14485) (5.02899) (4.16510) (4.51412) 
Constant 61.22156*** -735.39275* -8.42512e+05*** -1.46635e+06*** 
 (3.84808) (413.27680) (117483.62916) (229742.98259) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.35180 0.44153 0.46002 0.48468 
 
PANEL B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses 
VARIABLES equipped with water 
installation 
equipped with water 
installation 
equipped with water 
installation 
equipped with water 
installation 
     
Russia -0.16432 -1.29654 -1.33389 -1.56079 
 (1.34976) (1.25625) (1.12242) (1.14669) 
Constant 89.81115*** 143.40201 33,944.75536 52,219.80917 
 (0.87733) (134.17954) (30,535.87734) (64,376.08129) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.24044 0.37452 0.39025 0.39573 
 
PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses Share of houses 
VARIABLES equipped with  
sewerage 
equipped with  
sewerage 
equipped with  
sewerage 
equipped with  
sewerage 
     
Russia -16.71666*** -15.41815*** -17.57733*** -16.51854*** 
 (4.48579) (4.47518) (3.98924) (4.09459) 
Constant 45.45201*** -128.57081 -48259.52695 5,905.47047 
 (3.20077) (370.94735) (105117.55465) (220298.22622) 
     
Observations 442 442 442 442 
R-squared 0.08597 0.16690 0.17398 0.23223 
Note: The polynomial in the forcing variable is of degree-1 in all columns. Columns 1-2 employ one-dimensional RD 
and columns 3-4 two-dimensional RD. Columns 1 and 3 do not control for additional covariates, columns 2 and 4 
contains baseline covariates (altitude, longitude, latitude and large city dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CHAPTER 4 
JUDGES AS FISCAL ACTIVISTS:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL100 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Similarly to chapter 2, which demonstrates the impact of electoral regimes on fiscal outcomes, 
this chapter analyzes another element of the broader political (legal) setting, namely the judiciary. 
The general observation in the research covering the topic of political science and law is that 
policy-making becomes “judicialized” (e.g. Stone Sweet, 2000, pp. 12-13; Garoupa, 2011; 
Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2012). According to Vallinder (1995), the judicialization of politics refers 
to the shifting of decision-making powers from the legislature and the executive to the courts. To 
a large extent, if not exclusively, the judicialization of politics is due to the presence of 
Constitutional (Supreme) Courts and especially judicial (constitutional) review.101 Their presence 
triggers constitutional adjudication, which according to Stone Sweet (2007, p. 72) constitutes a 
lawmaking process.  
                                                    
100
  This chapter is in parts co-authored with Nuno Garoupa (University of Illinois). A modified version of this 
chapter titled “An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal, 2003-2014” is submitted to the Constitutional Political Economy Journal. Few descriptive parts 
of this chapter are extracted from Kantorowicz (2014). I am grateful to Jarosław Bełdowski, Matthias 
Dauner, Nora El-Bialy, Jerg Gutmann, Elena Kantorowicz, Alessio Pacces, Agnes Strauss, Stefan Voigt, 
Franziska Weber, the participants of the EDLE seminar held in Bologna on November 6, 2013 and the 
participants of the ‘Empirical Legal Studies at Erasmus School of Law’ seminar held at the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam on November 27, 2013 for useful comments on that paper. The usual disclaimers 
apply. 
101
  In this paper the terms judicial and constitutional review are used interchangeably. This is despite a slight 
difference between these two notions. While constitutional review might be pursued by any institutional 
body, judicial review is strictly conducted by the judiciary. 
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In the Kelsenian tradition, a special Constitutional Court is expliclty viewed as a negative 
legislator102 able to annul a law by declaring it unconstitutional (Kelsen, 1942, p. 187).103 A 
constitutional review is the main legal device through which the Court factually intervenes in the 
political sphere and by which the Court performs its legislative function (Kelsen, 1942, p. 187). In 
this chapter, judicial (constitutional) review is defined as the ability of the Court or another 
judicial body to verify whether the laws and regulations enacted by the legislature are in line with 
the constitutional provisions and in accordance with procedural requirements (Ginsburg, 2008). 
The crucial consequence of the constitutional review, at least from a theoretical standpoint, is that 
laws and regulations which fail to comply with the constitutional provisions are invalidated or 
revised by the legislature in line with the Court’s decision.  
Undoubtedly, the overall tendency of the judicialization of policy extends to the area of public 
finance (see, for instance, Kantorowicz (2014, pp. 82-85) for an overview of recent Consitutional 
Courts’ decisions in cases which had nonnegligible budgetary implications). Notwithstanding it, 
the mainstream literature on fiscal constitutions largely disregards judges as key institutional 
players in fiscal policy. This chapter attempts, at least partially, to fill this gap in the research. At 
the general level, this chapter inquiries therefore whether – by executing a constitutional review – 
the judiciary is able to shape the course of a fiscal policy. To answer this question, this chapter 
delves chiefly into the judicial decision-making and searches for systematic behavioral patterns of 
judges, with an emphasis on examining judicial behavioral patterns in adjudicating cases with 
budgetary implications.  
Judicial behavior, and hence decision-making, in any court around the world can be conceptually 
explained by the same determinants even though they might vary in degree. They include 
individual preferences104, intra-court interaction (collegiality)105 and the influence of other 
                                                    
102
  Stone Sweet (2000, p. 61) goes even further when referring to the Constitutional Court as a specialized 
legislative chamber able to reject legislative statues. 
103
  In fact, the role of today’s Constitutional Courts is much broader and their power goes far beyond the 
negative legislator concept. For instance, the Courts might be engaged in the law-making process at the 
parliamentary stage (e.g. Slovenia), the verification of the legality of elections (e.g. Lithuania) and the 
legalization of political parties (e.g. Bulgaria). Interestingly, some of these ancillary duties do not even rely 
on the interpretation of the constitutional text (Ginsburg and Elkins, 2009). This indicates that judicial 
power expands far beyond its traditional domain. 
104
  For judicial preferences, see Posner (1993; 2005; 2010; 2011). 
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relevant actors, including the political branches of government and the general public106. It is the 
exact mix of these three factors that divides academics and varies across jurisdictions. 
Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the United States, to explain 
judicial decision-making.107 In this respect, there is an important ongoing debate over whether 
judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology. Formalists take the stance that judges 
simply interpret and apply the constitution and the law in a conformist view of precedents. Judges 
are largely guided by what the law says and abide by a strict legal authoritative interpretation. 
Under a completely different perspective, the attitudinal model sees judicial preferences, with 
special emphasis on ideology, as the main explanatory factor. Finally, the proponents of the 
strategic model recognize the importance of judicial preferences but argue that they are 
implemented taking into account political and institutional realities.  
These different theories of judicial behavior cannot be convincingly addressed without an 
adequate empirical assessment. Legal scholars and political scientists have focused much 
empirical attention on the U.S. Supreme Court. Empirical debate about other higher courts is now 
an emerging literature, with notable applications in Europe and North America,108 in Asia109 and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
105
  See Cameron and Kornhauser (2010). The authors show that the final outcome might not be the position of 
the median justice because it depends on the entire distribution of ideal points. The model also suggests the 
importance of opinion assignment. See also Kornhauser (1992) explaining that path-dependence in 
collegial courts results from the fact that no single judge controls lawmaking, and Kornhauser (2003) 
pointing out that, due to collective decision-making, case-by-case and issue-by-issue approaches can result 
in different outcomes. The development of legal doctrines is determined crucially by how collegial courts 
operate. 
106
  See generally Garoupa and Ginsburg (2010). 
107
  For discussion, see among others, Brenner and Spaeth (1988), Segal and Cover (1989), Gely and Spiller 
(1990), George and Epstein (1992), Epstein and Knight (1998), Epstein et al. (2001), Segal and Spaeth 
(2002), Goff (2006), Hansford and Springgs (2006), Lax and Cameron (2007), and Spiller and Gely 
(2007).  
108
  On Canada, see Tate and Sittiwong (1989), Alarie and Green (2008), Green and Alarie (2009), and Songer 
et al. (2011). On Germany, see Schneider (2005) and Vanberg (2005). On Italy, see Breton and Fraschini 
(2003), Fiorino et al. (2007), Padovano (2009) and Dalla Pellegrina and Garoupa (2013). On Portugal, see 
Amaral Garcia et al. (2009). On France, see Franck (2009 & 2010). On Spain, see Garoupa et al. (2013). 
On Israel, see Shachar et al. (1997) and Eisenberg et al. (2012). On Australia, see Smyth and Narayan 
(2004). 
109
  On Japan, see Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2003), and in particular on the Japanese Supreme Court, see 
Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2006). On Taiwan, see Ginsburg (2003) and Garoupa et al. (2011). On the 
Phillipines, see Escresa and Garoupa (2012). 
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in Latin America.110 However, the question whether judicial behavior changes once judges are 
faced with fiscal cases (cases that have budgetary implications) is entirely neglected by this 
stream of literature, not to mention traditional literature on fiscal constitutions.111 Consequently, 
the contribution of this chapter is to look at judicial behavior in the particular court, i.e. the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal112 (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, hereinafter TK), and to verify whether this 
judicial behavior is somewhat modified once judges adjudicate in cases that have budgetary 
implications.  
The creation and the major reforms of judicial review in Poland coincide with a transition from 
the socialist regime to democracy. After Former Yugoslavia, in 1985113, Poland was the second 
socialist country to establish a Kelsenian-type constitutional court with an exclusive right to 
review laws for their conformity with the (then socialist) Constitution.114 In spite of its limited 
powers (e.g. the court could review the legislation passed only after its promulgation and the 
Court decisions were legally inconclusive), the TK managed to develop valuable case law even in 
its first years of existence under the then still prevailing socialist regime.115 Yet, more significant 
jurisprudence, on which TK managed to build its strong reputation, was developed shortly after 
                                                    
110
  On Argentina, see Chávez (2004) and Helmke (2004) as well as Iaryczower et al. (2002 & 2006). On 
Chile, see Hilbink (2007) and Carroll and Tiede (2011). More generally, see Kapiszewski and Taylor 
(2008). 
111
  A handful of empirical studies investigate the role of Constitutional Courts in shaping fiscal outcomes. 
None of these studies specifically look at judicial behavior, i.e. how judges make their decisions. These 
studies take more ‘macro’ view on the court, treating it as a single institution and disregarding the fact that 
courts consist of individuals with differing backgrounds and preferences. For instance, Vaubel (1996) 
suggests that the existence of Constitutional Court is an important factor of expenditure centralization. 
Similarly, Tridimas (2005) shows theoretically and empirically that a stronger judicial review and judicial 
independence are associated with a relatively lower size of government. In addition, Eslava (2006) presents 
suggestive empirical evidence that judicial activism in fiscal policy results in a larger public deficit. Lastly, 
Raudla (2011) demonstrates the impact of the Constitutional Court on the tax system, based on the case 
study of Estonia. More established is, however, the literature that takes judiciary as an explaining factor of 
the economic growth. Here the most notable are studies by Henisz (2000), Feld and Voigt (2003, 2006), 
Voigt et al. (2015). La Porta et al. (2004), on the other hand, discuss how judicial independence and 
constitutional review ensure economic and political freedom. 
112
  It was chosen to call it “tribunal” rather than “court” to underscore the fact that it is a specialized entity to 
deal only with constitutional matters.  
113
  The constitutional amendment enabling the establishment of the constitutional court was introduced in 
1982. However, the subsequent political conflict over the Constitutional Tribunal Act delayed its adoption. 
Consequently, it was only in 1985 when the Court started operating and, in 1986, when it issued its first 
judgment (see, for instance, historical outline of the Tribunal available at http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/about-
the-tribunal/constitutional-tribunal/historical-outline/ accessed on November 16, 2014). 
114
  See Sadurski (2002). 
115
  See Garlicki (2002) and Stawecki et al. (2008). 
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the fall of the socialism regime in 1989. The TK legal doctrines were particularly crucial in filling 
the constitutional gaps of the early transitional period. It is of note that until 1997 Poland was 
operating under the old Stalinist Constitution of 1952, which was of minor relevance in the 
freshly-restored democratic regime.116 The importance of the TK legal doctrines was reflected in 
the new Constitution of 1997, which was largely grounded on the principles and rules designed by 
the Court at the outset of the transition.117 However, one should emphasize that the new 
Constitution of 1997 constitutes an important breakthrough in the history of the TK itself. 
Specifically, the Constitution brought many reforms with regard to the TK organization and 
strengthened its position vis-à-vis the legislature. 
The contributions of the TK to the process of governing the political transformation of Poland and 
its current strong position within the Polish public institutions are unquestionable.118 However, as 
it is often raised in the debates over the TK, one point of concern is the potential ideological bias 
and party allegiance of the constitutional judges.119 In Poland, the nominations to the Court are 
exclusively vested upon the Sejm, i.e. the lower chamber of the Parliament. As a partisan body, 
the Sejm perceives the nominations to the TK as important political decisions possibly assuring 
that judges elected to the Court have congruent policy preferences with the occasional 
parliamentary majority. This largely politicized process of appointments, which is described in 
                                                    
116
  It is important to stress that in 1992 the interim Little Constitution was promulgated in Poland. This 
Constitution did not repeal all of the rules of the Stalinist Constitution of 1952. It aimed, however, at 
reducing institutional uncertainty through amending and facilitating the main functional and organizational 
features of the state. The most important was to bring order and regularity to the confused relations 
between the parliament, the government and the President. Among the hottest issues, the interim 
Constitution was supposed to remove dual authority over foreign affairs and security matters as well as 
clarify the process for appointing the Prime Minister (see, for instance, Elster 1993). 
117
  See Garlicki (2002) and Stawecki et al. (2008). 
118
  The TK enjoys fairly good reputation in the Polish society, but the proportion of surveyed opinions 
perceiving the Court as a good political actor has decreased since 2008. According to the public opinion 
survey (CBOS), at the beginning of 2008 roughly 55% of surveyed individuals had good opinion about the 
work of the TK. In 2013 this percentage dropped to 37%. This still should be considered high since, by 
comparison, only 15% of the same surveyed individuals assessed positively the work of the Parliament (for 
more information see http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_044_13.PDF accessed on November 16, 
2014). 
119
  See, for instance, the following press articles: (i) Andrzej Dryszel. 15 politycznych ludzi. Przegląd, 
41/2010, (ii) 15 prawych ludzi. Rozmowa z Bohdanem Zdziennickim. Polityka, November 26, 2010, (iii) 
Krzysztof Burnetko. Bój o Trybunał. Polityka, November 26, 2010, (iv) Opozycja: Nowi sędziowie w TK 
to polityczny wybór. Portal Money.pl, Novermber 26, 2010 (http://prawo.money.pl/aktualnosci/ 
wiadomosci/artykul/opozycja;nowi;sedziowie;w;tk;to;polityczny;wybor,99,0,723299.html accessed on 
November 14, 2014), (v) Ewa Siedlecka. Trybunał z łapanki. Gazeta Wyborcza, December 11, 2006, (vi) 
Stankiewicz, Śmiłowicz. Sędziowie z partyjnymi sympatiami. Rzeczpospolita, July 14, 2006. 
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details in section 4.2, can potentially endanger the impartiality of the court. Judges nominated by 
the partisan bodies instead of being of the highest merits and subject exclusively to the law might 
be too easy driven by individual ideologies and party’s interests in adjudicating specific cases. 
They might be further incentivized to cast ideological votes while hoping for future appointment 
to other public offices since constitutional judges in Poland do not serve for lifetime, but for a 
fixed term of nine years after the 1997 changes. In addition, on many occasions, judges are 
obliged to adjudicate in cases where ideological differences are large and political stakes are 
significant. The reason for this is that a wide range of partisan bodies can initiate judicial review 
before the Court in an abstract form (that is, outside of a concrete case).120 
Not surprisingly, the conjecture of this chapter is that the Polish constitutional court is politicized 
and ideology plays a role in judicial voting. Importantly, however, it is further conjectured that 
ideological bias should be somewhat weaker in cases with budgetary implications. There are two 
important institutional restraints which might mitigate politicization in budgetary cases (for a 
detailed discussion see section 4.3). First, the TK case law mentions the budgetary balance as one 
of the constitutional principles, which judges have to respect. Second, in cases with budgetary 
implications TK judges are procedurally obliged to officially question the government about the 
fiscal consequence of potentially voting the law unconstitutional. Being fully aware of fiscal 
consequence and being under strict public and media scrutiny, judges should have more 
reservations of voting ideologically.   
This is the first attempt of studying judicial behavior in the Polish TK. It is also the first 
contribution that explicitly explores judicial behavior in the budgetary cases. The results presented 
in this chapter confirm the hypothesis that judges’ decisions might be driven by their ideologies, 
thus convincingly refuting the conventional formalist account of judicial behavior prevalent in 
civil law academic scholarship. Those results hold particularly for judges chosen by the most 
                                                    
120
  The basic distinction done in the literature is between abstract and concrete judicial review. Abstract 
review is triggered by officials – usually the parliamentary opposition – “in the absence of a concrete 
judicial case” (Stone Sweet, 2009). The constitutional court therefore compares the constitutional 
provisions and the statutory law, in the abstract, to verify if the latter conforms to the constitution.   
Abstract review is also called “preventive review,” when it is pursued before the law is promulgated (i.e. 
before it can harm people). Concrete review, on the other hand, can be triggered by any court in relation to 
the case, which is currently before the court (Information on the TK’s website available at 
http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/about-the-tribunal/constitutional-tribunal/posterior-review-of-norms/ accessed on 
February 26, 2015). 
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ideologically polarized political camps, such as the left and extreme right parties. Most 
importantly, although to a lesser extent, ideological bias is also present in cases which have 
budgetary implications. This therefore refutes the hypothesis that additional institutional 
constraints are able to mitigate ideological voting in fiscal cases. A key conclusion of this chapter 
is that the fiscal outcomes might be indeed shaped by judges who drive the results in line with the 
preferences of their appointers, hence, political parties. It is to stress, however, that the pure 
attitudinal model might not be entirely correct. Thus, also the institutional constraints are 
recognized in driving the behavior of the constitutional judges, although only to a minor extent. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. An overview of the constitutional review in 
Poland is presented in section 4.2. Section 4.3 illustrates potential sources of the ideological bias 
in the TK and demonstrates possible institutional constraints of casting ideological vote, 
particularly in fiscal cases. A preliminary quantitative analysis is introduced and discussed in 
section 4.4. A regression analysis is discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 derives preliminary 
policy implications and gives an outlook for a possible institutional reform. Finally, section 4.6 
concludes. 
 
4.2. The case of Poland 
 
The Polish Constitution of 1997 was the result of a long-lasting political bargaining and log-
rolling121. Although the Constitutional Assembly (responsible for drafting the new constitution) 
was largely dominated by the left leaning parties, some conservative ideas were embedded in 
order to guarantee a more widespread political support for the constitution.122 Overall, it took 
almost five years for the Assembly to accomplish the drafting of the document, which is 
exceptionally long as compared to the average constitutional deliberation of 16 months (Ginsburg 
et al., 2009, p. 209). Delays in drafting the constitution resulted in the loss of the constitutional 
                                                    
121
  Log-rolling refers to an informal process where political party X supports certain issues which matter for 
party Y in exchange for party’s Y support in the future (Mueller, 2000, p. 105). 
122
  For instance, the constitutional drafters introduced an innovative fiscal rule limiting the country’s debt ratio 
to 60% of GDP (the rule has been already mentioned in section 1.2). 
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momentum. Consequently, the final draft of the constitution was approved in referendum by only 
a slight majority of 52.7%. Moreover, the voting turnout was low since it did not reach 50% of the 
eligible voters.123 
Albeit some opposition against strengthening the institutional locus of the TK was present, the 
Constitution of 1997 significantly reinforced the position of the TK vis-à-vis the legislative body 
of the state. The establishment of the TK in 1985 under the non-democratic regime (keep in mind 
that socialism in Poland collapsed only in 1989) resulted in highly restrained powers for the Court 
as compared to its Western counterparts. Most importantly, the decisions of the court were not 
final. The judgments on unconformity of the law with the constitution were subject to a possible 
later consideration by the Sejm124, which could reject the TK decisions by 2/3 majority.125 The 
new Constitution of 1997 and the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 1997126, i.e. two basic laws 
shaping the modern TK, banned this provision. Ultimately, after two years of transitory period, 
effectively in October 1999, the decisions of the TK started being final, conclusive in character, 
and not subject to further appeals. Under the currently binding procedures, whenever the Court 
adjudicates the unconstitutionality of a particular law, the challenged statute or its relevant articles 
become null and void. Unless it is formulated differently, the unconstitutional provisions cease to 
have binding legal effect at the moment of announcing the judgment.127 In some cases where the 
                                                    
123
  Although the Referendum Act 1995 required at least 50% turnout for a referendum to have a biding effect, 
the Constitutional Act 1992 instructed that the new constitution should be adopted in a referendum 
regardless of the turnout rate. The common belief in the early 1990s was that the turnout in the 
constitutional referendum would never achieve 50%. Therefore, the establishment of a 50% turnout 
threshold put the constitutional project at high risk (see, for instance, Supreme Court Resolution from July 
15, 1997). 
124
  In Poland, the parliament has a bicameral structure with the Sejm (460 deputies) constituting the lower 
chamber of the parliament and the Senate (100 senators) forming the upper chamber. The representatives 
of both chambers are elected for four years. It is important to stress that the Sejm enjoys larger prerogatives 
than the Senate and ultimately is responsible for promulgating (voting) laws. Albeit the Senate can initiate 
legislation or amendments, the final word on adopting or amending the law belongs to the Sejm. 
125
  Being dominated by the Communist Party MPs until 1989, the Sejm usually did not face significant 
problems of reversing the Court’s decision whenever it was politically relevant. This situation largely 
changed in the early 1990s, when democratic elections resulted in a much more pluralistic and fragmented 
Sejm. Under these new circumstances, in order to strike down the judgment of the TK, the governing 
majority needed to secure the support of the opposition parties. 
126
  Whereas the Constitution 1997 sets only general rules for the TK functioning, the Constitutional Tribunal 
Act 1997 – the ordinary statutory law – comprises detailed institutional framework of the TK. 
127
  Although according to the law, the unconstitutional statutes or articles cease to have any effective binding 
legal status, it is important to note that on many occasions the legislative bodies are obliged to further 
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unconstitutionality of the law imposes a high burden on the state budget or the law annulment 
results in a legal uncertainty, the Court allows a temporary preservation of the statute (up to 18 
months).128 
Before the reforms of 1997, the Court was composed of 12 judges, who were elected for a non-
renewable term of eight years (Garlicki, 2002). The new Constitution of 1997 increased the 
number of judges to 15 and lengthened their term to nine years. With respect to the nominations 
and appointments of the judges, the regulations before and after the 1997 reform remained almost 
untouched although a major change concerned the appointment of the President and Vice-
President of the Court. The candidates to the TK are put forward by a group of minimum 50 
deputies sitting in the Sejm or the Presidium of the Sejm.129 From those candidates, the Sejm 
elects the judges to the TK by an absolute majority of votes with no less than half of the deputies 
present.130 As a consequence of this procedure, the majority in the Sejm can largely influence the 
elections of the constitutional judges, and give precedence to the candidates of their preference. It 
is to stress that unlike the judicial appointment mechanism in Germany, Italy, Portugal, or Spain, 
a de facto quota system131 does not exist in Poland (that is, there is no stable arrangement of 
allocating seats to the political parties). Therefore, at different point in time, changing political 
majorities are reflected in appointments to the TK. 
Against this backdrop, it is important to note that there are several mechanisms formally 
entrenched in the law to secure judges’ independence. First, judges are irremovable from office132, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
enforce specific TK judgments. It is particularly the case when the TK derogates the law and creates a legal 
vacuum. In the years 2005-2008, approximately 70% (112/160) of judgments posed some enforcement 
obligation on the legislative bodies. However, 47% (52/112) of those judgments were not enforced by the 
relevant institutions (see Radziewicz, 2010). 
128
  See Article 190 of the Constitution 1997 and Article 71 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997.  
129
  The Presidium of the Sejm comprises the President and Deputy President of the Sejm. The main 
competence of the Presidium of the Sejm includes the setting of the Sejm’s work agenda, organizing 
cooperation between the committees of the Sejm and coordinating their activities. 
130
  See Article 5 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. 
131
  See Garoupa et al. (2013). 
132
  Removal from the office of the judge can be a consequence of the disciplinary punishment by the TK. A 
judge may be subject to the disciplinary punishment for an infringement of provisions of the law, for act 
which is inconsistent with the dignity of his office or for unethical conduct which might undermine judge’s 
confidence (see Articles 8-10 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997). 
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protected by the immunity and entitled to a permanent salary.133 Second, judges to the Court must 
not belong to any political party or a trade union, nor hold high public offices.134 However, past 
political activism does not exclude possible candidates from being appointed to the Court. Third, 
as already mentioned, judges are not allowed to be re-elected for the following terms. After 
terminating the duties at the court, they can retain the status of a judge135 or continue their 
academic careers, provided that they were university professors prior to the appointment.136 It is to 
underscore that former judges of the TK are not deprived from serving other state functions after 
finishing the term in the TK. In those cases, however, they cannot retain the status of the judge. 
The Tribunal is headed by its President and Vice-President. Until 1997, these bodies were elected 
by the Sejm therefore making the Court even more reliant on partisan choices. The new 
regulations of 1997 abolished this provision and introduced a mechanism where the President and 
Vice-President of the TK are appointed by the President of the Republic137. However, in his 
decision, the President of the Republic is constrained to only two candidates who are 
recommended by the Court and are chosen from its members.138   
Yet, another important change in 1997 concerned the prerogatives of the President of the TK. 
First, the President lost the privilege to decide which judge would be a rapporteur of the pending 
case139 and was deprived of the right to determine the composition of the benches assigned to 
adjudicate in individual cases. It is of note that some cases, particularly those which are not 
excessively complicated and do not concern the ex ante preventive constitutional review, are 
adjudicated in small benches of three or five judges.140 The existing law obliges the President of 
                                                    
133
  See Article 196 of the Constitution 1997 and Article 6 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. 
134
  See Article 195 of the Constitution 1997. 
135
  Retention of a judicial status entitles the retiring judge to a “pension” irrespective of his/her age. 
136
  See Garlicki (2002) and Article 6 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997.  
137
  Crucially, Article 126 (2) of the Constitution 1997 says that “The President of the Republic shall ensure 
observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the 
inviolability and integrity of its territory”. 
138
  See Article 15 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. 
139
  The rapporteur casts an important role in the adjudicating process since s/he is in charge of drafting the 
judgment together with its reasoning (see § 42 of the Constitutional Court Statute 2006). 
140
  The TK adjudicates in three types of benches, i.e. in a full bench (at least 9 judges), five-judge bench and 
three-judge bench. The size of the adjudicating bench depends on the nature of the case and its complexity 
(see Article 25 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997). 
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the TK to assign the new cases to the judges in alphabetical order of their surnames. The 
assignment of the judge rapporteur is accomplished in the same manner. The second reform 
referred to the fact that the President’s vote was no longer decisive in situations where the number 
of votes for and against a particular judgment is equal.141 After the amendments of 1997, the law 
states explicitly that the decisions by the TK are made by the majority of votes and no special role 
for the President is defined.142 
As to the voting and decision-making by the TK, it is important to stress that judges who disagree 
with the decision of the majority of the bench are allowed to present dissenting opinions (votum 
separatum).143 The dissenting opinion can concern the whole judgment or part of it. Judges are 
also allowed to present a different opinion with respect to the reasoning of the judgment 
(concurring opinions). Thus, judges may agree with the final decision of the bench but they 
disagree about the argumentation of the majority of the bench.144 
The Polish TK, similarly to its counterparts in Western Europe, is vested with much broader role 
than just reviewing the statutes for their conformity with the Constitution (Ginsburg and Elkins, 
2009). Among others, the Court also (i) examines the constitutionality of the goals or activities of 
political parties, (ii) settles the disputes over the competence between central constitutional bodies 
of the state and, (iii) declares incapacity of the President of the Republic to discharge the duties of 
his/her office.145 Importantly however, judicial review remains the largest part of the Court’s 
docket. 
                                                    
141
  In case of equal number of votes for and against the judgment, the adjudication is postponed. However, it is 
important to stress that this scenario is rare in practice. Most often judges adjudicate in benches comprising 
three or five judges. Consequently, the situation of equal votes can occur only in the situation of 
adjudicating in the full bench, when the number of judges is even due to absence or exclusion of some 
judges from the adjudicating stage (see Articles 25-26 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997). 
142
  See Article 25 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997 and § 26 of the Constitutional Court Statute  2006. 
143
  In 2012, 33% of the Court decisions included at least one dissenting opinion. This is, however, the record 
year. In previous years, the proportion of judgments with dissenting opinions is variable. It goes from 3% 
in 2006 to 29% in 2011 (see Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2013). 
144
  See Article 68 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. 
145
  See Article 188 of the Constitution 1997 and Article 2 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. 
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In this chapter, the attention is exclusively given to abstract judicial review.146 In this respect, a 
rather broad range of actors can initiate the petition: (i) the President of the Republic, (ii) the 
President of the Sejm or the President of the Senate, (iii) the Prime Minister, (iv) 50 deputies or 30 
senators, (iv) the First President of the Supreme Court, (v) the President of the Chief 
Administrative Court, (vi) the Public Prosecutor-General, (vii) the President of the Supreme 
Chamber of Control, (viii) the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights (Ombudsmen), (ix) the National 
Council of the Judiciary, (x) the constitutive bodies of local self-government, (xi) the national 
bodies of trade unions as well as the national authorities of employers' organizations and 
occupational organizations, and (xii) churches and religious organizations.147 While all those 
actors can file for ex post abstract review, it is to stress that preventive (ex ante) abstract judicial 
review can be requested by the President of the Republic only.148 
There is no doubt that the cases in which actors (i)-(iv) serve as petitioners are mostly political in 
nature and where the political interests are easily identifiable. It is often the case that the political 
opposition which failed to strike down a particular legislation in the Parliament seeks to challenge 
it in the Tribunal. Those cases, naturally, enjoy the largest media cover and political visibility. 
 
4.3. Ideological bias at the Polish Constitutional Court 
 
Since the approach taken in this chapter is inspired by the attitudinal and strategic model, it is 
argued that the Polish TK judges advance their ideological goals. More precisely, given the 
potential arbitrariness in constitutional adjudication and interpretation (a possible variant of 
judicial activism)149, judges rely on their ideological preferences in voting one way or the other.  
                                                    
146
  An abstract review of a law is not the only judicial review performed in the TK. Similarly to the U.S model 
of judicial review, any court in Poland can initiate concrete review. This occurs in the situation where the 
court has doubts about the constitutionality of legal provision that serves as a basis for the judgment (see 
Articles 31-44 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997). 
147
  See Article 191 of the Constitution 1997. 
148
  See Article 2 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. 
149
  Judges of the TK have relatively large freedom in interpreting the constitution. The law does not instruct 
that they need to apply a plain meaning (literal) interpretation of the constitution. The law says only that 
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There are three main arguments which allow for a conjecture that the behavior of the TK judges 
might be explained by such ideological bias. The first (and the main attitudinal) reason concerns 
the appointment procedure to the court. As already pointed out, the constitutional judges are 
elected to the TK through a mechanism that heavily (if not entirely) relies on the political 
influence of the parliamentarian majorities.150 An absolute majority of votes needed to appoint the 
judge by the Sejm gives no incentives to the timely majorities to appoint individuals that differ 
significantly from their policy preferences. The following numbers should be illustrative. In the 
years 1997-2012, 31 judges were appointed to the TK. From those, 29 judges were nominated by 
the groups belonging to the then governing majorities. In most cases the opposition also proposed 
some candidates. However, they never received the required majority. Consequently, the 
governing majorities, regardless of their political position, largely assume that they do not have to 
share decisions concerning appointments with the opposition (hence the inexistence of a quota 
system). As this political behavior is common practice, it became increasingly apparent that each 
change of political configuration of the Sejm is reflected in future appointments. In addition, 
given the political importance of the Court (actual extension of the legislative process), the 
parliamentary majorities have a clear benefit being careful in the selection of the judges they 
appoint. They want to minimize a mistake of appointing an individual with very different policy 
preferences. It is therefore safe to presume that the preferences of the political parties and those of 
appointed judges are strongly aligned.151 In other words, there might be a sincere correlation of 
political and judicial preferences. Some institutional safeguards such as comfortable retirement 
arrangements might reinforce sincere voting. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
judges are impartial and subject to the constitution (see Article 195 of the Constitution 1997 and Article 6 
of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997). 
150
  The political dominance is not the only weakness of the appointment process to the TK. There are several 
other problems. First, the short period of time given by the law to appoint the judges to the TK (30 days) 
reduces the transparency of the process and practically eliminates the possibility for public debate on the 
candidates. Second, the information about the candidates’ merits given by the nominating bodies is very 
limited. It is often the case that the press investigation reveals some disgraceful facts about the candidates 
to the TK. Thirdly, the judicial and academic circles are not invited to recommend the candidates to the TK 
or to examine the merits of the candidates. Fourth, there is no fixed procedure for electing the judges. 
Judges are appointed individually but on several occasions they were elected en banc (voting on all 
candidates together) (see Bojarski 2010). 
151
  The judicial and academic circles do not present their views on the candidates. 
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The second argument supporting the conjecture of ideological bias of the judges is based on the 
limited tenure at the court (recall that judges in Poland serve their duties for nine years only152). 
Due to the limited tenure, the judges’ future career is not entirely insulated from the influence of 
the political parties. One could think that judges terminating their duties at the TK seek new 
appointments to other high level occupations in the political sphere or they hope to play an 
important role in consultancy of lawmaking in the future. On several occasions, former 
constitutional judges indeed continued their careers by being nominated to other public positions. 
For instance, after retiring from the TK, some judges were appointed as members of the Monetary 
Policy Council at the National Bank of Poland and the State Election Commission, as judges of 
the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights, as members of the 
Legislative Council in the Prime Minister Office, as the President of the Chief Administrative 
Court and as Ombudsman. 
At the same time, further strategic considerations could be relevant such as reputational gains with 
the relevant audiences, perceived personalization of case law, or enhancing academic prestige. All 
these factors might explain why constitutional judges are expected to take into account political 
determinants in strategic ways.  
Finally, the third argument to support the conjecture on ideological bias is the fact that political 
actors challenge the laws through an abstract review, thus without a direct relation to a specific 
concrete dispute.153 Unlike in the United States, the most controversial cases in the Polish Court 
are filed by various political actors since they are the key players in the access to abstract review. 
In those cases where political actors challenge legislation, the Court has limited docket control 
(i.e. control over which cases are adjudicated).154 Thus, constitutional judges in Poland have to 
                                                    
152
  In some supreme/constitutional courts around the world, judges hold life tenure. This is, for instance, the 
case in the US Supreme Court (Calabresi and Lindgren, 2006). 
153
  About 20-30% of cases reviewed by the TK in an abstract form were initiated by the explicit political 
bodies, i.e. President of the Republic, deputies, senators and Presidents of the Sejm or the Senate (own 
calculation based on the dataset created for the purpose of this chapter). 
154
  Although docket control is limited, the Court has some tools to dismiss the cases. This can be done only in 
the situation when the petition is evidently groundless (see Article 36 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 
1997). According to the practice, the TK dismisses very often also those cases which are filed by a group 
of MPs at the end of a parliamentary term. At the time of the constitutional discussion by the Court, very 
often this group already ceased its power to initiate judicial review due to the beginning of a new 
parliamentary term. See, for instance, the decision K 34/09. The judgment can be accessed through the 
electronic base of judgments: http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
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decide on the constitutionality of specific laws precisely because political bodies want to know the 
Court’s standpoint. It is in contrast to the US Supreme Court where constitutional adjudication 
can only be triggered by the courts by means of concrete constitutional review. In the US the 
constitutional review is more independent from the political process, as explicit political actors do 
not have access to the constitutional review. The consequence is that judges in the TK typically 
have to adjudicate since there are heavy ideological differences and non-negligible political 
interests at stake. One can expect therefore that, at least in these politicized cases, the pattern of 
ideological voting should prevail. 
On numerous occasions, the TK decided on cases in which ideological differences and political 
stakes were significant. For instance, the TK was obliged to adjudicate in vulnerable cases on 
lustration process155, pensions of the former secret service agents156, relationship between the state 
and the church157, financing of the catholic universities158 and regulations of the credit unions159. 
Those cases had straightforward political implications with distinct ideological consequences. The 
current (in place since 2001) ideological division in Poland is, yet, more subtle than the clear left-
right fragmentation typical for the old democracies. Broadly speaking, the Polish political stage 
can be divided into left-of-center (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, hereinafter SLD), center 
(Platforma Obywatelska, hereinafter PO) and extreme right (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereinafter 
PiS).160 Under this setting, the largest ideological disparity should be observed between the left-
wing SLD and the anti-socialist extreme right-wing party PiS. Interestingly, regarding economic 
aspects, the most conservative approach is taken by PO. PiS could be classified as moderately 
                                                    
155
  See judgment K 2/07. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
156
  See judgment K 6/09. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
157
  See judgment K 3/09. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
158
  See judgment K 55/07. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
159
  See judgment Kp 10/09. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
160
  In the current parliamentary setting there are three other political parties present in the Sejm, i.e. Polish 
People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, hereinafter PSL), Palikot’s Movement (Twój Ruch, 
hereinafter TR) and United Poland (Solidarna Polska, hereinafter SP). PSL is currently the coalition partner 
of the PO (centrist party). In years 1993-1997 and 2001-2003, however, this party was the coalition junior 
partner of the leftist governments. TP and SP, in turn, are relatively new parties on the Polish political 
scene. 
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conservative as while supporting certain welfare programs during the ruling of this party the 
largest tax reduction was pursued.161 
These three arguments explain why the ideology might be crucial in determining the behavior of 
the Polish constitutional judges, either by sincere voting or by pondering strategic interests. 
Nevertheless, some limitations as to which extent ideological goals can be advanced by judges 
need to be recognized. One should not expect all decisions to be polarized and ideology or party 
alignment to explain all voting. In fact, most importantly, judges might be simply dissent averse. 
This can be justified by different reasons. Crucially, dissenting requires additional work (judge 
needs to justify the reason of a dissenting opinion). Dissenting also leads to difficulties in collegial 
relationships, which might have detrimental effects on the workplace.162 Additionally, in the civil 
law tradition, to which Poland adheres, the emphasis is put on the consensus since dissent is 
perceived as harming legitimacy.163 Excessive political and ideological division in the Court could 
reduce its prestige vis-à-vis other courts (in particular, the Supreme Court164), and therefore 
diminish the influence of constitutional judges over judicial ranks, and ultimately, the legal 
system overall.165 Finally, not all cases allow the same discretion or are open to identical 
ideological argumentation (there is an opportunity element to be considered). 
An ideological vote can be particularly difficult to cast in cases which have fiscal implications, i.e. 
where decision on unconstitutionality might lead to an increase (decrease) of expenditure or 
increase (decrease) of tax income. There are two main reasons for this. First, the case law suggests 
that budget balance and public finance sustainability are treated as implicit constitutional 
principles, which are binding for the TK decisions. In its adjudication TK several times 
                                                    
161
  The most prevailing personal income tax was decreased by PiS government from 32% to 18%.  
162
  See Edelman et al. (2012) and Epstein et al. (2011). 
163
  See Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo (2007). 
164
  The Supreme Court is a judicial body to administer the justice system in Poland and is considered the last 
instance in all sorts of cases (excluding constitutional adjudication). The Constitutional Tribunal – the TK 
– is a specialized court with a duty to review the legal acts for their conformity with the Constitution. The 
TK decisions cannot be challenged by the Supreme Court as the TK is not subordinate to the Supreme 
Court. 
165
  The relationship between the TK and the Supreme Court in Poland is quite conflicting. For several years, 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court could resolve the issue as whose judgments are more 
important. It is of particular tension in those cases where the decisions of the two courts are contradictory 
(see, for instance, Jankowski 2011). The conflict emerges from the fact that it is not clear to what extent the 
interpretation of statutes fixed by the TK is binding for the ordinary courts (see Garlicki 2002). 
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underscored that the public goods that should be particularly protected is the condition of public 
finance and safeguard against excessive indebtedness of the public sector.166 The principle of 
budget balance and public finance sustainability is usually given priority when clashing principles 
are being applied.167 The second reason relates to the obligation imposed by the Constitution 1997 
and the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. Both these docuemnts require that a TK judgment that 
has financial consequences not provided for in the budget shall seek the opinion of the national 
government.168 This allows clarifying fully the fiscal context and what are the actual fiscal 
consequences of the TK judgment. Hence, for fiscal cases the final decision of the TK is made 
having full awareness of the budget consequences. This awareness of budget consequences and of 
potential harm to the budget could have some sort of de-politicizing effect on judicial behavior. 
Also due to this special procedure, it is very likely that media visibility and public scrutiny over 
fiscal cases are more encompassing. Given that budget balance and sustainability of public 
finance stand as constitutional principles and that judges are more aware of budget consequences 
of their decisions, the ideological voting in fiscal cases should be less probable or – as formalist 
would argue – even entirely damped.169 
Summing-up, in this chapter the following approach is taken. The hypothesis is that Constitutional 
judges want to advance their ideological goals, either sincerely or strategically but they are 
constrained by a variety of institutional factors. When those ideological goals are important, 
judges will sacrifice other considerations and make decisions according to the most explicit party 
                                                    
166
  See judgment K 40/02. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
167
  See judgment K 2/00. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
168
  See Article 190 (3) of the Constitution 1997 and Article 44 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997. 
169
  A couple of recent judgments seem to indicate that the TK is indeed concerned with the stance of public 
finance. For instance, in judgment K 9/12 the TK denied granting compensation to three million of retired 
people who were disadvantaged due to a change of indexation system of retirement. The TK decision 
protected the budget and held back a withdrawal of 1.8 billion PLN in compensation. In its non-unanimous 
judgment the TK acknowledged that a change of indexation is an essential part of the austerity program, 
which aims at breaking the growth of public debt. Similarly, in judgment K 1/12 the TK denied striking 
down a law that froze the remunerations of judges and prosecutors, asserting that a concern about the state 
of public finance is the responsibility of the authorities. The TK decision in that case was not unanimous. It 
is to stress that even the budget balance principle might be used strategically by judges. For instance, if the 
majority of judges in the adjudicating bench are aligned with the party which pursue the austerity 
programs, these judges might conveniently refer to the principle of budget balance in order to help the 
party which nominated them. The judgment can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: 
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 2015). 
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interests. In fiscal cases, which involve even more institutional restraints on voting in accordance 
with party alignment, it is expected that ideological bias is weaker or even entirely eliminated. 
 
4.4. A preliminary quantitative exploration 
 
This chapter applies regression analysis to a unique dataset collected and coded by the author. An 
emphasis is given to abstract judicial review of statutes, in cases initiated by explicit political 
actors (i.e. the President of the Republic, 50 deputies, 30 senators or the Presidents of Sejm and 
Senate) from July 2003 to October 2014.170 As already mentioned, those cases are the most 
politicized and particular party interests can be easily identified. The sub-sample of fiscal cases 
refers to the adjudications that mention in their decisions budgetary consequences. 
There are several reasons to constrain the cases analyzed to the period 2003-2014. First, in the late 
1990s, the TK went through major institutional changes (see section 2). Most importantly, only 
since the end of 1999, the decisions by the TK are binding and parliamentarian supermajorities 
cannot reject the judgments of the Court. It is argued that timespan until 2003 is sufficient to 
internalize the effect of these reforms and stabilize the role of the TK under the new constitutional 
provisions. It is of note that no major reforms of the TK were introduced or pursued after 2003. 
Second, all judges adjudicating over the period 2003-2013 were chosen after the institutional 
reforms of 1997. Specifically, they were part of the (new designed) Court consisting of 15 judges 
and they all were chosen for a period of nine years (with no possibility of reappointment). Third, 
at the beginning of 2000s one can observe an increase in the number of cases petitioned by the 
MPs, which most often have significant political context. For instance, while in the period 1997-
                                                    
170
  Abstract judicial reviews of statutes are classified by the TK under two letter codes, i.e. K (ex post abstract 
review) and Kp (ex ante abstract review). Due to the fact that the availability of the documentation on the 
TK website is limited, it was impossible to identify petitioners in six cases, i.e. K 12/02, K 19/02, K 34/03, 
K 24/04, K 38/04 and K 17/12. Consequently, those cases are not part of the dataset. The judgments can be 
accessed through the electronic base of judgments: http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on 
February 25, 2015). 
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2001, the Court decided an average of two cases filed by the deputies per year; in 2002-2006 it 
increased to six cases yearly.171 
Overall the dataset includes 73 cases, 344 decisions (issues) and 3,595 individual decisions 
(votes). Out of these, 1,947 individual decisions were taken in fiscal cases, i.e. cases which had 
some budgetary implications. Some caveats to these numbers are in order. First, the number of 
decisions is much larger than the number of cases since a single judgment (case) might consist of 
several issues being analyzed. The reason for this is that petitioners usually challenge numerous 
articles of a particular legislation. Second, although the judges in the adjudicating benches vote on 
the whole judgment (case) at once, it is assumed that judges cast several votes depending on the 
number of issues comprised in the judgment. For instance, if the judgment consists of four issues, 
and the decision of the bench is that all the provisions are in conformity with the constitution, the 
judge who does not present a dissenting opinion will be counted as casting four votes for 
constitutionality.172 In case s/he presents a dissenting opinion with respect to one issue, three of 
his/her votes are considered in favor of the constitutionality and one against it. Lastly, specifically 
in the Polish TK, besides declaring the simple and partial173 constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality of the provision174, the adjudicating bench can decide that the provision ‘is not 
in unconformity’175 with the constitution. This decision conveys that the control benchmark 
(constitutional provision), which was proposed by the petitioner to be the basis for judging in 
favor or against constitutionality of a specific article, is considered irrelevant by the Court. In this 
                                                    
171
  See Trybunał Konstytucyjny (2006). 
172
  It is important to note that the decisions in the adjudicating benches are taken by a simple majority. Judges 
vote secretly and if they do not agree with the final judgment, they are allowed to present the dissenting 
opinions. In the view of this chapter, the absence of the dissenting opinion indicates that a judge, even if 
initially s/he voted differently than the majority, eventually s/he agrees with the decision of the 
adjudicating bench. 
173
  In addition to judgments on the simple conformity to the constitution of a legal provision, the TK has also 
developed so-called partial decisions. Partial decisions refer to recognizing only a partial non-conformity 
of the reviewed provision, e.g. only to the extent to which the specific provision could have a retroactive 
application. 
174
  The statute, article or portion of the article is counted as unconstitutional if it is struck down with respect to 
at least one control benchmark (constitutional provision). It is often the case that petitioners quote or 
propose several constitutional provisions to declare specific article or the entire law unconstitutional. 
175
  This is an explicit translation of the Polish expression: “nie jest niezgodny z (…)”. 
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chapter, for the sake of empirical consistency, the view is taken as if this decision is in favor of 
constitutionality.176 
It is important to stress that among 344 decisions, unanimous decisions were an important 
fraction: 222 (roughly 65%). This could serve as a first indication of dissent aversion and 
constraining effect of institutional realities in the TK. The 344 decisions which are studied can be 
divided into 66 decisions from July 2003 to October 2005 (leftist government), 106 decisions 
from 2005 to November 2007 (extreme right government), 172 decisions from 2007 to 2014 
(centrist government). Thus, the sample fairly represents all political cycles enabling to conclude 
that the econometric results are not primarily driven by a certain particular political context. 
In the analyzed period, i.e. from July 2003 to October 2014, there have been in total 30 judges 
adjudicating in constitutional cases.177 They were mostly male and, in general, they were 
academically oriented. Some judges had a political past, i.e. they were members of political 
parties or even served as MPs in the parliament. From among the 30 judges, seven were appointed 
by the left-wing SLD. The remaining judges were appointed by center and right-wing parties. 
However, it is of note that some of the parties which nominated judges in our dataset disappeared 
at some point before 2014 (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, hereinafter AWS; Unia Wolności, 
hereinafter UW) or lost representation in the parliament during the period we consider (Liga 
Polskich Rodzin, hereinafter LPR). For the summary of the individual characteristics see appendix 
1.  
The preliminary exploration starts by looking at simple conditional probabilities of voting for and 
against constitutionality. In the first step, the whole 3595 individual votes are divided into those 
for constitutionality (56.5%) and those against constitutionality (43.5%), in reference to the 344 
decisions advanced by the Court. In the second step, it was identified whether the petitioners (i.e. 
the group of deputies, the President of the Republic or the President of the Sejm) represent the 
party which nominated a particular judge. Recall that a petitioner challenges the law and claims its 
                                                    
176
  The reason for such interpretation is that, on several occasions, judges presented a dissenting opinion 
stating that they found the law unconstitutional, when the majority had decided that the legal provision is 
not being in unconformity with the constitution (see, for instance, the judgment Kp 1/08). The judgment 
can be accessed through the electronic base of judgments: http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed 
on February 25, 2015). 
177
  Overall, between July 2003 and April 2013, there were 31 judges appointed to the TK. However, one judge 
resigned from the post without adjudicating in any of the considered cases in our dataset. 
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unconstitutionality. Overall, table 4.1 shows that a vote against constitutionality is slightly more 
likely when the petitioner and the judge are of the same party (55.1%) as compared to the 
situation where the petitioner is associated with a different party (39.1%). Similarly, the vote for 
constitutionality is more probable when the petitioner and the judge are from different parties 
(60.9%) than when they are associated with the same parties (44.9%). 
Table 4.1. Voting for constitutionality (all decisions) 
 Vote against 
constitutionality 
Vote for 
constitutionality 
Total 
A petitioner associated with 
the same party as judge 546 (55.1%) 445 (44.9%) 991 (27.6%) 
A petitioner associated with a 
different party 1,017 (39.1%) 1,587 (60.9%) 2,604 (72.4%) 
Total 1,563 (43.5%) 2,032 (56.5%) 3,595 (100%) 
 
It is important to stress that the dataset includes the cases filed by Presidents Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski (left of center) and Bronisław Komorowski (centrist party), who occasionally 
challenged laws issued by parties from which they politically originated. In that situation, 
however, judges might be addressing a conflict of interest between two political bodies with the 
same political preferences. Thus, a vote for constitutionality does not necessary show that the 
judge goes against her/his ideological background. Similarly, a vote for unconstitutionality does 
not need to indicate straight ideological alignment. Table 4.2 introduces conditional probabilities 
where petitions by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski are excluded. To a large extent, the 
results are fairly similar. 
Table 4.2. Voting for constitutionality (cases filed by Presidents Kwaśniewski and 
Komorowski are excluded) 
 Vote against 
constitutionality 
Vote for 
constitutionality 
Total 
A petitioner associated with 
the same party as judge 446 (54.5%) 373 (45.5%) 819 (25.5%) 
A petitioner associated with a 
different party 873 (36.4%) 1,523 (63.6%) 2,396 (74.5%) 
Total 1,319 (41.0%) 1,896 (59.0%) 3,215 (100%) 
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Table 4.3 depicts an additional contingency analysis178 for nonunanimous decisions (122 
decisions). The voting patterns for and against constitutionality seem to be even stronger 
associated with the background of the petitioner. A vote against constitutionality is much more 
likely when the petitioner and the judge are of the same party (66.7%) as compared to the 
situation where the petitioner is associated with a different party (38.9%). Similarly, the vote for 
constitutionality is more probable when the petitioner and the judge are from different parties 
(63.6%) than when they are associated with the same parties (45.5%). 
Table 4.3. Voting for constitutionality (only nonunanimous decisions) 
 Vote against 
constitutionality 
Vote for 
constitutionality 
Total 
A petitioner associated with 
the same party as judge 294 (66.7%) 147 (33.3%) 441 (30.4%) 
A petitioner associated with a 
different party 392 (38.9%) 616 (61.1%) 1,008 (69.6%) 
Total 686 (47.3%) 763 (52.7%) 1,449 (100%) 
 
Since the central inquiry of this chapter is to verify how judicial behavior changes once judges are 
faced with fiscal cases, table 4.4 shows contingency analysis for these cases only. Table 4.4 
demonstrates a very similar pattern of voting for and against constitutionality as compared to the 
aforementioned contingency analyses. A vote against constitutionality is slightly more likely 
when the petitioner and the judge are of the same party (52.4%) as compared to the situation 
where the petitioner is associated with a different party (37.4%). Similarly, the vote for 
constitutionality is more probable when the petitioner and the judge are from different parties 
(62.6%) than when they are associated with the same parties (47.6%). 
Table 4.4. Voting for constitutionality (only fiscal cases) 
 Vote against 
constitutionality 
Vote for 
constitutionality 
Total 
A petitioner associated with 
the same party as judge 218 (52.4%) 198 (47.6%) 416 (21.4%) 
A petitioner associated with a 
different party 573 (37.4%) 958 (62.6%) 1,531 (78.6%) 
Total 791 (40.6%) 1,156 (59.4%) 1,947 (100%) 
                                                    
178
  Contingency analysis is a statistical tool, which enables displaying frequency distributions of given 
variables (Rószkiewicz, 2002). 
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Another way of illustrating a potential ideological bias is by showing the votes for and against 
constitutionality distributed among judges nominated by different political camps when they are 
faced with cases filed by the SLD (left of center) and PiS (extreme right), i.e. parties considered 
having the largest ideological disparity. The distribution of votes by judges representing the main 
political parties (SLD – left of center, PO – center, PiS – extreme right) is shown in table 4.5. It 
can be observed from the table that judges appointed by SLD are more likely to vote against 
constitutionality in cases where the petitioner is associated with SLD. The results are reversed, i.e. 
‘SLD judges’ tend to vote for constitutionality, when the case is filed by PiS. Also ‘PiS judges’ 
differ in their voting patterns when faced with PiS (more probable vote against constitutionality) 
and SLD petitioners (more probable vote for constitutionality). ‘PO judges’, in turn, are much 
more likely to vote for constitutionality in cases challenged by both SLD and PiS. However, a low 
number of observations for ‘PO judges’, when petitioner is associated with SLD, should be 
acknowledged. 
Table 4.5. Vote for constitutionality after identifying petitioners and party nominations (all 
decisions) 
 SLD petitioner (left) PiS petitioner (extreme right) 
 Unconstitutional Constitutional Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Judges appointed by 
SLD (left of center) 
361 
(56.8%) 
275 
(43.2%) 
83 
(34.9%) 
155 
(65.1%) 
Judges appointed by  
PO (center) 
16 
(39.0%) 
25 
(61.0%) 
103 
(26.4%) 
287 
(73.6%) 
Judges appointed by  
PiS (extreme right) 
127 
(28.1%) 
325 
(71.9%) 
162 
(52.1%) 
149 
(47.9%) 
The same exercise is replicated for the sample of fiscal cases. From table 4.6, it can be observed 
that judges appointed by PO (economic conservatives) are much more likely to vote for 
constitutionality in cases challenged by both SLD (economic left of center) and PiS (moderately 
conservative). ‘SLD judges’ are more likely to vote against constitutionality in cases where the 
petitioner is associated with SLD and to vote for constitutionality when the case is filed by PiS. A 
reverse pattern is observed in case of ‘PiS judges’. It is slightly more likely that ‘PiS judges’ vote 
against constitutionality when case is petitioned by PiS and also more likely that they vote for 
constitutionality if faced with SLD petitions. 
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Table 4.6. Vote for constitutionality after identifying petitioners and party nominations 
(only fiscal cases) 
 SLD petitioner  
(economic left of center) 
PiS petitioner  
(economic left of center) 
 Unconstitutional Constitutional Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Judges appointed by 
SLD (economic left 
of center) 
100  
(61%) 
64  
(39.0%) 
52  
(36.6%) 
90  
(63.4%) 
Judges appointed by  
PO (economic 
conservative) 
13  
(39.4%) 
20  
(60.6%) 
79  
(24.5%) 
243  
(75.5%) 
Judges appointed by  
PiS (economic left 
of center) 
25  
(38.5%) 
40  
(61.5%) 
122  
(51.9%) 
113  
(48.1%) 
 
The contingency analysis suggests that, even though a significant number of decisions are 
unanimous, there is preliminary evidence to support the conjecture that, in general, judges seem to 
respond (sincerely or strategically) to the identity of the petitioner. The same holds for fiscal 
cases. Therefore, judges seem to cast ideological vote even in light of the fact that their decisions 
might have heavy budgetary implications. 
 
4.5.  Regression Analysis  
 
In order to test more robustly the conjecture that judges vote in accordance with their ideological 
stance, a more sophisticated regression exercise is employed. A set of regressions is presented to 
support the above preliminary results, and further investigate determinants of judicial behavior in 
the Polish TK both at the general level and regarding fiscal cases. A dummy dependent variable, 
i.e. vote for constitutionality, takes value one when a judge votes for constitutionality and zero 
otherwise. A set of independent (explanatory) variables is summarized in table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7. Independent variables for regression analysis 
Political variables:  
 Request: 1 if the party of the judge requested the judicial review, 0 otherwise; 
 Government: 1 if the party of the judge is in the government, 0 otherwise. 
Personal 
characteristics of 
judges: 
 
 SLD: 1 if the judge was nominated by SLD, 0 otherwise; 
 PiS: 1 if the judge was nominated by PiS, 0 otherwise; 
 PO: 1 if the judge was nominated by PO, 0 otherwise; 
 LPR: 1 if the judge was nominated by LPR, 0 otherwise; 
 PSL: if the judge was nominated by PSL; 0 otherwise; 
 AWS/UW: if the judge was nominated by AWS or UW, 0 otherwise (due to the 
inclusion of the constant term, this category does not appear in the regressions, i.e. 
serves as a baseline category); 
 Gender: 1 if the judge is female, 0 otherwise; 
 Age: the age of the judge at the time of appointment; 
 Prof: 1 if the judge pursued an academic career, 0 otherwise; 
 Political involvement: 1if the judge was politically involved in the past, 0 otherwise. 
Function of the 
judge in the 
adjudicating bench: 
 
 Chair: 1 if the judge is a chairman in the adjudicating bench, 0 otherwise; 
 Rapporteur: 1 if the judge is a rapporteur in the adjudicating bench, 0 otherwise. 
Characterization of 
the decisions: 
 
 Big bench: 1 if the decision was taken by a big bench (i.e. minimum 9 judges), 0 
otherwise; 
 Unanimity: 1 if the decision was without dissenting opinion, 0 otherwise. 
 
  138  
 
It is of note that several fixed effects per judge and per court179 were included in the explanatory 
variables set as well. Usually with these types of regression, one should consider the signal and 
not put too much emphasis on the magnitude in the estimated coefficients. Although the purpose 
is mainly to assess qualitatively the impact of explanatory variables on the probability of a judge 
voting for constitutionality, the marginal effects180 for main explanatory variables are also 
presented. Due to the non-independence of votes within cases and decisions (recall that each case 
might encompass more than one decision or issue181), the appropriate logit models with clustering 
by case and by decision are applied182. 
According to strict legal formalism183, there should be no systematic correlation between the 
dependent variable of interest (vote for or against constitutionality) and political variables 
(Request). In view of formalism, the constitutional disputes should be resolved in light of facts of 
the case and precedents with respect to the plain meaning of the constitution and intent of its 
drafters. Decision for or against constitutionality should not therefore depend on the fact that body 
challenging the law and the judge are associated with the same political party. In a formalist 
model, a coefficient of the Request should not be statistically significant.  
In line with the attitudinal and the strategic models that propose ideology as the factor shaping 
judicial behavior, the prediction is that variable capturing ideology should be statistically 
significant. Regarding the variable Request, it is expected therefore that the vote for 
constitutionality is less likely when the law is challenged by the party that nominated the judge. In 
the cases analyzed in this chapter, the petitioner, who challenged the law, always claimed its 
                                                    
179
  Fixed effects per judges and court allow controlling for unobservable features that vary across judges and 
courts but do not change over time. To cover fixed effects, dummy variables per judge and per court are 
used.  
180
  Marginal effects inform what a change in probability of voting constitutionality is if judges are from the 
same party as petitioner as compared to situation where judges are from different party than petitioner. 
181
  Note that almost each case adjudicated by the TK consists of several decisions as typically more than one 
provision of the statutory law is challenged. 
182
  Logit is a typical empirical model to apply in a situation where a dependent variable is of a binary nature, 
i.e. zero-one variable. In the context of this chapter, the dependent variable is whether judges vote for or 
against the constitutionality. Clustering is applied in order to control for specific interactions among judges 
adjudicating in specific decision or in specific case.  
183
  Legal formalism takes the stance that judges simply interpret and apply the constitution and the law in a 
conformist view of precedents. Judges are largely guided by what the law says and abide by a strict legal 
authoritative interpretation (Robertson, 1998; 2010). 
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unconstitutionality. Consequently, it is anticipated that the coefficient of Request variable should 
be negative. Due to institutional restraints depicted in section 4.3, the expectation is that the 
absolute value of the coefficient should be smaller in the sample of fiscal cases. Several logit 
regressions with clustering by decisions are produced in table 4.8 and 4.9. While table 4.8 
presents estimates for the general sample, table 4.9 focuses exclusively on fiscal cases. Table 4.12 
and 4.13 in appendix 4.2 present the same regressions with clustering by cases. 
The regression analysis largely confirms the preliminary analysis of the dataset. The influence of 
the ideologies and party politics seem to matter. As expected, coefficient for Request variable has 
a negative sign and is significant for almost all specifications. Particularly, the results are robust 
for selected subsamples and irrespective of clustering by decisions (table 4.8 and table 4.9) or by 
cases (table 4.12 and 4.13 in appendix 4.2). This strongly supports the view that constitutional 
judges respond to the interests of political bodies. Overall, the probability that a judge will vote 
for constitutionality decreases when the judge’s party requests the judicial review. However, the 
absolute values of coefficients are somewhat smaller in the sample of fiscal cases. This supports 
the conjecture that ideological bias exists in fiscal cases but is weaker due to additional 
institutional restraints. The probability of voting for constitutionality decreases by 15-35%, if the 
judge is associated with the party which challenges the law in the general sample. For the sample 
with fiscal cases only, the likelihood of voting for constitutionality decreases by 7-22%, if the 
judge is related to the petitioning party. See table 4.14 and table 4.15 in appendix 4.3 for relevant 
marginal effects184. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
184
  For marginal effects see footnote 180. 
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Table 4.8. Vote for constitutionality (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions VARIABLES 
       
Request -0.80442*** -0.72971*** -1.46779*** -0.65893*** -0.59320*** -0.65855** 
 
(0.15947) (0.15913) (0.27647) (0.17011) (0.16847) (0.29940) 
Government 0.02773 0.19006 -0.59300* 0.25361 0.44590* 0.26347 
 
(0.21852) (0.24191) (0.33000) (0.20859) (0.25326) (0.38181) 
Big bench -0.02210 0.01977 -0.76284* -0.04700 -0.01026 -1.00520*** 
 
(0.26124) (0.27519) (0.42694) (0.25864) (0.27378) (0.38969) 
Unanimity 0.33510 0.50733**  0.38971 0.56271**  
 
(0.22497) (0.24355)  (0.23782) (0.25793)  
PO 0.88862* 0.66881 3.97543***    
 
(0.47093) (0.50691) (0.76450)    
SLD 0.53527** 0.38711* 1.32767***    
 
(0.21961) (0.22010) (0.33373)    
PiS 0.62761** 0.55479* 1.85857***    
 
(0.28294) (0.29343) (0.41233)    
LPR 0.21422 0.32685 1.49684***    
 
(0.27512) (0.29787) (0.41168)    
PSL 0.90498* 0.79653 3.48457***    
 
(0.49268) (0.53677) (0.76816)    
Gender 0.06765 0.05897 0.23842**    
 
(0.05609) (0.06216) (0.10786)    
Prof -0.12388* -0.10704 -0.18489    
 
(0.06701) (0.07340) (0.13415)    
Political involvement 0.05836 0.03594 0.04560    
 
(0.05846) (0.06731) (0.09911)    
Age 0.01532*** 0.01544*** 0.03318***    
 
(0.00377) (0.00412) (0.01002)    
Chair 0.17547** 0.15339* 0.29016    
 
(0.08316) (0.09100) (0.21337)    
Rapporteur 0.22321*** 0.16788*** 0.39310***    
 (0.06130) (0.06371) (0.13289)    
Constant -1.02574** -1.05201** -2.07941*** 0.00038 0.12969 1.80629*** 
 (0.42610) (0.46127) (0.71629) (0.34419) (0.37687) (0.54240) 
       
Court fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Judge fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0709 0.0711 0.2652 0.0892 0.0817 0.2927 
Observations 3,595 3,215 1,449 3,595 3,215 1,449 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by decisions. Regressions (1)-(3) do not contain judge and court fixed effects. 
Regressions (4)-(6) employ judge and court fixed effects. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset; regressions 
(2) and (5) exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall that Presidents 
Kwaśniewski and Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO respectively); 
regressions (3) and (6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.9. Vote for constitutionality in fiscal cases (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full  
sample 
Without 
Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions VARIABLES 
       
Request -0.58617*** -0.79527*** -1.04307*** -0.47867** -0.76376*** -0.34202 
 (0.20832) (0.19555) (0.31435) (0.24240) (0.23245) (0.41241) 
Government -0.08181 -0.05833 -2.13241*** 0.34713 0.27765 1.39110*** 
 (0.38815) (0.40552) (0.40193) (0.30492) (0.33138) (0.53530) 
Big bench 0.26402 0.30476 -0.02751 0.23670 0.28913 0.06891 
 (0.35152) (0.36906) (0.56521) (0.35270) (0.36937) (0.65133) 
Unanimity -0.40854 -0.30263  -0.40054 -0.28793  
 (0.33198) (0.35391)  (0.34516) (0.36285)  
PO 0.75313 0.53775 5.77269***    
 (0.72394) (0.76398) (1.05558)    
SLD 0.22263 0.13971 2.03083***    
 (0.34530) (0.36218) (0.70485)    
PiS -0.07400 0.02112 1.54605**    
 (0.39321) (0.38870) (0.67618)    
LPR -0.14725 0.02772 1.46673**    
 (0.38266) (0.40557) (0.66807)    
PSL 0.75885 0.72961 5.40807***    
 (0.73581) (0.76816) (1.05277)    
Gender -0.03489 -0.09645 -0.20317    
 (0.07687) (0.08359) (0.19922)    
Prof -0.29834*** -0.28081*** -0.87187***    
 (0.08579) (0.09550) (0.22924)    
Political 
involvement 
-0.05884 -0.06711 0.00669    
(0.06985) (0.07891) (0.14586)    
Age 0.00860 0.01270** 0.03208*    
 (0.00555) (0.00617) (0.01737)    
Chair 0.14600 0.10695 0.41139    
 (0.09946) (0.10449) (0.41285)    
Rapporteur 0.38060*** 0.32892*** 0.84697***    
 (0.07007) (0.07024) (0.26561)    
Constant 0.07361 -0.12262 -2.06953** 0.57547 0.63297 0.43450 
 (0.56728) (0.60117) (0.97375) (0.41992) (0.44103) (0.75149) 
       
Court fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Judge fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0404 0.0383 0.2281 0.0442 0.0421 0.2589 
Observations 1,947 1,745 724 1,947 1,745 717 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by decisions. Regressions (1)-(3) do not contain judge and court fixed effects. 
Regressions (4)-(6) employ judge and court fixed effects. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset regarding 
fiscal cases; regressions (2) and (5) exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall 
that Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO 
respectively); regressions (3) and (6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In addition, one can observe that a robust pattern of statistical significance is present in case of 
age and certain party affiliation variables. Some systematic patterns can also be noticed for 
variables representing specific functions of the judges in the adjudicating bench, i.e. rapporteur 
(table 4.8 and 4.9) or chairman (table 4.8). The same is noticed for the unanimity over the case 
(table 4.8) and the fact that a judge held a university position (table 4.9). As to other variables, the 
vote for constitutionality seems to be random and unexplained by them. 
Institutional constraints may limit the ability of ideological voting. For instance, the fact that a 
judge is in charge of drafting the majority opinion (rapporteur) or chairs the adjudicating bench 
increases the probability of declaring that the law is in conformity with the constitution. Thus, it 
could be inferred that those judges who hold some functions in the adjudicating benches exert 
stronger presumption of the constitutionality.185 Lower absolute values of estimates for the sample 
of fiscal cases also suggest that institutional constraints matter. However, these institutional 
constraints are not able to entirely eliminate the ideological bias. Going beyond institutional 
constraints, the presumption of the constitutionality seems to be stronger also for older judges 
who, consequently, might be less responsive to parties’ interests. For instance, they might not 
expect further appointment after serving in the Court. 
Overall, party affiliation plays an important role in explaining the behavior of the TK judges but 
with some limitations given the institutional realties in the TK. Therefore, not a simple attitudinal 
model is proposed but an adjusted model where the advancement of ideological goals coincides 
with limitations imposed by institutional realities of the TK. The econometric results provide 
support for this approach. 
An alternative way to identify the ideological bias in the court could be by employing interaction 
terms186 between the variables concerning which party appointed the judge and whether the 
petitioner is, for instance, a left wing party. The interpretation is that a judge appointed by a given 
                                                    
185
  Presumption of the constitutionality states that the starting assumption is that law is in conformity with the 
constitution forasmuch as the law was promulgated by the legitimate, democratic legislative body. 
Therefore, the decision against the constitutionality should be made only in cases of clear breach of the 
constitutional provisions (see Czarnocka 2002 and judgment K 19/96). The judgment can be accessed 
through the electronic base of judgments: http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzeczenia/ (accessed on February 25, 
2015). 
186
  Interactions allow for testing conditional hypotheses, such as “a decrease in Y is correlated with a decrease 
in X when condition Z is fulfilled” (Brambor et al., 2005).  
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party and confronted with a petition filed by the leftists is less (if appointed by the lefty) or more 
(if appointed by the other political camps) likely to vote for constitutionality.  
Due to the limited number of observations where ‘PO, LPR and PSL judges’ voted on cases filed 
by SLD, the interaction terms for them are dropped. As a result, two interaction terms are 
considered for two most ideologically polarized parties, i.e. SLD and PiS. In the fiscal cases the 
largest ideological differences should be observed between SLD and PO. Yet again due to 
insufficient number of observations in which judges appointed by PO voted in case filed by SLD, 
it is impossible to robustly estimate the model for this political dimension. It is argued, however, 
that finding of ideological bias by comparing parties which are somewhat closer on the 
ideological spectrum is even more appealing.  
If the hypothesis of ideological alignment holds, then the judge appointed by SLD should help 
SLD petitioners (vote against constitutionality) while the opposite should happen for the judges 
appointed by PiS (vote for constitutionality). Hence, for the interaction term with appointments by 
SLD one should expect a negative coefficient whereas for appointments by PiS, one should 
anticipate a positive coefficient. Table 4.10 and 4.11 contain the several logit regressions with 
clustering by decisions for the general sample and sample of fiscal cases, respectively. Table 4.16 
and 4.17 in the appendix 4.4 demonstrate analogous regressions with clustering by cases. 
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Table 4.10. Vote for constitutionality (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full  
sample 
Without 
Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without 
Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions VARIABLES 
       
SLD*law  
challenged by SLD 
-0.51801** -0.45656* -3.10768*** -0.47599** -0.40884* -3.17215*** 
(0.20828) (0.24028) (0.98548) (0.21145) (0.24652) (1.03896) 
PiS*law  
challenged by SLD 
1.68781*** 1.24548*** 1.83614*** 1.74988*** 1.32024*** 1.78339*** 
(0.29542) (0.26347) (0.57352) (0.30319) (0.26939) (0.60474) 
Law challenged  
by SLD 
-0.33192 -0.20708 1.16566 -0.39823 -0.28361 1.14416 
(0.28319) (0.29541) (0.87783) (0.28530) (0.29806) (0.91500) 
PO 0.82683* 0.68691 5.88726*** 0.89577* 0.74646 5.89869*** 
 (0.48136) (0.52051) (1.45541) (0.50022) (0.53670) (1.42386) 
SLD 0.36605 0.22296 2.62970*** 0.45578* 0.29852 2.68720*** 
 (0.23399) (0.24107) (0.90483) (0.25140) (0.25558) (0.87698) 
PIS -0.45642 -0.33195 1.43166* -0.44470 -0.32544 1.38445* 
 (0.28743) (0.29377) (0.78868) (0.29090) (0.29731) (0.77996) 
LPR -0.00362 0.17602 1.92211*** 0.07770 0.26411 2.06215*** 
 (0.29051) (0.29819) (0.70200) (0.29975) (0.31153) (0.69905) 
PSL 0.51743 0.41511 5.02906*** 0.88462* 0.76130 5.37460*** 
 (0.48827) (0.52792) (1.39019) (0.51729) (0.55465) (1.35702) 
Unanimity 0.30999 0.47995*  0.32821 0.49146**  
 (0.22720) (0.24714)  (0.22840) (0.24787)  
Government -0.22716 0.06189 -1.96900*** -0.24826 0.04021 -1.99746*** 
 (0.24025) (0.25827) (0.51938) (0.24122) (0.25882) (0.52854) 
Big bench 0.00493 0.00874 -0.91710** 0.05935 0.04637 -0.87502** 
 (0.26259) (0.27374) (0.39986) (0.26306) (0.27338) (0.39379) 
Gender    0.05087 0.04862 0.25362** 
    (0.05585) (0.06079) (0.11871) 
Prof    -0.15189** -0.14402* -0.15251 
    (0.06910) (0.07589) (0.14000) 
Political 
involvement 
   0.08419 0.06185 -0.01188 
   (0.05706) (0.06327) (0.12071) 
Age    0.01302*** 0.01350*** 0.02178** 
    (0.00366) (0.00410) (0.00947) 
Chair    0.22349*** 0.19689** 0.07467 
    (0.08541) (0.09116) (0.20832) 
Rapporteur    0.21752*** 0.17277*** 0.23545* 
    (0.06264) (0.06294) (0.12906) 
Constant 0.05628 -0.02977 -0.91298 -0.75048* -0.82810* -2.15588** 
 (0.37798) (0.39518) (0.75347) (0.45356) (0.48458) (0.91245) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0755 0.0729 0.2867 0.0794 0.0760 0.2949 
Observations 3,595 3,215 1,449 3,595 3,215 1,449 
 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by decisions. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset; regressions (2) and 
(5) exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall that Presidents Kwaśniewski 
and Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO respectively); regressions (3) 
and (6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 4.11. Vote for constitutionality in fiscal cases (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full  
sample 
Without 
Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without 
Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions VARIABLES 
       
SLD*law  
challenged by SLD 
-0.86797** -1.14256** -4.04332** -0.87780** -1.16425** -4.09217** 
(0.33788) (0.44882) (1.94511) (0.34259) (0.45753) (2.08555) 
PiS*law  
challenged by SLD 
0.96077** 0.60672* -0.04361 1.00616** 0.66424** 0.11113 
(0.43461) (0.31507) (0.92939) (0.44368) (0.32732) (1.05449) 
Law challenged  
by SLD 
-0.30023 -0.02865 2.37646 -0.31111 -0.03826 2.39869 
(0.42508) (0.48146) (1.84498) (0.42950) (0.48947) (2.01461) 
PO 0.77118 0.65992 6.50380*** 0.83164 0.69421 6.75572*** 
 (0.72826) (0.76255) (1.53141) (0.74642) (0.78186) (1.55751) 
SLD 0.32394 0.23262 2.99843*** 0.43887 0.31377 3.26685*** 
 (0.35504) (0.36905) (1.13864) (0.37493) (0.38979) (1.10021) 
PIS -0.65534* -0.61636 1.41775 -0.62408 -0.60070 1.60710* 
 (0.39283) (0.40114) (0.92127) (0.39746) (0.40649) (0.97529) 
LPR -0.09880 0.06334 1.86256** -0.13397 0.01827 1.77614** 
 (0.37633) (0.38095) (0.87735) (0.38178) (0.39187) (0.84692) 
PSL 0.53942 0.46531 5.61178*** 0.81819 0.76445 6.50880*** 
 (0.73538) (0.76623) (1.43362) (0.76146) (0.79234) (1.60678) 
Unanimity -0.42509 -0.33312  -0.42936 -0.33740  
 (0.33913) (0.35991)  (0.34114) (0.36222)  
Government -0.24260 -0.19013 -2.46847*** -0.27036 -0.22102 -2.50908*** 
 (0.41229) (0.43370) (0.67736) (0.41415) (0.43694) (0.69335) 
Big bench 0.27211 0.25524 -0.04544 0.32295 0.29430 0.13777 
 (0.35704) (0.36909) (0.51251) (0.35662) (0.36862) (0.61983) 
Gender    -0.04815 -0.11195 -0.40418 
    (0.07749) (0.08595) (0.29572) 
Prof    -0.31814*** -0.30008*** -0.80697*** 
    (0.08786) (0.09807) (0.24812) 
Political 
involvement 
   -0.05122 -0.07875 -0.11153 
   (0.07097) (0.07901) (0.20894) 
Age    0.00793 0.01129* 0.03194 
    (0.00555) (0.00618) (0.02141) 
Chair    0.14909 0.08029 0.10187 
    (0.10206) (0.10645) (0.50583) 
Rapporteur    0.35219*** 0.31287*** 0.89867*** 
    (0.07227) (0.07375) (0.34371) 
       
       
Constant 0.46556 0.46990 -1.58968 0.16129 0.02374 -3.06065 
 (0.49399) (0.50608) (1.07963) (0.58182) (0.61975) (1.90438) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0445 0.0362 0.2575 0.0492 0.0410 0.2824 
Observations 1,947 1,745 724 1,947 1,745 724 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by decisions. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset regarding fiscal 
cases; regressions (2) and (5) exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall that 
Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO 
respectively); regressions (3) and (6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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As seen from table 4.10 and 4.11, the interaction terms of interest are highly statistically 
significant in all specifications in table 4.10 and somewhat less statistically significant (or 
occasionally not significant) in table 4.11. With one exception, they have the expected signs, 
which are in line with party alignment of the judges. Thus, whenever a judge appointed by SLD is 
confronted with a case filed by SLD, it is less probable that s/he votes for constitutionality. In 
contrast, the judges nominated by PiS are more likely to vote for the constitutionality when facing 
a law challenged by the SLD. The conclusion seems to be that the TK judges cast ideological bias 
in the direction of the parties which nominated them. This is in particular for judges nominated by 
the two most polarized political parties. For the sample of fiscal cases the estimates are somewhat 
less robust as they occasionally do not reach conventional significance level. This could be 
another piece of evidence that in fiscal cases party alignment is somewhat weaker.  
Similarly to previous regressions, also other variables are statistically robust. Once again 
institutional constraints seem to play a role. In particular, the fact that the judge is in charge of 
drafting the Court’s judgment (rapporteur) or chairs the adjudicating bench increases the 
likelihood of voting in favor of constitutionality. Additionally, statistical significance is observed 
for party affiliation (SLD, PO), age at the appointment and for academic employment of the 
judge. Other variables do not seem to have a robust pattern of statistical significance. 
 
4.6. Policy implications 
 
At the general level, this chapter inquired whether – by executing constitutional review – the 
judiciary is able to shape the course of fiscal policy. The answer to this question should be 
positive. The fact that ideological bias is present also in fiscal cases – despite considerable 
institutional restraints – might have important implications for public finance. Given that the 
majority of judges in the adjudicating benches are occasionally politically aligned with the 
petitioners (opposition parties)187, it might be harder for the governing party to pursue major 
                                                    
187
  It happens occasionally that the entire TK is dominated by the judges appointed by the opposition parties. 
Judges are replaced gradually only if tenure of other judges finishes. Therefore, particularly in the initial 
stage, after gaining the power, the winning party or collation faces the TK which is dominated by the 
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reforms of public finance, such as fiscal consolidation and public debt reduction. For instance, in 
times of economic distress necessary fiscal adjustments might be severely delayed or entirely 
damped by the TK. Under these circumstances, the TK can be perceived as a veto player biasing 
policy towards a status quo and hampering adjustments. If one considers the non-Keynesian 
effects of fiscal consolidations188, then lack of fiscal adjustment might result in economic growth 
forgone in the long- and short-run.189 Moreover, the current government is unlikely to conduct 
fiscal policy which is aligned with the preferences of the majority if, even periodically, the TK is 
dominated by the judges nominated by the opposition party. For instance, the TK might block 
important reforms regarding the reallocation of the public spending, which is in line with the 
preferences of the majority. This might endanger the reputation of the TK and further fuel the 
criticism regarding undemocratic foundations of constitutional review. Opponents of 
constitutional review argue that review is illegitimate due to its anti-majoritarian nature (decisions 
of the parliamentary majorities might be struck down), but also due to the fact that final decisions 
on crucial political matters are taken out of the citizens’ hands (see for discussion Waldron, 2006; 
Fallon, 2008; Tushnet, 2010; Doherty and Pevnick, 2013). Further argument against the 
constitutional review stems from the fact that review endangers judicial independence as judges 
need to take decisions on the political issues (Adams and Schyff, 2010). 
The reform of the judicial appointment process could be a possible solution for reconciling 
ideological bias in the Polish TK, though not eliminating it entirely. One could think of more 
consensual process for appointing the judges in the Sejm. For instance, one could argue for 
employing 2/3 majority rule to appoint the judge. Under this rule the governing majorities would 
possibly need to secure the support of opposition parties for a particular candidate. In screening 
the candidates’ merits, one could also guarantee the participation of judicial and academic circles. 
Experts from these fields are likely to be the most appropriate to assess the experience, reputation 
                                                                                                                                                                         
opposition parties. Also, since the TK in most of the cases adjudicates in small benches it is possible that 
these benches are coincidently dominated by the judges from the opposition party. 
188
  According to the conventional Keynesian view, an increase in deficit during the economic recession 
stimulates the economic activity. Non-Keynesian view contradicts this conventional perception and argues 
that reduction of the deficit during the recession might stimulate economic growth. This is particularly in 
situations where the economy is close to bankruptcy and when fiscal consolidation is pursued on the 
spending side (Rzońca, 2007). 
189
  According to some authors (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), reducing fiscal deficits may contribute to a 
faster economic growth not only in the long term, but in the short run as well. 
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and political background of the candidates. As often raised in the debate over the TK in Poland, 
the Sejm should consider only those candidates who are successfully short-listed by the experts as 
suitable candidates. Alternatively, the appointment of the constitutional judges could be entirely 
vested upon a special committee comprised of the representatives of judicial circles, academia 
with some participation of political bodies (representatives of governing majorities and the 
opposition). This system is at work in many jurisdictions. One of those jurisdictions is Israel 
where the system works as follows.190 A judge to the Supreme Court is appointed by the President 
of the State based on the nomination from a committee established for the selection of judges. 
This committee consists of nine members: three judges (president of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
and two other judges of the Supreme Court), two ministers (including the minister of justice), two 
parliament members and two representatives of the Israeli Bar Association. The selection of 
judges by the committee is based on the simple voting in the committee. The only requirement is 
that the majority of the participating members of the committee are present. Crucially, the 
committee includes representatives of the three state authorities (parliament, government, 
judiciary) and the bar association. Thus, decision on judicial appointments is in the hands of all 
the authorities together. The way judges are appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court and the 
structure of the selecting committee guarantee that the consideration for selecting a judge can be 
professional, substantive, and based on merits (mainly experience and integrity).191 
 
4.7. Closing remarks for chapter 4 
 
The empirical results presented in this chapter seem to support some version of the attitudinal and 
strategic model in the general sample of data and with regard to fiscal cases. It is to say that 
judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because judges’ preferences coincide with 
the interests of a specific party or because the judges are incentivized to show their loyalty to the 
party. Party alignment exists but subject to some institutional influences. In fiscal cases, these 
                                                    
190
  See Article 4 of the Israeli Basic Law: Judiciary 1984. 
191
  See official information on the website of the Israeli Supreme Court available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/rashut/judges/judges.htm (accessed on February 27, 2015). 
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institutional constraints seem to be mildly stronger as the likelihood of voting in accordance with 
party alignment is somewhat weaker in fiscal cases as compared to the general sample of cases. 
Overall, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis of formalist behavior in the 
Constitutional Court as advocated by traditional legal scholars. Formalists underscore that judges 
are driven by the law and are resilient to political influences (Robertson, 1998; 2010). The results 
of this chapter are in line with previous findings for the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts, i.e. 
evidence from France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Vanberg, 2005; Fiorino et al., 2007; 
Padovano, 2009; Amaral Garcia et al., 2009; Franck, 2010; Dalla Pellegrina and Garoupa, 2013; 
Garoupa et al., 2013).  
The fact that ideological bias is present also in fiscal cases – despite considerable institutional 
restraints – might have important implications for public finance. Given that the majority of 
judges in the adjudicating benches are occasionally politically aligned with the petitioners 
(opposition parties), it might be more difficult for the governing party to pursue major reforms of 
public finance, such as fiscal consolidation and public debt reduction. For instance, in times of 
economic distress necessary fiscal adjustments might be severely delayed or entirely damped by 
the TK. Under these circumstances, the TK can be perceived as a veto player biasing policy 
towards a status quo, hampering fiscal adjustments and leading to accumulation of debt.  
 
Appendix 4.1. Basic characteristics of the dataset  
 
 AWS-UW SLD-PSL-
UP 
PiS LPR PO PSL 
In the government 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2007 2007-2014 
Academic career 6 7 3 1 1 1 
Male 7 5 2 2 5 1 
Female 2 2 2 0 2 0 
Politically 
involved 
4 2 2 1 1 0 
Total 9 7 4 2 7 1 
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Appendix 4.2. Robustness check 1 
 
Table 4.12. Vote for constitutionality (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
       
Request -0.73991*** -0.80520*** -1.61000*** -0.56714** -0.70191*** -1.08153* 
 (0.21095) (0.18969) (0.44732) (0.23034) (0.17481) (0.64322) 
Government 0.07168 0.04955 0.05094 0.48169* 0.41906* 0.56084 
 (0.30700) (0.28192) (0.66605) (0.27426) (0.24666) (0.64105) 
Big bench -0.13873 0.12163 -0.70495 -0.24437 -0.03665 -1.13391** 
 (0.45914) (0.48940) (0.61449) (0.39340) (0.46104) (0.55437) 
Unanimity 0.36085 0.60393  0.46949 0.62705  
 (0.62105) (0.71545)  (0.68267) (0.73910)  
PO 1.04183** 1.03026** 2.76628**    
 (0.51785) (0.51404) (1.29332)    
SLD 0.63976** 0.55527** 1.16912**    
 (0.26183) (0.27569) (0.48384)    
PiS 0.71454** 0.72284** 1.11283    
 (0.33592) (0.34547) (0.70110)    
LPR 0.48840 0.65598* 1.21020    
 (0.35656) (0.36248) (0.87049)    
PSL 1.00733* 1.11276* 2.15999*    
 (0.56315) (0.59091) (1.22880)    
Gender 0.08886 0.09326 0.25644    
 (0.15267) (0.17266) (0.32222)    
Prof -0.17743 -0.11045 -0.15050    
 (0.12573) (0.14696) (0.37344)    
Political involvement 0.11512 0.06893 -0.04275    
 (0.08813) (0.09217) (0.19386)    
Age 0.01771*** 0.01674** 0.04480**    
 (0.00619) (0.00651) (0.02063)    
Chair 0.24271** 0.19781* 0.36632    
 (0.10500) (0.11234) (0.37738)    
Rapporteur 0.22554** 0.16644* 0.47218**    
 (0.09113) (0.08945) (0.22845)    
Constant -1.24071 -1.28759 -2.71258** -0.23776 0.05407 0.72682 
 (0.84844) (0.91528) (1.37859) (0.76620) (0.74324) (0.91676) 
       
Court fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Judge fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0709 0.0711 0.2652 0.0892 0.0817 0.2927 
Observations 3,595 3,215 1,449 3,595 3,215 1,449 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by cases. Regressions (1)-(3) do not contain judge and court fixed effects. 
Regressions (4)-(6) employ judge and court fixed effects. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset; regressions 
(2) and (5) exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall that Presidents 
Kwaśniewski and Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO respectively); 
regressions (3) and (6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.13. Vote for constitutionality in fiscal cases (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions VARIABLES 
       
Request -0.58617** -0.79527*** -1.04307** -0.47867 -0.76376** -0.34202 
 (0.29169) (0.25714) (0.49390) (0.34653) (0.29921) (0.67120) 
Government -0.08181 -0.05833 -2.13241*** 0.34713 0.27765 1.39110 
 (0.33914) (0.30054) (0.55041) (0.29672) (0.25522) (0.94496) 
Big bench 0.26402 0.30476 -0.02751 0.23670 0.28913 0.06891 
 (0.44694) (0.46175) (0.77304) (0.44507) (0.45528) (0.83783) 
Unanimity -0.40854 -0.30263  -0.40054 -0.28793  
 (0.58724) (0.63591)  (0.60475) (0.64360)  
PO 0.75313 0.53775 5.77269***    
 (0.56864) (0.50938) (1.54706)    
SLD 0.22263 0.13971 2.03083*    
 (0.31081) (0.26867) (1.18056)    
PiS -0.07400 0.02112 1.54605    
 (0.37321) (0.35325) (1.15810)    
LPR -0.14725 0.02772 1.46673    
 (0.42284) (0.33469) (1.22071)    
PSL 0.75885 0.72961 5.40807***    
 (0.63984) (0.58621) (1.71298)    
Gender -0.03489 -0.09645 -0.20317    
 (0.08280) (0.07870) (0.24097)    
Prof -0.29834** -0.28081* -0.87187**    
 (0.13793) (0.14629) (0.33870)    
Political involvement -0.05884 -0.06711 0.00669    
 (0.09744) (0.10973) (0.26160)    
Age 0.00860 0.01270 0.03208    
 (0.00821) (0.00875) (0.02791)    
Chair 0.14600 0.10695 0.41139    
 (0.13964) (0.14338) (0.60233)    
Rapporteur 0.38060*** 0.32892*** 0.84697*    
 (0.10092) (0.10072) (0.45299)    
Constant 0.07361 -0.12262 -2.06953 0.57547 0.63297 0.43450 
 (0.71950) (0.77076) (1.44600) (0.64480) (0.70590) (1.03892) 
       
Court fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Judge fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0404 0.0383 0.2281 0.0442 0.0421 0.2589 
Observations 1,947 1,745 724 1,947 1,745 717 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by cases. Regressions (1)-(3) do not contain judge and court fixed effects. 
Regressions (4)-(6) employ judge and court fixed effects. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset regarding 
fiscal cases; regressions (2) and (5) exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall 
that Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO 
respectively); regressions (3) and (6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 4.3. Marginal effects 
 
Table 4.14 and 4.15 allow for interpretation of coefficients for Request variable. Row 
“Request=0” depicts the probability of voting for constitutionality given that judge is not 
associated with the party which challenges the law and the rest of the covariates are set to their 
mean values. Conversely, row “Request=1” informs on the probability of voting for 
constitutionality if the judge is associated with the petitioner who challenges the law and all other 
predictors are set to their mean values. The difference between these two row probabilities 
demonstrates a decrease in voting for constitutionality once the judge and petitioner represent the 
same political parties as compared to the situation when judge and petitioner represent different 
parties. 
Table 4.14. Interpretation of coefficients for Request variable (full sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
       
Request -0.80442*** -0.72971*** -1.46779*** -0.65893*** -0.59320*** -0.65855** 
 
(0.15947) (0.15913) (0.27647) (0.17011) (0.16847) (0.29940) 
       
Marginal effects       
Request=0 .423958 .459962 .309556 .450878 .486577 .432553 
Request=1 .62196 .638582 .660515 .613443 .631694 .595586 
       
Request(1)-Request(0) -0.19800 -0.17862 -0.35100 
 
-0.16257 -0.14512 -0.16303 
 
Table 4.15. Interpretation of coefficients for Request variable (fiscal cases) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
       
Request -0.58617*** -0.79527*** -1.04307*** -0.47867** -0.76376*** -0.34202 
 
(0.20832) (0.19555) (0.31435) (0.24240) (0.23245) (0.41241) 
       
Marginal effects       
Request=0 .4858786 .4560408 .553734 .5071348 .4625547 .6808352 
Request=1 .6294064 .6499871 .7788265 .6241513 .6487835 .7501906 
 
      
Request(1)-Request(0) -0.1435278 -0.1939463 -0.2250925 -0.1170165 -0.1862288 -0.0693554 
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Appendix 4.4. Robustness check 2 
 
Table 4.16. Vote for constitutionality (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
       
SLD*law  
challenged by SLD 
-0.70224*** -0.59935** -3.34813** -0.65300** -0.55679* -3.43586** 
(0.25429) (0.28392) (1.32949) (0.25655) (0.29382) (1.38170) 
PiS*law  
challenged by SLD 
1.56160*** 1.28954*** 2.78745*** 1.64640*** 1.37557*** 2.71506*** 
(0.32756) (0.26898) (0.61740) (0.34242) (0.27573) (0.62777) 
Law challenged  
by SLD 
-0.11175 -0.35658 1.06341 -0.17477 -0.42952 1.05635 
(0.34272) (0.34984) (1.16118) (0.33839) (0.34392) (1.18941) 
PO 1.04660** 0.95606** 5.11198** 1.15748** 1.05864** 5.03172** 
 (0.51818) (0.48196) (2.37116) (0.54771) (0.50365) (2.35317) 
SLD 0.56253** 0.41024 2.69046** 0.68983** 0.51856* 2.69574** 
 (0.25739) (0.25050) (1.25845) (0.28319) (0.27678) (1.24659) 
PIS -0.29064 -0.24948 0.37950 -0.26663 -0.22838 0.30206 
 (0.28535) (0.28199) (1.17102) (0.28281) (0.28013) (1.17314) 
LPR 0.26614 0.44333 1.43232 0.38106 0.57579** 1.62704 
 (0.33587) (0.28376) (1.15294) (0.33645) (0.29270) (1.15743) 
PSL 0.63111 0.58204 3.82055* 1.10567* 1.01938* 4.35411** 
 (0.54690) (0.54216) (2.24547) (0.60077) (0.58683) (2.19593) 
Unanimity 0.34126 0.58172  0.36001 0.58915  
 (0.62976) (0.71981)  (0.63261) (0.72291)  
Government -0.23137 -0.07681 -1.81456* -0.25681 -0.10880 -1.83862* 
 (0.28804) (0.28243) (1.01192) (0.29000) (0.28104) (1.02304) 
Big bench -0.11611 0.15874 -0.95988* -0.06640 0.18827 -0.92349* 
 (0.45783) (0.50890) (0.54186) (0.44535) (0.49848) (0.52878) 
Gender    0.08247 0.08437 0.25798 
    (0.15315) (0.16848) (0.35407) 
Prof    -0.19538 -0.15440 -0.15737 
    (0.12985) (0.15691) (0.39722) 
Political  
involvement 
   0.13065 0.10238 -0.08254 
   (0.09339) (0.09036) (0.20417) 
Age    0.01555*** 0.01565*** 0.03556* 
    (0.00509) (0.00556) (0.01817) 
Chair    0.27943** 0.25133** 0.17883 
    (0.11936) (0.11941) (0.38617) 
Rapporteur    0.21960** 0.17629* 0.32051 
    (0.10274) (0.09853) (0.21759) 
Constant -0.14770 -0.05737 -0.83619 -1.14539 -1.02997 -2.84135** 
 (0.73120) (0.77622) (0.87941) (0.94591) (0.95943) (1.44468) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0755 0.0729 0.2867 0.0794 0.0760 0.2949 
Observations 3,595 3,215 1,449 3,595 3,215 1,449 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by cases. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset; regressions (2) and (5) 
exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall that Presidents Kwaśniewski and 
Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO respectively); regressions (3) and 
(6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.17. Vote for constitutionality in fiscal cases (clustered logit estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions 
Full  
sample 
Without Kwaśniewski  
and Komorowski 
Nonunanimous  
decisions VARIABLES 
       
SLD*law  
challenged by SLD 
-0.86797* -1.14256* -4.04332* -0.87780* -1.16425* -4.09217* 
(0.45172) (0.64436) (2.21969) (0.45600) (0.65108) (2.40328) 
PiS*law  
challenged by SLD 
0.96077*** 0.60672 -0.04361 1.00616*** 0.66424* 0.11113 
(0.35333) (0.37799) (1.23599) (0.36471) (0.39274) (1.43207) 
Law challenged  
by SLD 
-0.30023 -0.02865 2.37646 -0.31111 -0.03826 2.39869 
(0.33077) (0.37164) (2.02623) (0.33286) (0.37713) (2.24550) 
PO 0.77118 0.65992 6.50380*** 0.83164 0.69421 6.75572*** 
 (0.53252) (0.53845) (1.86002) (0.54774) (0.54748) (1.96930) 
SLD 0.32394 0.23262 2.99843** 0.43887 0.31377 3.26685** 
 (0.27793) (0.28021) (1.36662) (0.30875) (0.30982) (1.38323) 
PIS -0.65534** -0.61636** 1.41775 -0.62408** -0.60070** 1.60710 
 (0.28522) (0.29572) (1.16710) (0.28434) (0.29614) (1.26640) 
LPR -0.09880 0.06334 1.86256 -0.13397 0.01827 1.77614 
 (0.43905) (0.37727) (1.27237) (0.42268) (0.37362) (1.22545) 
PSL 0.53942 0.46531 5.61178*** 0.81819 0.76445 6.50880*** 
 (0.53860) (0.56134) (1.83879) (0.59959) (0.63433) (2.15015) 
Unanimity -0.42509 -0.33312  -0.42936 -0.33740  
 (0.59107) (0.64258)  (0.59871) (0.65180)  
Government -0.24260 -0.19013 -2.46847*** -0.27036 -0.22102 -2.50908*** 
 (0.32435) (0.34250) (0.76309) (0.32062) (0.34538) (0.82361) 
Big bench 0.27211 0.25524 -0.04544 0.32295 0.29430 0.13777 
 (0.44194) (0.45810) (0.65508) (0.44124) (0.45918) (0.74213) 
Gender    -0.04815 -0.11195 -0.40418 
    (0.07942) (0.08226) (0.36847) 
Prof    -0.31814** -0.30008* -0.80697** 
    (0.14816) (0.16512) (0.40032) 
Political  
involvement 
   -0.05122 -0.07875 -0.11153 
   (0.10741) (0.11340) (0.30054) 
Age    0.00793 0.01129 0.03194 
    (0.00734) (0.00811) (0.02952) 
Chair    0.14909 0.08029 0.10187 
    (0.14676) (0.15310) (0.70677) 
Rapporteur    0.35219*** 0.31287*** 0.89867* 
    (0.10543) (0.10176) (0.52267) 
Constant 0.46556 0.46990 -1.58968 0.16129 0.02374 -3.06065 
 (0.69585) (0.75529) (1.25334) (0.72762) (0.80189) (2.24312) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0445 0.0362 0.2575 0.0492 0.0410 0.2824 
Observations 1,947 1,745 724 1,947 1,745 724 
Note: All regressions apply clustering by cases. Regression (1) and (4) use the whole dataset regarding fiscal cases; 
regressions (2) and (5) exclude the cases challenged by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski (recall that 
Presidents Kwaśniewski and Komorowski challenged laws which were issued by their parties, i.e. SLD and PO 
respectively); regressions (3) and (6) employ only nonunanimous decisions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FEDERAL FISCAL CONSTITUTIONS:  
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMNENT192 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Contrary to the previous chapters which study particular elements of fiscal constitutions, this 
chapter is interested in finding links and interactions between constitutional building blocks. 
Whereas chapters 2-4 were focused on Poland, this chapter focuses on the fiscal constitution of 
federal countries, and it does so for two reasons. First, federal fiscal constitutions are far more 
complex than those of unitary countries. In federal countries, a great deal of the fiscal constitution 
relates to intergovernmental relations, thereby establishing rules on the power-sharing between the 
federal level and the states.193 In other words, the fiscal constitution of federal countries is mainly 
concerned with specifying the conduct of fiscal policy across government levels and the 
separation of fiscal authority between them. Second, federal countries may inspire institutional 
reforms in emerging “federations”, either individual countries that are on a secular path towards 
decentralization, or supra-national entities that are about to build their constitutional framework. 
                                                    
192
  Parts of this chapter are co-authored with Hansjörg Blöchliger (OECD). A modified version of this chapter 
entitled “Fiscal Constitutions: An Empirical Assessment” is forthcoming as an OECD Working Paper and 
as a book contribution in OECD (2015), Fiscal Federalism 2016: Making decentralisation work, Paris. I 
would like to thank participants of the OECD Workshop on the Institutions of Intergovernmental Relations 
held in Paris on November 6-7, 2014 and participants of Klaus Heine’s Intensive Seminar held in 
Rotterdam on December 4, 2014 for their valuable comments. This chapter particularly benefited from 
comments by Richard Bird, Cesare Colino, Peter Heller, Elena Jarocińska, Geert Jennes, Anton Matzinger, 
Alessio Pacces, Damiaan Persyn, and Stefan Voigt. Elena Kantorowicz is once again the one I need to 
thank the most for her patience and persistent support. The usual disclaimers apply. 
193
  In terms of terminology, the term “state” is interchangeably used with the country-specific terms for the 
intermediate level. In Germany and Austria, a state is a Land (plural Länder). Provinces are equivalent to 
the state level in Canada and South Africa. In Belgium, Italy and Spain, states are regions or communities, 
in Switzerland cantons, and in Russia subjects. Finally, in Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico and the United 
States, the intermediate level of government is a state or estado. 
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In both cases, almost any potential fiscal policy question has a “who should do what” or “federal” 
dimension, and this chapter may shed some light on the options for constitutional reform.  
This chapter emphasizes the narrow definition of fiscal constitutions, differently than previous 
chapters that mainly referred to ordinary statutory laws. Therefore, in this setting federal fiscal 
constitution covers constitutional law as well as selected statutory laws like organic laws, basic 
fiscal and financial laws or rulings of the constitutional court. As such, the federal fiscal 
constitution primarily encompasses this legislation that is subject to harsher amendment rules – 
usually qualified majorities – and hence provides a (relatively) stable institutional framework for 
fiscal policy over time. However, due to the constitutional vacuum in some cases, ordinary 
statutory laws occasionaly are also taken into account. Main laws used for coding are listed in 
appendix 5.1. 
Federal fiscal constitutions consist of several building blocks, which together shape fiscal 
outcomes. They comprise rules on intergovernmental relations and transfers, budget rules and 
fiscal councils, or the political settings like bicameralism and judiciary. Different fiscal 
constitutions are likely to imply different outcomes. There is a rich literature on the relationship 
between certain elements of the institutional setup of a country and fiscal outcomes (see section 
1.2). Yet the interaction between building blocks is rarely analyzed comprehensively, thereby 
neglecting the understanding that the manner in which various arrangements fit together is crucial 
for outcomes. Indeed, certain combinations of building blocks might be more conducive to 
achieving policy objectives such as sustainable fiscal outcomes or crisis prevention (Voigt 2011a, 
2011b). For these reasons, much weight is put on analyzing how building blocks are interlinked 
and identifying aligned (or coherent) fiscal constitutions.  
This chapter provides an empirical assessment of federal fiscal constitutions and the interaction 
between constitutional arrangements. The fiscal constitutions of 15 federations or quasi-
federations are investigated. These are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. 
Besides Argentina, all countries are OECD members or key partners. Most of the information 
used in this chapter draws on a questionnaire on federal fiscal constitutions sent to 15 national 
experts in February 2014 (list of country experts is provided in appendix 5.2 and template of the 
questionnaire in appendix 5.3). Additional information was extracted from the Comparative 
  
159 
 
Constitutions Project194 and other sources, such as national legal documents, historical statistical 
databases, indicator databases, the academic literature and OECD country surveys. 
Overall, the chapter demonstrates that federal fiscal constitutions differ in the degree of 
constitutionally guaranteed decentralization. More specifically, two types of fiscal constitutions 
can be distinguished: decentralized and integrated. In decentralized federations states (sub-central 
units) enjoy high tax and spending autonomy; face high responsibility for their own fiscal policy, 
have little co-determination power at the federal level; and intergovernmental budget rules and 
frameworks are relatively weak. The opposite is the case in integrated federations. An important 
contribution of this chapter is to show that fiscal constitutions vary in terms of coherence (or 
alignment) of institutional arrangements. Coherent (aligned) fiscal constitutions combine 
arrangements in a way that “fits well” together. For instance, incoherent fiscal constitution is the 
one which merges high state autonomy with low responsibility. Contrary, incoherent fiscal 
constitutions combine arrangements in an unbalanced manner, for instance by combining low tax 
autonomy with high spending autonomy or low responsibility for fiscal policy with a weak budget 
framework (see section 5.3. for theoretical underpinnings of these interactions). Tentative 
evidence suggests that the degree of decentralization of fiscal constitutions is hardly associated 
with economic and fiscal outcomes, but alignment (or coherence) of fiscal constitutions is 
correlated with selected outcomes. Over the period 1980-2010, less coherent fiscal constitutions 
were associated with higher debt and spending growth, and more economic and sovereign debt 
crises. Moreover, federations with less coherent fiscal constitutions had somewhat lower GDP 
growth between 1980 and 2010. This chapter also attempts to “endogenize” fiscal constitutions. In 
other words, it tries to identify the driving forces of constitutional reforms. It finds that reforms of 
fiscal constitutions usually follow events like economic and fiscal crises, the establishment or fall 
of authoritarian regimes or separatist threats. Additionally, the chapter traces back the evolution of 
fiscal constitutions since their inception. It is show that the autonomy and responsibility of states 
declined over the last 100 years, while budget frameworks were strengthened. Also, the coherence 
of fiscal constitutions increased over the last three decades. 
                                                    
194
  More information on the project can be found at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ (accessed on 
April 21, 2014). The author of this dissertation would like to thank Tom Ginsburg, Zahary Elkins and 
James Melton for making datasets on historical developments of the constitutions available. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the building blocks of federal fiscal 
constitutions and assesses them empirically using a common coding framework. Theoretical 
underpinning regarding interaction between building blocks and simple correlations between the 
building blocks are depicted in section 5.3. Section 5.4 combines and links the building blocks 
more systematically to characterize fiscal constitutions, i.e. to what extent they are decentralized 
or integrated. In section 5.4 some tentative policy implications for the EU are also included. 
Section 5.5 traces the development of the fiscal constitutions over time, identifies main trends, 
and explains the major reforms and their driving forces. Lastly, Section 5.6 provides basic 
evidence on the association between constitutional characteristics and fiscal outcomes. Finally, 
section 5.7 concludes. 
 
5.2. The building blocks of a fiscal constitution 
 
5.2.1. Arrangements and their alignment 
 
Fiscal constitutions consist of a set of building blocks (or arrangements), and in turn each building 
block comprises a series of constituting elements (table 5.1). Five building blocks are 
distinguished: autonomy, responsibility, co-determination, budget frameworks and stability, 
which together reflect the institutional background of fiscal policy-making across government 
levels. A constituting element represents constitutional rules on a specific item, while the building 
blocks combine several items. For instance, “tax autonomy” of the states is a constituting element, 
while “autonomy” is the building block encompassing tax, spending, borrowing and budgeting 
autonomy. And while numerical fiscal rules are a single constituting element of the budget 
framework, the latter also includes procedural fiscal rules and the functioning of fiscal councils.  
Fiscal constitutions, their building blocks and their elements are assessed by means of institutional 
indicators, which are created based on coding of particular constitutional arrangements195. The 
                                                    
195
  Coding allows for numerical representation of qualitative features of fiscal constitutions. Coding comes at 
certain price, however. Namely, coding is pursued according to the coder’s discretion and therefore is 
subject to some biases and errors. To limit the errors arising from the fact that coding is based on 
discretional assessment, the coding is typically pursued by more than one person. Multiple coding results 
are subsequently cross-validated minimizing the occurrence of errors (so-called inter-coder reliability). 
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indicator set is assembled in the form of an “indicator tree” with two levels of indicators, i.e. low-
level indicators (hereinafter LLIs) and intermediate-level indicators (hereinafter ILIs) (figure 5.1). 
Each constituting element of the fiscal constitution is represented by a low-level indicator (LLI). 
These are then aggregated to intermediate-level indicators (ILIs) reflecting the building blocks. 
ILIs are again aggregated to form a summary indicator, which reflects the overall characteristics 
of the fiscal constitution, such as for instance to what extent fiscal constitution is decentralized or 
integrated. In total, there are 23 LLIs196 and they are grouped to form five ILIs reflecting 
overarching building blocks. Indicator values depict whether the fiscal constitution features 
“more” or “less” of a certain element or building block and range from 0 to 1. For a detailed 
construction of indicators see appendix 5.4. 
Table 5.1. The building blocks of fiscal constitutions: depicting the overall institutional 
background 
Building block  
or arrangement Description Constituting elements 
Autonomy The extent to which sub-federal 
governments can conduct their own 
fiscal policy. 
Tax autonomy; spending autonomy in various 
policy areas; autonomy to borrow; autonomy over 
setting budget frameworks. 
Responsibility The degree to which sub-federal 
governments are exposed to budget 
constraints and must assume 
responsibility for their own fiscal policy. 
Bankruptcy exposure; bailout expectations; 
responsibility for setting fiscal rules; state revenue 
mix; dependence on revenue from federal transfers. 
Co-determination The extent to which sub-federal 
governments can shape fiscal policy at 
the federal level. 
The various channels through which states can co-
determine fiscal policy at the federal level: 
bicameralism; review by constitutional courts; 
intergovernmental executive bodies and meetings; 
federal transfers.  
Budget 
frameworks 
The degree to which fiscal rules and 
budgetary frameworks constrain 
discretionary fiscal policymaking at all 
governmental levels. 
Various elements shaping the strength of fiscal 
frameworks: numerical fiscal rules; procedural 
fiscal rules; fiscal councils and other independent or 
arms-length bodies 
Stability Ease at which constitutional rules 
affecting fiscal policy can be amended. 
Elements include the strength of the second 
chamber; the power of constitutional courts; 
majorities needed to amend the constitution; scope 
of direct democracy/popular veto. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Coding pursued by the author of this dissertation was cross-validated by the delegates from the countries 
under investigation. 
196
  None of the LLIs is dichotomous since binary indicators would not allow taking institutional details into 
consideration. 
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Figure 5.1. Indicator tree: low-level indicators for the assessment of building blocks 
(intermediate-level indicators) 
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fiscal autonomy with little responsibility (see section 5.3. for theoretical underpinnings of these 
interactions). Unlike indicator values which have no normative connotation, alignment contains a 
value judgment insofar as “more” alignment is considered better than “less”.  
Alignment is measured as the variance around indicator values applying a technique called 
random weights. Random weights technique allows calculating both the level of indicator values 
and the variance around them (Sutherland et al., 2005). By using random weights technique to 
construct ILIs (indicators for building blocks) one does not need to assess the relative importance 
ascribed to different LLIs. The advantage of random weights is therefore that it does not assume 
any prior knowledge about the importance of LLIs in a given setting. Crucially, random weights 
method allows identifying variation of possible values representing the ILIs, given that different 
weights are assigned to LLIs. This variance can be interpreted as the degree of coherence of an 
arrangement (Blöchliger, 2008). The smaller the variance, the higher is coherence. If each LLI 
(constituting element of a building block) has the same value, no variance around the average 
emerges since whatever weight is given to the LLIs, the resulting average ILI (a building block) is 
always the same. As applied here, the technique uses 1,000 sets of randomly generated weights 
applied to LLIs to calculate 1,000 overall ILIs. The weights are drawn from a uniform distribution 
between zero and one and are normalized so as to sum to one. Accordingly, the resulting 
distribution of indicators reflects the possible range of values of the building blocks (ILIs). 
Confidence intervals are calculated from these distributions and they are centered on the mean of 
each country’s 1,000 indicator values. The more similar are the values of the LLIs that form one 
ILI, the smaller are the confidence interval.  
 
5.2.2. Autonomy  
 
The autonomy indicator captures the assignment of fiscal power across government levels and the 
extent to which sub-federal governments can conduct policy in the area of taxation, spending, 
borrowing and budgeting. Fiscal constitutions provide very different degrees of autonomy to sub-
national governments. In some federations the state level is a de facto branch of the federal level, 
while in others states enjoy large fiscal autonomy and little interference from the federal level. 
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Alignment also varies: while some countries feature similar degrees of autonomy for all budget 
areas, some others combine large spending and borrowing autonomy with little tax autonomy.  
Tax autonomy 
Tax autonomy varies wildly across federal countries197, although constitutionally guaranteed sub-
national autonomy in levying taxes is seen as a crucial feature of federalism (Boadway and Shah, 
2009, p. 85). In some countries only few taxes are assigned to the federal level, sometimes 
combined with a residual clause that leaves remaining taxing powers to the states. In other 
federations taxation is largely a federal prerogative and is often combined with a general clause 
allowing central government to change the tax system by ordinary legislation. Some constitutions 
are very precise about assigning different taxes across government levels, while others are vague 
or simply silent. In a few countries post-constitutional legislation and constitutional courts play a 
crucial role in shaping tax autonomy.  
A few country examples may help clarify the large institutional differences in tax autonomy. 
Austria’s Fiscal Constitution Law assigns all tax legislation power to the federal level and restricts 
the states’ power to levy indirect taxes198. The constitutional law is likewise restrictive in Italy, 
where the federal level is responsible for tax legislation199. Tax autonomy is a bit higher in Russia, 
where subjects200 may reduce the rate of corporate income taxes for certain taxpayers. On the 
other hand, in Switzerland, the federal government is only allowed to levy taxes which are listed 
in the constitution, and a change of personal income tax rates requires a constitutional 
amendment201. In some countries constitutional voids had to be filled by legal interpretation. The 
Canadian constitution assigns exclusive power to provinces with respect to natural resource taxes 
and direct taxes202. Creative interpretation of “direct taxation” at some time allowed including 
sales taxes, and hence in Canada both the federal and the provincial level have concurrent rights 
to levy all major taxes. Judicial review has strongly shaped Australian tax assignment. The 
                                                    
197
  The questionnaire asked about assignment rules for personal and corporate income tax, indirect taxes, 
natural resource taxes and social security contributions. 
198
  § 3, 6, 7, 8 of the Austrian Financial Constitutional Law 1948 (Finanzverfassungsgesetz). 
199
  Article 117, c. 2 of the Italian Constitution 1947. 
200
  Subjects are sub-federal governments in Russia (see footnote 193). 
201
  Article 128 § 1 and art. 130 § 1 of the Swiss Federal Constitution 1999.  
202
  Article 92A(4) of the Canadian Constitution 1867. 
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constitutional court ruled that all consumption taxes should be considered “trade taxes and 
excises”, which are the only levies constitutionally assigned to the federal level (Petchey, 2014). 
As a result, the General Sales Tax is a federal tax. In Mexico, constitutionally guaranteed tax 
autonomy is undercut by another constitutional provision that makes actual use of tax autonomy 
very costly for the states.203 
Spending autonomy and links between tax and spending autonomy 
Spending autonomy captures the extent to which states have sovereignty in legislating and 
spending in certain policy areas.204 Constitutional spending autonomy varies less than tax 
autonomy, as there is a core of public functions which is in most federations assigned in a similar 
way. Fiscal constitutions rely on two main sorts of assignments, i.e. exclusive assignment where 
only one sphere of government has the authority, and joint/concurrent assignments where both 
spheres of government are allowed to legislate and spend. The Austrian and Italian fiscal 
constitutions provide the most spending prerogatives to the federal level, while the Canadian or 
the United States constitutions provide the largest state autonomy. In the latter, the constitution 
does not prevent states from spending in any area as long as the Commerce Clause205 is not 
violated (Rodden, 2014).  
Some further constitutional provisions may affect the degree and alignment of tax and spending 
powers:  
• Rather than governing every single policy area, some constitutions provide a template for 
tax and spending assignments, such as the subsidiarity principle or the principle of 
residual power, as enshrined in the Swiss206 and German207 constitutions for instance.208 
                                                    
203
  Although states could in principle exit the revenue sharing system and start levying its own taxes, there is a 
provision in the law that makes exit prohibitively expensive (Convenio de Adhesion). If a state exits the 
system, federal taxes continue to be levied at the sub-national level, and revenue shares are calculated as 
though the state were still in the system, so the residual revenue is kept fully by the federation. 
204
  For the purpose of this study, 16 spending categories (policy areas) were selected based on the OECD’s 
COFOG-2 classification. These are (1) national defence, (2) police services, (3) law courts, (4) prisons, (5) 
public transportation, (6) environmental protection, (7) housing development, (8) out-patient services, (9) 
hospital services, (10) primary education, (11) secondary education, (12) tertiary education, (13) sickness 
and disability, (14) old age, (15) family and children, and (16) unemployment. 
205
  The Commerce Clause says that states may not adopt regulations or taxes that place an ‘undue burden’ on 
interstate commerce, even if Congress has taken no action. 
206
  Article 5a of the Swiss Federal Constitution 1999. 
207
  Article 72(2) of the German Constitution 1949. 
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These two countries also recognize the residual law-making powers of states in their 
constitutions. Conversely, in Canada, India, South Africa and Spain residual powers are 
assigned to the federal level.  
• Some constitutions provide a link between tax and spending autonomy stipulating that all 
public expenditure of a government level should be covered by the own taxes of that 
level (“Wicksellian connection”: Wicksell 1896; Breton, 1996; Bird and Slack, 2013). 
Italy lists this principle in the constitutional law209, although still deviates from it in 
practice.  
• Some constitutions hardly followed the large evolutionary changes in the way 
governments spend money, but some provisions were flexible enough to adapt to new 
public tasks. Many explicitly enumerated federal powers listed in the United States 
constitution are quite specific to the late 18th century, but the power to “build post roads” 
enabled the federal government to build the highway network of the 20th century 
(Rodden, 2014). 
Borrowing and budgeting autonomy 
Borrowing autonomy refers to a state’s ability to borrow on financial markets and/or from public 
institutions. The federal level has various instruments to limit state borrowing. In the most 
extreme cases states have no right to borrow. The German constitution forbids new state 
borrowing outright if the state’s budgets are not structurally balanced210. There are also milder 
forms of borrowing restrictions. The Mexican constitution prohibits state borrowing from 
abroad211. The Brazilian constitution requires approval of state level borrowing by the federal 
level212. Several countries use differentiated deficit and debt rules when restricting the power of 
states to add debt. Moreover, the federal level might restrict or entirely ban borrowing from state-
                                                                                                                                                                         
208
  The principle of subsidiarity says that decentralizing economic functions to lower levels of government 
should be favored unless convincing arguments can be advanced for centralising them. Residual legislative 
power means that unless some policy area is assigned to one level, it is automatically within the authority 
of the other level. 
209
  Article 119 of the Italian Constitution 1947. 
210
  Article 109(3) of the German Constitution 1949. 
211
  Article 127.VIIII of the Mexican Constitution 1917. 
212
  The Complementary Law 101 2000 (the Fiscal Responsibility Law). 
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owned banks, as is the case in Brazil213. In Switzerland and the United States, the federal level 
imposes no restrictions on state borrowing.  
Budgeting autonomy evaluates the extent to which states are able to set their budget according to 
their own rules. Federal involvement in the state’s budgeting process varies considerably. Some 
countries such as Argentina (Saiegh, 2014) and Germany214 explicitly forbid any federal meddling 
in state budgeting. On the other hand, some constitutions, such as the South African215 or Spanish 
(Solé-Ollé, 2014), allow the federal level to intervene in the substance of the state budget. Specific 
budgeting frameworks are quite often prescribed. In Italy216 and in Germany217 the federal level 
obliges the state level to establish medium-term budget frameworks and to co-ordinate medium-
term objectives across states. In several countries the federal level imposes a set of fiscal rules on 
the states, thereby reducing their budgeting autonomy. Failure to comply may bring about further 
federal intervention in the sub-national budget process, as provided for by the Brazilian (Pereira, 
2014) or Italian (Scabrosetti, 2014) constitutions.  
Results for the intermediate institutional indicator “autonomy” 
Intermediate level indicators (ILI) representing autonomy are presented in figure 5.2 (for 
construction of the indicator see appendix 5.4). High values of the indicator, i.e. large fiscal 
autonomy of the state level, are observed in the United States, Canada and Switzerland. Moderate 
levels of autonomy are found in Australia, Argentina and Mexico. The other countries – with a 
measure of fiscal autonomy below 0.5 – could be classified as countries with low sub-federal 
fiscal autonomy, with Spain, India and South Africa showing the lowest scores. Alignment of 
autonomy levels, as shown by confidence intervals – the vertical bars – varies considerably across 
countries. Mexico’s autonomy setting is relatively aligned – the states enjoy moderate autonomy 
in all fiscal policy areas – while the autonomy arrangements in Argentina, Australia, Austria and 
Germany look less aligned. In particular, the Australian and Argentinian fiscal constitutions are 
                                                    
213
  Ibid. 
214
  Article 109(1) of the German Constitution 1949. 
215
  Section 100 and 139 of the South African Constitution 1996. 
216
  The law n. 39 from April 7, 2011 (Scabrosetti, 2014). 
217
  § 50 of the German Budget Law 1969 (Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz). 
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less aligned since they combine low tax autonomy with relatively moderate spending autonomy 
and high budgeting and borrowing autonomy. 
Figure 5.2. Fiscal autonomy of the state level: intermediate level indicator representing 
building block 1 
 
 
In some countries tax, spending and borrowing capacity of the state level is strongly limited by 
the federal level, while others leave much scope for spending and borrowing and simultaneously 
provide for wide-ranging tax autonomy. Both institutional settings can provide for effective long-
term fiscal sustainability. Yet an uneven distribution of autonomy may result in undesirable fiscal 
policy outcomes. In Argentina and Germany the lack of sub-national tax autonomy combined with 
large borrowing autonomy led the states to behave opportunistically and failed to meet their 
budget targets despite deficit rules (Tommasi et al., 2011; Kirchgässner, 2013). In Austria, where 
borrowing autonomy is large but tax autonomy non-existing, the states often struggle to keep their 
deficits at bay and tend to miss the targets agreed within the Austrian Stability Pact 
(Schratzenstaller, 2008).  
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5.2.3. Responsibility 
 
Responsibility refers to the extent to which states have to bear the consequences of their fiscal 
actions. While autonomy means the extent of states’ freedom to conduct their policies, 
responsibility measures whether states internalize the costs of these policies. Responsibility is a 
central feature of federal constitutions as it defines the extent to which states can derail the fiscal 
position of general government and make fiscal outcomes unsustainable. As such, responsibility is 
analogous to the hardness or softness of the budget constraints (Goodspeed, 2002). State 
responsibility is assessed by measuring the likelihood of bankruptcy or a bailout, the status 
(imposed or self-imposed) of fiscal rules as well as the strength and size of transfer mechanisms 
such as grants and equalization payments. Responsibility arrangements are coherent if constituting 
elements of responsibility indicator have similar values.  
Bailout and bankruptcy exposure 
Going bankrupt and not being bailed out is arguably one of the strongest sticks to ensure state 
responsibility. The bailout clause and exposure to default are hence a central measure for the 
institutional anchoring and credibility of the budget constraint. The likelihood of default, the 
prevalence of insolvency frameworks and the probability of a bailout are likely to affect the long-
term behavior of sub-national governments. The extent to which governments assume 
responsibility relies on constitutional provisions as well as on actual experience: 
• Constitutional provisions. Fiscal constitutions provide various rules for dealing with 
states in fiscal distress. Some countries such as South Africa forbid a state default 
outright (Khumalo and Rakabe, 2014), while others such as Brazil (Pereira, 2014) and 
Switzerland (Schaltegger, 2014) provide rules for an orderly default and an insolvency 
framework. Bailouts are particularly critical and tackled very differently. The 
constitutions of Brazil218 and Spain219 forbid bailouts, while the Argentinian (Saiegh, 
2014) and German220 constitutions enable, and the Italian constitution221 even requires 
                                                    
218
  The Complementary Law 101 2000 (the Fiscal Responsibility Law). 
219
  Article 8(2) of the Organic Law 02/2012. 
220
  Article 104(1)(b) of the German Constitution 1949. 
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them. Some fiscal constitutions do not contain explicit bailout provisions but offer 
alternatives such as federal borrowing guarantees, which come close to an implicit 
bailout. 
• Historical experience. The credibility of no-bailout rules is shaped by a country’s 
experience with past defaults and how the federal government reacted (Fasten, 2010). 
The experience of defaults and (non-)bailouts may affect sub-national behavior for quite 
long. The defaults and ensuing non-bailouts of several states in the United States in the 
1840s may have shaped fiscal behavior of the states until these days (Rodden, 2014). On 
the other hand, the bailout of two German states in the 1990s fuelled further bailout 
expectations and might have contributed to fiscal profligacy of some states in later years 
(Fasten, 2010).  
Constitutional courts have considerable influence on bailout expectations. In Germany a Federal 
Court ruling222 supported the two states of Saarland and Bremen in 1992, focusing on the 
solidarity principle enshrined in the constitution and providing an implicit bailout guarantee (Feld 
and Baskaran, 2010). In 2006, the Court changed course and denied the state of Berlin a bailout 
on grounds that it was able to cope itself223. The Swiss Federal Court in 2003224 confirmed the 
non-bailout rule after the bankruptcy of a municipality, thereby lowering the financing costs of 
cantonal governments.225  
Responsibility for fiscal rules 
Fiscal rules can serve as a signal to creditors that a state follows a prudent fiscal policy (OECD, 
2013). While fiscal rules are a complement rather than a substitute for well-functioning budgetary 
                                                                                                                                                                         
221
  Article 120 of the Italian Constitution 1947 and Law 131/2003. 
222
  Decision BVerfGE 86, 148 - Finanzausgleich II from 1992. 
223
  Decision 2 BvF 3/03 from 2006. 
224
  Decisions 2C.1/2001, 2C.4/1999, 2C.4/2000 and 2C.5/1999 from 2003. 
225
  The court ruled that the canton Valais was not liable for the debt of Leukerbad municipality, which went 
bankrupt in 1998. The case was brought to the Court by a group of creditors who claimed that the canton 
neglected its control duty and should hence assume municipal liabilities. With the court’s ruling the no-
bailout clause became confirmed and hence credible (Blankart and Klaiber, 2006). The court’s decision cut 
the relation between cantonal risk premia and the financial situation of the municipalities and reduced 
cantonal risk premia by around 25 basis points. The ruling implicitly showed that weak no-bailout 
commitments impose high costs on potential guarantors (Feld et al., 2011). 
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frameworks, they help communicate that state finances are on a long-term sustainable track. 
Financial markets tend to reward prudent fiscal behavior with lower yields (Schuknecht et al., 
2009). In this respect, a rule that is self-imposed is supposed to provide a stronger signal of 
responsibility than a fiscal rule imposed by the federal government. An imposed rule assumes that 
the federal government is ultimately responsible for state finances and that the states can shift the 
fiscal burden onto other governments. Also, self-imposed rules create “ownership”226, likely to 
increase the probability that states follow them (OECD, 2013). 
The extent to which states self-impose fiscal rules varies across countries. While in Canada, 
Switzerland and the United States federal governments have no power over state fiscal policy, 
they impose rules on the states in Brazil227, Germany228 and Russia229. In some countries such as 
Belgium230 and Spain231 rules are negotiated across government levels, giving states more leeway 
but not full responsibility. In the United States, self-imposed rules provide a strong anchor for 
state fiscal policy (Rodden, 2014). Following an array of defaults during the 1840s and again in 
the 1870s, virtually all states enshrined relatively tight fiscal rules in their constitutions232, 
providing a framework for long-term sustainable state fiscal policy until today.233  
Revenue responsibility 
Revenue responsibility evaluates to what extent states have recourse to own revenue sources. 
Revenue responsibility is inversely related to external financing from the federal level and 
                                                    
226
  Self-imposed rules create “ownership” in a sense that rules are established and tailored according to the 
preferences of state governments (OECD, 2013). It is contrary to the rules which are imposed and therefore 
given by the higher level of government. 
227
  The Complementary Law 101 2000 (the Fiscal Responsibility Law). 
228
  Article 109(3) of the German Constitution 1949. 
229
  Federal Law N268 2012 on the Amendments to the Budget Code (Jarocińska, 2014). 
230
  The Special Financing Law 1988 (“3rd State Reform”) (Geert and Jannes, 2014). 
231
  Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution 1978; Article 11(2), Article 12 and Article 13 of the Organic Law 
02/2012. 
232
  In almost all federal countries besides the federal constitution, states also promulgate their own 
constitutions, which regulate matters in which states have power.  
233
  Since the beginning of 19th century the states had accumulated a large amount of debt mostly to finance 
infrastructure projects. After a fiscal panic and shrinking revenues, several states were unable to service 
their debt. A bailout was discussed in the federal legislature but ultimately rejected. This decision sent a 
clear message that state debt was a state responsibility. In order to tap the credit markets again, states made 
substantial reforms including the introduction of various balanced budget requirements. In the 1870s, after 
yet another banking panic and ensuing depression, states further tightened their fiscal rules (Dove, 2014). 
  172  
 
decreases with the extent of transfers. High reliance on transfers and other common pool 
resources may soften the budget constraint of state governments, create moral hazard on the side 
of states and distort tax enforcement (Rodden, 2003). The extent of responsibility over own 
resources is assessed using four indicators: (1) fiscal equalization234, (2) tax-sharing235, 
(3) stabilization transfers236, and (4) other intergovernmental grants237.  
• Fiscal equalization. Equalization aims at reducing differences in fiscal capacity across 
states. The stronger equalization, the weaker is revenue responsibility. First, equalization 
mechanisms differ with respect to their institutional anchoring. While equalization is part 
of the constitution e.g. in Canada238 and Switzerland239, it is enshrined in secondary 
legislation e.g. in Australia240 and Mexico241. While some constitutions are vague and 
limited to stating that fiscal equalization should be pursued (e.g. Austria242 and 
Canada243), others require an independent body244 responsible for equalization policy, as 
in South Africa.245 Second, while some countries require (almost) full equalization of 
                                                    
234
  Fiscal equalization deals with regional fiscal equity and its main goal is to achieve redistributive goals 
between states. 
235
  Some taxes are not assigned exclusively to one level of government but are shared among them according 
to sharing formula.  
236
  Stabilization is triggered in case of adverse economic shocks, either for the whole country or parts of it 
(risk sharing across states). 
237
  Other intergovernmental grants comprise financial support of some state activities/policies (other than for 
stabilization purposes or equalization). 
238
  Article 36 of the Canadian Constitution 1867. 
239
  Article 135 of the Swiss Constitution 1999. This article intends “to reduce the differences in financial 
capacity among the states; guarantees the states a minimum level of financial resources and compensates 
them for excessive financial burdens due to geo-graphical or socio-demographic factors”. This article 
requires therefore only weak form of fiscal equalization (juxtapose with the full fiscal equalization in 
Germany). 
240
  The Commonwealth Grants Commission Act 1976. 
241
  The Law on Fiscal Coordination 1953 (the Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal). 
242
  § 4 of the Austrian Financial Constitutional Law (Finanzverfassungsgesetz). 
243
  Article 36 of the Canadian Constitution 1867. 
244
  Section 220 of the South African Constitution 1996 establishing an independent Financial and Fiscal 
Commission. 
245
  In Australia, the Commonwealth Grants Commission – a non-partisan body – is responsible for 
equalisation. Unlike South Africa, the Commission’s role is not defined in the constitution but only by 
ordinary law. 
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regional differences, such as in Australia (Petchey, 2014) and Germany246, others require 
disparities to be equalized to a certain extent only, such as in Mexico247 and 
Switzerland248. Other countries, such as Spain249, are somewhere in between, requiring a 
“considerable” reduction in disparities.  
• Tax sharing. In several federations certain taxes are not exclusively assigned to one level 
of government but shared among levels. Again, revenue responsibility is lower in 
federations with strong tax-sharing mechanisms. Some constitutions such as those of 
Argentina250 and Germany251 provide rules for tax sharing, while in Australia tax sharing 
is provided for in ordinary law. Some sharing systems cover major taxes, such as in 
Argentina and Germany.252 In the United States, a tax sharing system prevailed in the 
1970s and 1980s (Rodden, 2014), but was easy to abandon since it was not enshrined in 
the constitution. Tax sharing arrangements differ in how detailed they are in 
constitutions. Some constitutions provide sharing details, such as in Belgium253 and 
Germany254. The South African255 and Spanish256 constitutions require an independent 
body responsible for setting and adjusting tax shares.  
• Stabilization. Transfers for stabilization purposes constitute another form of co-financing 
states. The stronger stabilization policy is, the lower is the revenue responsibility of 
states. Some constitutions provide that in times of economic distress, the federal 
government may deliver extra financial support to states. The “strength” of stabilization 
                                                    
246
  Article 72(2) of the German Constitution 1949. In this article the aim is to achieve equal life conditions 
across Länder (gleichwertige Lebensverhältnisse). 
247
  The Law on Fiscal Coordination 1953 (the Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal). 
248
  Article 135 of the Swiss Constitution 1999. 
249
  The Organic Law 8/1980.  
250
  Article 75 § 2 of the Argentine Constitution 1853. 
251
  Article 106 of the German Constitution 1949. 
252
  Strong tax sharing is defined as making up more than 10% of total general government revenue. 
253
  The Special Financing Law 1980 (“2nd State Reform”) (Geert and Jannes, 2014). 
254
  Article 106 of the German Constitution 1949. 
255
  Section 220 of the South African Constitution 1996 establishing an independent Financial and Fiscal 
Commission. 
256
  The Organic Law 8/1980 establishing the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy of the Autonomous 
Communities (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas). 
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policy varies across countries. First, stabilization transfers can be specified in 
constitutional law, such as in Germany257 and Italy (Scabrosetti, 2014), or by ordinary 
legislation, as in Australia258 and Canada259. Second, constitutional provisions attach a 
different thrust to stabilization. While some constitutions state that stabilization “must” 
be pursued (e.g.  Russia260), some others say that it “should” be pursued (e.g.  Spain261).  
• Other intergovernmental transfers. Federal governments often support state activities 
through intergovernmental grants. These can be general (states are free in allocating 
grants) or special purpose grants (states have to spend them in a given policy area). In 
Germany262 and Switzerland263 grants are prescribed by the constitution, while they are 
shaped by ordinary legislation e.g. in Mexico264 and the United States265. Some countries 
provide a constitutional background for quite extensive grant systems, such as in 
Belgium and the United States, while Australia and Canada provide for less extensive 
grant systems (Blöchliger and Petzold, 2009).  
Results for the intermediate institutional indicator “responsibility” 
Numerical results for the intermediate responsibility indicator are presented in figure 5.3 (see 
appendix 5.4 for the construction of the indicator). The values of the indicator suggest that the 
states in Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States are highly responsible for their own 
fiscal policy, while responsibility is low in Germany, Italy, South Africa and Belgium. 
Responsibility is assigned in a relatively coherent way in Germany, India and Italy, all countries 
with relatively low responsibility. Incoherent fiscal arrangements are found in South Africa, 
Australia, Switzerland and the United States. The root cause of relatively little coherence in 
                                                    
257
  Article 104(1) of the German Constitution 1949. 
258
  Equalization system plays a stabilizing role in Australia (Petchey, 2014). 
259
  The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act (various years) (Petchey, 2014).  
260
  Article 96.9 of the Budget Code 1998 (Jarocińska, 2014). 
261
  The Financial Support Law 22/2009 (Solé-Ollé, 2014). 
262
  Article 91 of the German Constitution 1949. 
263
  Article 63a § 2, Article 66 § 1, Article 70 § 4, Article 70 § 5, Article 75 § 2, Article 86 § 3, Article 88 § 2, 
article 123 § 3 of the Swiss Constitution 1999. 
264
  The Law on Fiscal Coordination 1953 (the Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal). 
265
  Grants for the Medicaid are the fastest-growing intergovernmental grants (Rodden, 2014). 
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Switzerland is that the likelihood of a bailout is low but the grant system to help out governments 
in distress is extensive.  
Figure 5.3. Fiscal responsibility of the state level: Intermediate level indicator representing 
building block 2 
 
 
5.2.4. Co-determination 
 
Co-determination is the extent to which states can shape fiscal policy-making at the federal level. 
While state autonomy refers to a state’s power to legislate for its own jurisdiction, co-
determination refers to the scope of a state or a group of states to influence fiscal policy of the 
whole country (Hooghe et al., 2008). States can influence overall fiscal policy through different 
channels, of which the most important is likely to be the second chamber of the federal 
parliament266. “Alignment” of co-determination reflects the extent to which certain channels are 
complements rather than substitutes. An aligned co-determination framework suggests that all 
channels are used concomitantly, while in a less aligned setting some channels are often used 
while others are barely available. 
                                                    
266
  The second chamber traditionally serves as a platform through which states in a federation can directly 
influence policy making. Out of 28 federations, 17 have the second chamber with regional representation, 
including all analyzed federations in this chapter (Hickey, 2013).  
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Bicameralism 
Bicameralism is a central feature of federalism. The second chamber of the federal parliament 
(Senate) serves – at least from de jure point of view – as an explicit forum for state 
representation267 and states’ co-determination of national policies. The extent to which the state 
level can co-exercise some power at the national level depends on the institutional strength of the 
second chamber and the degree of representation of states’ interests. 
• Institutional strength. In all analysed countries, the Senate is formally the representation 
of states (Hickey, 2013). However, the influence of the second chamber on national 
policy-making varies among countries. While in most federations the Senate has full 
legislative and veto power, in a few cases its power is constrained. In Canada (Bird, 
2014) and India (Rao, 2014), for instance, the second chamber can be excluded from 
initiating certain legislation. In Germany, the Senate can veto only legislation concerning 
the Länder (Voigt, 2014). In Austria, the first chamber can overrule almost any Senate 
decision (Thöni, 2014). 
• Representation of state’s interests. States’ interests are represented to different extent in 
the second chamber. First, the electoral system plays a role. While senators elected by the 
state legislative or executive with a mandate – as in Germany – might represent their 
states interests tightly (Voigt, 2014), representation might be weaker if Senators are 
elected in popular elections. In Canada senators are selected by the general governor on 
advice of the prime minister, thereby reducing effective state representation (Bird, 2014). 
Second, state interests tend to be better reflected if seats are distributed equally. If 
representation in the second chamber is (partially) proportional to population size – as 
e.g. in Belgium (Jennes and Persyn, 2014) or South Africa (Khumalo and Rekabe, 2014) 
– the federal government is more likely to align policies with the preferences of the larger 
states. Third, coordination and reconciliation mechanisms between the two chambers of 
parliament – as for instance in Germany (Voigt, 2014) and Switzerland (Schaltegger, 
2014) – may further strengthen state representation. 
                                                    
267
  In some countries only part of the second chamber serves as a representation of states. This is, for instance, 
the case in Italy. Article 5, c.1, of the Italian Constitution 1947 says that: “The Senate of the Republic is 
elected on a regional basis, with the exception of the seats assigned to the overseas constituency”.  
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While strong participation of states in federal policy-making may balance the interests of more 
stakeholders, it may also lead to a joint decision trap where no policy decisions are taken at all 
(Scharpf, 2006). Reducing the degree of joint decision-making was the main aim of the federalism 
reform in Germany in 2006 where overlapping competencies, intertwined responsibilities and 
political bargaining led to frequent policy deadlocks. The German reform strengthened both the 
federal government’s decision-making capacity and the autonomy of the states (Moore et al., 
2010). 
Judicial review 
The second channel through which states can co-determine national policy is via judicial review 
by an independent supreme or constitutional court. Except Switzerland, all countries under 
investigation have some form of constitutional review of federal laws. Judicial review may void 
unconstitutional laws. States can influence constitutional review in two ways. 
• Challenging federal laws. The states – either directly as e.g. in Italy and Spain or via the 
second chamber as e.g. in Germany and South Africa – can trigger a judicial review of 
federal legislation (Ginsburg et al., 2014). The law might then be abrogated or modified. 
The sole right of states and the second chamber to challenge federal legislation at the 
court can be perceived as a deterrence mechanism for legislating unfavorably for states 
(Stone Sweet, 2000). 
• Judicial appointment. States or second chambers are often involved in nominations and 
approvals of the judges to courts, as is the case e.g. in Argentina and Germany (Ginsburg 
et al., 2014). There is a vast literature conjecturing that preferences of the appointers and 
those of judges are strongly aligned (see, for instance, chapter 4 of this dissertation).268 
Thus, once states or second chambers play an important role in nominating or approving 
judges, the court is likely to rule more in favor of the states.  
In Argentina, Australia, Germany, Mexico and the United States, judicial reviews play an 
important role in resolving conflicts between the federal and state level. The US Supreme Court is 
a particularly important crossroads of federal and states interests. Following its rulings, the power 
                                                    
268
  For Australia see Smyth and Narayan (2004); for Canada see Songer et al. (1989); for Germany see 
Vanberg (2005); for Italy see Della Pellegrina and Garoupa (2012); for Spain see Garoupa et al. (2013). 
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of the federal government was cut back on several occasions because the Court insisted on a 
narrow interpretation of key clauses in the constitution (Rodden, 2014).269 
Other channels of co-determination 
There are three other channels through which states influence policy-making at the federal level. 
These are co-determination via (1) constitutional amendments, (2) executive meetings and 
(3) intergovernmental transfers. 
• Constitutional amendment. There are two ways in which states can influence 
constitutional reforms. First, all federal constitutions require that the states – as e.g. in 
Canada and the United States – or the second chamber – as e.g. in Belgium and India – 
need to approve constitutional amendments. The extent to which states can influence a 
constitutional amendment varies, however. In some countries both the second chamber 
and the states have to approve a change, e.g. in Mexico and in Russia. Second, states may 
propose a constitutional change. While in some countries states may propose a 
constitutional amendment (e.g. Brazil and Mexico), in other cases this right is reserved to 
the second chamber (e.g. Italy and Switzerland). In some countries neither the states nor 
the second chamber may launch a constitutional reform (e.g. Canada and Argentina).  
• Intergovernmental executive meetings. Intergovernmental meetings serve as a forum for 
negotiations between tiers of government and co-ordination of national and state policies. 
Executive meetings are often institutionalized and have routine character (e.g. the 
Consultation Committee in Belgium270 and the State Council in Russia271). Some 
intergovernmental bodies can be authoritative and parties reach decisions that formally 
bind the participants, such as in Australia (Council of Australian Governments, COAG; 
                                                    
269
  See for instance, the 1995 court case United States v. Lopez. Also, in a recent case National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius the justices adjudicated in favor of the states (Rodden, 2014). They 
agreed that a significant expansion of Medicaid was not a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power, 
since it forced states to accept the expansion at the risk of losing existing Medicaid funding. 
270
  The State Financing Law 1980 (“2nd State Reform) establishing the Consultation Committee between the 
Belgian governments (Geert and Jannes, 2014). 
271
  Decree N1602 2000 establishing the State Council (Государственный Совет) where president, the 
speakers of the first and second chambers and the leaders (governors and presidents) of Russian states are 
present (Jarocińska, 2014). 
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Petchey, 2014) or Argentina (Consejo Federal de Inversiones, or the Consejo Federal de 
Educación; Saiegh, 2014).  
• Intergovernmental transfers. States are able to influence transfers through different 
channels. Transfers are often determined through intergovernmental bargaining, in which 
receiving governments have a voice. Transfers can also be viewed as a response to 
lobbying of state politicians and their interest groups (Sato, 2007). There is a vast 
literature on how states may drive transfer allocation through equalization, tax sharing, 
stabilization and other transfers (see, for instance, OECD, 2014).  
Results for the intermediate institutional indicator “co-determination” 
The numerical results for the intermediate level indicator “co-determination” are shown in 
figure 5.4 (see appendix 5.4 for the technicalities regarding the construction of the indicator). 
High values, meaning extensive co-determination, are observed in Germany, Brazil and 
Argentina. On the other hand, little co-determination is found in Canada, the United States and 
South Africa. The most aligned institutional environment within this building block is observed in 
India. In India, states influence national policy moderately through all channels. Co-determination 
in Canada, Switzerland and Belgium is less aligned. For instance, Belgium has a strong executive, 
but a relatively weak second chamber. The combination of a weak Federal Court – which is not 
allowed to review federal laws – with strong influence of the second chamber is responsible for 
less well-aligned co-determination in Switzerland. 
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Figure 5.4. Co-determination of national policy by the state level: intermediate level 
indicator representing building block 3 
 
 
5.2.5. Budget frameworks 
 
Budget frameworks govern the budget process and aim at restraining discretionary fiscal policy. 
The framework is defined by three elements, i.e. numerical fiscal rules, procedural fiscal rules and 
fiscal councils. Tight fiscal frameworks (1) impose a set of well-defined numerical fiscal rules, 
(2) imply top-bottom (hierarchical) and transparent procedural and budgeting rules, and 
(3) feature fiscal councils or other arms-length agencies. Aligned budget frameworks are those 
where the three elements have similar strength. Less aligned frameworks are those where 
instruments are not uniform, e.g. where tight numerical fiscal rules go together with weak 
procedural rules.  
Numerical fiscal rules 
Numerical fiscal rules constrain policymakers’ decision-making discretion. The main rationale for 
establishing fiscal rules is a perceived spending and deficit bias and reluctance of states to commit 
to fiscal discipline. As such, numerical fiscal rules have gained popularity since the 1990s when 
they were put in place to reduce the fiscal fallout from irresponsible fiscal behavior at all 
government levels (Schaechter et al. 2012). There are four main types of numerical fiscal rules: 
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budget balance (deficit), debt, expenditure and revenue rules. Discretion of policy-makers is 
constrained most when a country uses all four types of numerical fiscal rules.  
Their strength can be assessed based on four criteria:  
• Legal basis. While some rules are enshrined in the federal constitution (e.g. debt brakes 
in Germany272 and Switzerland273), others are set in secondary legislation (e.g. rules in 
Argentina274 and Australia275). Constitutional fiscal rules are more difficult to amend and 
hence more credible, and they may entail high reputation costs for the government if 
breached (Blume and Voigt, 2013). The use of a constitutional fiscal rule might signal 
that fiscal discipline is perceived as a fundamental policy objective (Drazen, 2002).  
• Status. Status of the sub-national rules indicates whether rules are imposed or self-
imposed. Imposed rules are more likely to reflect a consistent and harmonized budget 
framework than self-imposed rules, which may differ across states. Rules are, for 
instance, imposed in Germany (e.g. budget balance rule for Länder)276 and in Spain 
(budget balance, debt and expenditure rules for regions)277. In some countries, rules are 
negotiated between government levels, such as in Austria (budget balance, debt and 
expenditure rules for Länder)278 and Belgium (budget balance rules for regions)279. State 
fiscal rules are self-imposed – and often enshrined in state constitutions – in Switzerland 
(Kirchgässner, 2013; Schaltegger, 2014) and the United States (Primo, 2007).  
• Enforcement. The constitutional setting may underpin the enforcement of fiscal rules, 
particularly who takes actions in case of non-compliance with the rules. Self-enforcement 
works well when a government has an incentive to follow them. Rules are self-enforced 
                                                    
272
  Article 109(3) of the German Constitution 1949. 
273
  Article 126 of the Swiss Constitution 1999. 
274
  The Fiscal Pacts 1992 and 1993 (Saiegh, 2014). 
275
  States’ constitutions (Petchey, 2014). 
276
  Article 109(3) of the German Constitution 1949. 
277
  Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution 1978, Article 11(2), Article 12 and Article 13 of the Organic Law 
02/2012. 
278
  The Austrian Stability Pact 2012 (Thöni, 2014). 
279
  The “financing requirements” branch of the High Council of Finance (Jennes and Persyn, 2014). 
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in Australia (Petchey, 2014), Canada (Bird, 2014), Switzerland (Schaltegger, 2014 and 
the United States (Rodden, 2014). Rules tend to be stronger when enforced by a higher 
level government or by external bodies. State rules are enforced by the federal level in 
Spain (Solé-Ollé, 2014) and Russia (Jarocińska, 2014), for instance. Courts and audit 
institutions have a strong role in Brazil280 and the United States (Bohn and Inman, 1996; 
Rodden, 2014). In some countries enforcement is not explicitly specified. For instance, 
sanctions and their enforcement are not mentioned in the German constitution.  
• Coverage. Some numerical fiscal rules cover the general government budget (e.g. budget 
balance, debt and expenditure rules in Spain281), whereas some others cover only the 
federal or state level finances (e.g. the deficit rule in Mexico covers only central 
government and several rules in South Africa cover only the state level) (Diaz-Cayeros, 
2014; Khumalo and Rakabe, 2014). In some cases separate federal and state fiscal rules 
complement each other, such as in Switzerland (Schaltegger, 2014). Wide coverage 
limits policymaker’s ability to bypass the rules and re-allocate fiscal resources between 
governments (Milesi-Ferretti, 1996, 2003).  
Procedural fiscal rules  
Procedural fiscal rules ensure that budget planning, approval and execution is subject to proper 
control and accountability, and that the annual budget law is consistent with medium and long-
term fiscal plans and objectives. Two elements help assess the restrictiveness of procedural fiscal 
rules: (1) the extent to which top-down budgeting is applied and (2) the transparency of the 
budgeting process. 
• Top-down approach. Top-down procedural rules aim at empowering a single actor in the 
budgeting process, in order to address the common pool problem of public decision-
making (Ljungman, 2009). Top-down approaches give strong prerogatives to the federal 
                                                    
280
  In Brazil the public officials at the state and local level are subject to criminal prosecution for non-
compliance with the rules incorporated in the Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2000. The Law limits new 
funding for sub-national governments and denies credit guarantees in case of systematic violation 
(Goldfajn and Guardia, 2004). A special Fiscal Crime Law (Lei dos Crimes Fiscais) sets a range of 
penalties for budget mismanagement such as fines, removal from the office, ineligibility for public office 
up to five years and even imprisonment. 
281
  Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution 1978, Article 11(2), Article 12 and Article 13 of the Organic Law 
02/2012. 
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executive vis-à-vis the legislature in the approval stage of the budget and/or to a federal 
Prime or Finance Minister vis-à-vis other spending ministers, as in Argentina (Saiegh, 
2014) or Brazil (Pereira, 2014; Alesina et al., 1999). In some countries, e.g. Belgium 
(Jennes and Persyn, 2014) or Germany282, the constitution restricts the federal 
legislature’s power to amend a budget proposed by the government.  
• Transparency. Budget transparency relies on three elements. First, some constitutions 
such as the German283 or Spanish (Solé-Ollé, 2014) ones require federal budgets to be 
assessed by an independent audit institution. In Brazil284 or India (Rao, 2014), the audit 
extends also to the state level. Second, medium-term budgetary frameworks are required 
by the Brazilian285 or Russian286 constitution, to ensure planning transparency over 
several years. Medium-term objectives might be further coordinated between the states 
and the federal government as is the case in Belgium287 and South Africa288. Third, 
constitutions may require uniform accounting standards across levels of government, as 
in Italy289 and India (Rao, 2014). 
Fiscal councils and other arms-length agencies 
The strength of the budget framework is shaped by the prevalence and prerogatives of fiscal 
councils and other arms-length bodies. These are usually non-partisan public bodies that assess 
the fiscal stance and/or issue recommendations on fiscal policy matters. More specifically, fiscal 
councils may deliver independent analysis and review fiscal projections by governments. Finally, 
fiscal councils may assess compliance with fiscal rules and sustainability requirements or provide 
recommendations on specific items of budgetary policy. As such, councils raise awareness about 
                                                    
282
  Article 113 of the German Constitution 1949. 
283
  Article 114(2) of the German Constitution 1949. 
284
  The Tribunais de Contas are constitutionally defined as ancillary bodies, with the purpose of examining the 
accounts of the three branches of government in terms of their compliance with the principles of public 
administration and fiscal responsibility (Pereira, 2014). 
285
  The Complementary Law 101 2000 (the Fiscal Responsibility Law). 
286
  The Budget Code 1998 (Jarocińska, 2014). 
287
  The State Financing Law 1989 (“3rd State Reform”) establishing High Council of Finance, which advise 
annually on the “financial requirements” of the Belgian governments (Geert and Jannes, 2014). 
288
  The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (Khumalo and Rakabe, 2014). 
289
  Decree n. 118 June 23, 2011 (Scabrosetti, 2014)). 
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short and long-term costs and benefits of budgetary measures both among policy-makers and the 
public (Calmfors, 2011; Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011; Kopits, 2011).  
The strength of fiscal councils is assessed on three criteria. 
• Institutional anchoring. Fiscal councils are likely to enjoy more stability, legitimacy and 
recognition if enshrined in the constitution, as in Germany290 or Spain291, than in ordinary 
law, as in Australia or Canada (IMF, 2013a). In some countries such as Argentina and 
Brazil, fiscal councils have for long been enshrined in the constitution but have still not 
been established (Pereira, 2014; Saiegh, 2014).  
• Prerogatives. In some countries, fiscal councils have broad prerogatives as they have the 
right to assess the fiscal stance of both federal and state governments (e.g. the 
Parliamentary Budget Office in Italy292 and the High Council of Finance in Belgium293). 
The Public Council in Russia (Jarocińska, 2014) and the Congressional Budget Office in 
the Unites States (Rodden, 2014) are allowed to evaluate the federal budget only. 
• Independence. Independence rests on how the governing body of a fiscal council is 
composed (e.g. members of parliament, representatives of states, ministers, independent 
experts) and where the council is attached (e.g. to the parliament). Fiscal councils are 
largely independent, for instance, in Germany294 and Spain295. Partially independent 
fiscal councils – parliamentary budget offices – exist in Italy296 and in the United States 
(Rodden, 2014).  
                                                    
290
  Article 109a of the German Constitution 1949 establishing the Stability Council. Another fiscal council – 
German Council of Economic Experts is established by ordinary statutory law (Act on the Appointment of a 
Council of Experts on Economic Development 1963). 
291
  The Organic Law 06/2013 establishing Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal. 
292
  Article 16-19 of the law n.243, ch. 7 December 24, 2012. 
293
  The State Financing Law 1989 (“3rd State Reform) (Geert and Jannes, 2014). 
294
  Act on the Appointment of a Council of Experts on Economic Development 1963. 
295
  The Organic Law 06/2013 establishing Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal. 
296
  Article 16-19 of the law n.243, ch. 7 December 24, 2012. 
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Results for the intermediate institutional indicator “budget frameworks” 
The numerical results for the intermediate indicator are shown in figure 5.5 (see appendix 5.4 for 
the technicalities regarding the construction of the indicator). High values are observed in Spain, 
South Africa and Germany, which appear to be endowed with strong and integrated budget 
frameworks. Argentina, Switzerland and Canada, on the other hand, have relatively weak budget 
institutions. Budget frameworks are aligned in Austria and Italy and rather less aligned in Brazil, 
South Africa and India. Brazil’s budget framework is likely less aligned because numerical and 
procedural fiscal rules are strong but there is no fiscal council.  
Figure 5.5. Strength of budget frameworks: intermediate level indicator representing 
building block 4 
 
 
5.2.6. Stability of fiscal constitutions 
 
The stability of fiscal constitutions depends largely on the number and strength of actors and veto 
powers. Veto powers increase the transaction costs of reforms and bias the institutional 
framework towards the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002). Stability is hence a two-edged sword. Stable 
institutions may provide a basis for long-term fiscal planning at all government levels, but they 
may also prevent reform and adaptation to changing circumstances (Cox and McCubbins, 1991). 
Very stable constitutions may slow down the pace of structural reform and fiscal adjustment. 
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Bicameral veto 
In most federal countries the second chamber is involved in the legislative process and can veto a 
reform of the fiscal constitution. The strength of a bicameral veto is gauged on two criteria, (1) the 
extent of veto power and (2) the distribution of seats in the second chamber. 
• Extent of veto powers. The Senate has more veto power if it can veto all laws initiated by 
the first chamber, which is the case in a majority of federal countries. In some countries 
the second chamber has only partial veto power, however, e.g. in Germany (Voigt, 2014) 
or Mexico297.  
• Distribution of seats. A Senate with an equal distribution of seats among states should be 
more veto prone as it is more difficult in a highly fragmented chamber to gather support 
for reform. Each state has the same number of seats in the Senate in Brazil (Pereira, 2014) 
and the US (Rodden, 2014). Under a proportional or partially proportional distribution of 
seats  the federal government must secure support only from the larger states and probably 
less than half the states. Partially proportional distribution of seats takes effect in Germany 
(Voigt, 2014) and India (Rao, 2014). 
Judicial veto 
The judicial veto depends on the degree of constitutional review and the power to strike down 
unconstitutional legislation (Gutmann et al., 2014). It might be evaluated based on four criteria.  
• Coverage. Certain laws are off-limit for judicial review. The Swiss Federal Court does 
not have the right to rule on laws passed by the federal government but only by state 
governments298.  
• Right to petition. The power of judicial review depends on the number of actors who can 
initiate a petition to the court. In some countries a broad range of political actors can file 
                                                    
297
  The Senate in Mexico has no authority in the approval of the revenue bill of each year (Ley de Ingresos), 
which is only approved by the lower chamber (Diaz-Cayeros, 2014). 
298
  Article 189 § 4 of the Swiss Constitution 1999 says that acts of the federal parliament or the federal 
government may not be challenger in the Supreme Court. In accordance with this article and Article 190, 
federal acts are binding and not reviewable the Supreme Court. 
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a court case, as is the case in Austria299 and Brazil300. On the other hand, in Argentina 
and Australia, only few political and institutional actors have access to the constitutional 
court (Ginsburg et al., 2014). 
• Timing. Judicial influence is broadest if the court has the competence to check the 
constitutionality of laws both before and after the adoption and implementation of a law, 
which is the case in e.g.  South Africa (Khumalo and Rakabe, 2014). Judicial influence is 
weaker if the court can review the legislation only after the law is adopted, e.g. in Canada 
(Bird, 2014) or Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros, 2014; Ginsburg et al., 2014).  
• Unconstitutionality. There are different ways to deal with laws deemed unconstitutional: 
(1) the law can be repealed automatically (e.g. Russia (Jarocińska, 2014) and Italy301)302, 
(2) the law can be returned to the legislature for revision or (3) the constitution can be 
silent on what happens with unconstitutional laws (e.g. Canada and India).  
Judicial veto is strongest when no laws are excluded from court adjudications, a broad range of 
actors can challenge federal legislation in the court, challenging legislation can occur before and 
after the law is adopted, and when an unconstitutional law is automatically void. 
Direct democracy  
Direct democracy has two tools, which are popular referendums and initiatives. They might have 
opposite effects on the stability of the fiscal constitution.  
• Referendum. The possibility of referendums introduces an additional veto power. 
Referendums make the status quo more difficult to change. Referendums on federal 
legislation are compulsory for new legislation in Switzerland (Schaltegger, 2014). Lately, 
                                                    
299
  In Austria, those political and institutional actors are: Federal Assembly, federal government, Länder 
governments, local governments, Courts, Ombudsman, Austrian members of the European Parliament, 
local councillor, single person (Thöni, 2014). 
300
  In Brazil, those actors are: the President, Senate, States’ Governors, General Public Prosecutor, Law Bar 
Association, political parties represented in Congress, National Unions and National Associations (Pereira, 
2014). 
301
  Article 136, c.1 of the Italian Constitution 1947 says that “When the Court declares the constitutional 
illegitimacy of a law or enactment having force of law, the law ceases to have effect the day following the 
publication of the decision”. 
302
  In cases where the law is void certain actions are expected to be encountered by the national parliaments to 
fill a legal gap and prevent legal uncertainty. 
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the Swiss people vetoed two major tax initiatives, which would have had a large fiscal 
impact at both the cantonal and the federal level.303  
• Popular initiative. Unlike referendums, popular initiatives can introduce additional 
instability into fiscal frameworks. Popular initiatives may translate changes in public 
opinion directly into policy changes. While the Swiss constitution provides a 
fundamental right to launch a popular initiative (Shaltegger, 2014), the Argentinian 
constitution explicitly bans certain types of initiatives, such as on constitutional reform, 
international treaties, taxes, the budget and penal matters (Saiegh, 2014).  
Constitutional amendment 
All constitutions contain a section that lays out the way to amend them. The rules governing 
constitutional amendment determine the frequency of actual amendments and hence constitutional 
stability (Rasch and Congleton, 2006). There are five criteria that determine how easily 
constitutions can be changed.  
• Qualified majorities. In most countries qualified majorities are required to approve a 
constitutional reform. Issues pertaining to the federal level can be amended with the 
consent of a ¾ majority in both chambers in Russia. Belgium and Germany require 2/3 
majorities in both chambers to pass an amendment (Ginsburg et al., 2014). An absolute 
majority is required in India and Italy304.  
• Referendums. National referendums on constitutional reforms are required or allowed in 
Australia, Austria, Italy and Switzerland (Ginsburg et al., 2014).  
• Consent from the states. In some countries such as Australia and Switzerland, 
constitutional changes must be approved by a majority of voters nationally and by a 
majority of states (Ginsburg et al., 2014). In other words, to materialize a constitutional 
                                                    
303
  These were the family tax initiative (providing tax deductions for families with a stay-at-home parent), and 
the highways vignette proposal (increasing the annual price for using motorways) (descriptions and 
outcomes of referenda are available on website of “A service of the Confederation, cantons and 
communes” https://www.ch.ch/en/ accessed on February 20, 2015). 
304
  If constitutional amendment in Italy is approved by absolute majority, referendum might be triggered when 
– within three months – such request is made by 1/5 of the members of the House or 500 thousands voters 
or Regional Councils. If the amendment is approved by a majority of 2/3 no such referendum can be 
triggered (Article 138 of the Italian Constitution 1947). 
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amendment not only half of the voters need to approve it globally, but majority needs to 
be also achieved in at least half of states.   
• Number of actors that can propose a reform. In some countries a broad range of actors 
can propose a constitutional reform. In Brazil the president, the first and second 
chambers separately and states can propose an amendment. In Germany, only the federal 
parliament can propose a constitutional change (Ginsburg et al., 2014).  
• Unamendable parts. The most radical constraint for constitutional amendment is non-
amendability. For instance, in Italy the first 12 articles of the Constitution cannot be 
modified. One of them concerns the principle according to which local autonomy is 
recognized and administrative decentralization has to be implemented.305 
Results for the intermediate institutional indicator “stability of fiscal constitutions” 
The numerical results for the intermediate level indicator “stability of fiscal constitutions” are 
presented in figure 5.6 (refer to appendix 5.4 for the detailed content and construction of the 
indicator). Australia, Russia and the United States have highly stable fiscal constitutions. Low 
stability is found in Austria and Switzerland. The remaining countries can be classified as having 
moderately stable fiscal constitutions. The most aligned institutional environment within this 
building block is observed in Germany, while arrangements are less aligned in Brazil, where 
strong judicial and bicameral veto powers go along with a proliferation of actors that can propose 
a constitutional change. 
                                                    
305
  Article 5 of the Italian Constitution 1947 says “The Republic is one and indivisible. It recognises and 
promotes local autonomies, and implements the fullest measure of administrative decentralisation in those 
services which depend on the State. The Republic adapts the principles and methods of its legislation to the 
requirements of autonomy and decentralisation”. 
  190  
 
Figure 5.6. Stability of fiscal constitutions: intermediate level indicator representing 
building block 5 
 
 
 
5.3. Interaction between building blocks 
 
The various building blocks are not assigned randomly across a fiscal constitution. The 
characteristics of one building block are often aligned with the characteristics of another building 
block. The extent to which building blocks reflect certain constitutional patterns can be assessed 
by using bivariate correlation306 among selected building blocks. Such a procedure not only 
allows assessing common features across countries, but also to identify “outlier” countries whose 
constitutions do not fit an established pattern. Four main linkages between the building blocks are 
studied here: (1) autonomy versus responsibility of states, (2) responsibility of states versus 
strength of fiscal framework, (3) autonomy of states versus co-determination of national policy by 
states, and (4) autonomy of states versus the stability of fiscal constitution. The correlations are 
one step towards finding commonalities between fiscal constitutions and to develop a summary 
indicator. 
                                                    
306
  Bivariate correlation shows simple empirical relation between two variables. One of the most common 
form to depict the relationship is a graphical representation of correlation. 
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5.3.1. Autonomy versus responsibility 
 
Autonomy and responsibility of states are positively correlated: the higher autonomy, the higher 
the responsibility of the states (figure 5.9). Arrangements where both indicators have similar 
values can be considered aligned, reflecting that when states are given large freedom in 
conducting fiscal policy, they are in general more accountable for their policies. On the other 
hand, if the role of states is limited to executing federal functions, their responsibility might also 
be lower, including support in times of distress (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). Spain and 
India are outliers compared to the established pattern. However, the building blocks autonomy 
and responsibility of these two federations are more aligned than those of other integrated 
federations, as the level of autonomy corresponds closely to the level of responsibility.  
Figure 5.9. Correlation between autonomy and responsibility of states 
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5.3.2. Responsibility versus strength of budget framework 
 
Responsibility and strength of fiscal frameworks are negatively correlated (figure 5.10). In an 
environment where states have to bear the consequences of their fiscal actions, strong budget 
frameworks and general government fiscal rules are hardly necessary. On the other hand, low 
state responsibility and ensuing soft budget constraint might induce the federal government to 
impose various fiscal rules and other constraints on state budgeting in order to commit general 
government fiscal discipline (Foremny, 2014). Most federations fit into the pattern between 
responsibility and budget frameworks. Budget frameworks in Argentina are however rather weak 
to cope with the low degree of state responsibility. 
Figure 5.10. Correlation between responsibility of states and strength of budget framework 
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that concern them (Moore et al. 2010). In most countries low autonomy is compensated by high 
participation at the federal level, an arrangement sometimes called co-operative federalism. The 
different evolution of autonomy and co-determination over time seems to confirm these findings. 
The correlation is a bit less significant, and several countries are quite far away from the line 
representing an established pattern of autonomy and co-determination. Especially South Africa 
seems to be an outlier, where states do not compensate low autonomy with large co-determination 
prerogatives.  
Figure 5.11.  Correlation between autonomy of states and co-determination of national 
policy by states 
 
 
5.3.4. Autonomy versus stability 
 
Autonomy and constitutional stability are positively correlated (figure 5.12). The explanation to 
this pattern could be the centrist bias in federal constitutions and states’ interest in rigid 
amendment procedures in countries where they enjoy large autonomy (Ginsburg and Versteeg, 
2013). In countries where the fiscal constitution is more stable and biased towards the status quo, 
the autonomy of states tends to be comparatively better preserved. The correlation is however 
relatively weak and several countries deviate widely from the supposed link. Especially in 
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Switzerland, autonomy of the states is much larger than suggested by the ease with which 
constitutional amendments could thwart it (Blöchliger and Frey, 1993)  
Figure 5.12. Correlation between autonomy of states and stability 
 
 
5.4.Types of fiscal constitutions 
 
The final step in the empirical assessment is to compare and rank all fiscal constitutions based on 
an aggregate classification. Such a classification helps better discern similarities as well as 
differences between fiscal constitutions, and it helps assess the meaning of terms such as 
“competitive”, “co-operative”, “executive”, “dual” and other types of federalism. In the following 
two empirical methods are used to assess the overall character of fiscal constitutions. First, 
clustering which helps identify groups that share similar fiscal constitutions but which are 
genuinely different from other groups. It is common to present output of clustering in 
dendrogram, i.e. figure demonstrating how the groups of similar fiscal constitutions are created. 
Second, factor analysis allows reducing number of variables describing fiscal constitutions, 
provided that certain building blocks of fiscal constitutions are highly correlated. Factor analysis 
drives a construction of a single summary indicator reflecting over-arching feature of the fiscal 
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constitution, for instance the degree of decentralization the fiscal constitution is granting (for a 
description of both methods see appendix 5.5 and 5.6). 
 
5.4.1. Identifying similar fiscal constitutions: clustering 
 
This section assesses the extent to which fiscal constitutions can be grouped or “clustered”, i.e. to 
what extent certain fiscal constitutions are very similar to each other, while they differ from 
others. Cluster analysis is used to group countries with comparable fiscal constitutions, i.e. which 
combine building blocks in a similar manner. Cluster analysis is applied on all five building 
blocks for the 15 countries. Various clustering methods are used in order to find robust country 
clusters (see appendix 5.5). 
When clustered, two groups of distinct fiscal constitutions emerge, which can be divided further 
into sub-groups (see figure 5.13). 
• The United States, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Argentina and Mexico feature 
decentralized fiscal constitutions. These constitutions combine institutions that provide 
for high autonomy of states, relatively high responsibility, low co-determination and 
weak budget rules and frameworks. Decentralized constitutions tend to be quite stable as 
well (Switzerland is an exception). Although clustered together, decentralized fiscal 
constitutions still differ significantly in the degree of responsibility. While in the United 
States, Canada and Switzerland the state level is highly responsible for its actions, 
responsibility is somewhat lower in Argentina, Australia and Mexico. These countries 
create a separate cluster of quasi-decentralized federations. 
• Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Russia, South Africa and Spain feature 
cooperative or integrated fiscal constitutions. As a mirror image of the previous cluster, 
these federations tend to combine low autonomy and responsibility with a high level of 
co-determination and strong fiscal rules and frameworks. On average, integrated fiscal 
constitutions are less stable. Overall, the cluster of integrated federations looks more 
coherent than the cluster of decentralized federations, as shown by the higher level of 
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dissimilarity. Some outliers should be pointed out: South African states have relatively 
weak co-determination power; Belgium and Russia have quite stable fiscal constitutions. 
Figure 5.13. Similarities and differences between fiscal constitutions: dendrogram based on 
cluster analysis 
 
Note: The clustering height on the vertical axis is a measure of dissimilarity. The higher its value the more 
heterogeneous are the units grouped in a given cluster. The horizontal axis has no meaning, i.e. clusters lying close to 
another one are not more similar than clusters farther apart. Values on top of the horizontal bars indicate probabilities. 
The approximately unbiased (AU) p-values computed by multi-scale bootstrap resampling are printed in red and 
bootstrap probabilities (BP) are printed in green. AU p-values are more accurate than the BP values as unbiased p-
values (Suzuki and Shimodaira, 2006). Clusters for which AU values exceed 90 are strongly supported by data 
indicating stable clusters. 
 
 
5.4.2. The degree of constitutional decentralization: composite indicator 
 
The second method to gauge similarities and differences between fiscal constitutions is to develop 
a composite indicator reflecting the degree of constitutionally provided decentralization. In order 
to do so, factor analysis is applied as the first step. Factor analysis gauges whether building blocks 
are always combined in the same fashion. Technically speaking, factor analysis tests to what 
extent the variances of the building blocks’ indicator values are co-moving, in other words to what 
extent building blocks are correlated or linked together. Results of the factor analysis suggest that 
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the various building blocks are indeed highly correlated, with around 85% of the total variation 
explained by two single factors (table 5.2).  
• Factor 1, strongly associated with autonomy, responsibility, co-determination and budget 
rules, represents around 66% of the variation in the original building blocks. The four 
building blocks are reduced to one single dimension, which can be described as the extent 
of decentralization.  
• Factor 2, explaining roughly 19% of the variation in the original variables, is mainly 
associated with the stability of the fiscal constitution. Differing degrees of stability are 
hence the second characteristic that helps differentiate fiscal constitutions.  
• Decentralization and stability are independent of each other, i.e. stable or unstable fiscal 
constitutions can be found in both decentralized and integrated federation. 
Table 5.2. Commonalities between the building blocks of fiscal constitutions: results off 
factor analysis 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Autonomy 0.95 0.17 
Responsibility 0.92 0.20 
Co-determination -0.81 0.05 
Budget frameworks -0.86 -0.03 
Stability 0.10 0.99 
Variance explained 66% 19% 
 
Given the correlation with the individual building blocks, factor 1 reflects the degree of 
constitutionally provided decentralization. A fiscal constitution is the more decentralized the 
higher fiscal autonomy and fiscal responsibility and the lower co-determination and the weaker 
budget frameworks are. Conversely, a fiscal constitution is the more integrated, the lower 
autonomy and responsibility, the higher co-determination and the stronger budget frameworks. 
Factor 2 covers the stability of fiscal constitutions and is only remotely linked to the degree of 
decentralization. As such, a composite indicator reflecting single dimension “decentralization” 
can be constructed, using the four aforementioned building blocks. To aggregate the composite 
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indicator, the random weights method (see section 5.2.1) is applied to the four intermediate-level 
indicators.  
Results are largely similar to the cluster analysis before, with two groups of constitutional settings 
emerging (figure 5.14). The United States, Canada and Switzerland are federations with a highly 
decentralized fiscal constitution, featuring what is sometimes referred to as competitive 
federalism. Spain, Germany and Russia feature relatively integrated or co-operative fiscal 
constitutions. Mexico, Argentina and Australia are in between. Confidence intervals indicate the 
level of alignment between building blocks. Spain and Canada have the most aligned fiscal 
constitution, while Argentina has the least aligned.307 Again, the results show clearly that 
constitutional coherence is independent of whether a federation is decentralized or integrated.  
Figure 5.14. Decentralized versus integrated fiscal constitutions: ranking order and 
coherence of the composite indicator 
 
Note: The random weights technique is used to generate the composite indicator. Since co-determination and budget 
framework indicators are negatively correlated with factor 1, their values are adjusted so that higher values of these 
variables indicate more decentralization.  
 
                                                     
307
  The random weights technique takes only alignment between the building blocks into account. An 
alternative method is to combine alignment between the building blocks with alignment within the building 
blocks. Hence, an alternative indicator was constructed where 50% of the variance within building blocks 
(between LLIs) and 50% of the variance between building blocks (between ILIs) are used. This alternative 
indicator delivers largely similar results, except for Mexico whose overall arrangement becomes more 
aligned. 
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5.4.3. The degree of constitutional decentralization: European Union 
 
Although the European Union is not usually seen as a true federation308, some aspects of its 
institutional design and governance are akin to those observed in nation-state federations. As in all 
federations, many policy issues are related to institutional questions such as “who does what” and 
“how do procedures function”. The single market, the (small) EU budget and majority voting in 
selected policy areas also suggest that the European Union has some features of a federation or a 
proto-federation. Against this background, the Union’s constitutional design and coherence can be 
ranked against nation-state federal countries. The same methodology as for the 15 federations is 
applied. 
The EU fiscal constitution is moderately decentralized and less aligned than those of most federal 
countries (figure 5.15). It is less decentralized than that of the United States, Canada and 
Switzerland, and less than quasi-decentralized federations like Mexico, Argentina and Australia. 
On the one hand, the EU fiscal constitution features relatively high autonomy and responsibility 
of the member states. On the other hand, the EU constitution is characterized by high co-
determination and strong hierarchical budget rules and frameworks, i.e. the building blocks of co-
operative federalism. The EU fiscal constitution mixes therefore elements from decentralized and 
integrated federal systems. For that reason, fiscal constitution of the EU could be classified as a 
hybrid combining features of decentralized and centralized fiscal constitutions.  
                                                    
308
  The comparison of the fiscal constitutions in the true federations and the EU should be pursued, however, 
with a few caveats. For example, labour mobility within the EU remains lower than in federal states. In 
addition, the EU is not yet a political union as all other federations (Cottarelli and Guerguil, 2014). 
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Figure 5.15. The European Union’s fiscal constitution: Degree of decentralization and 
coherence 
 
 
This assessment appears to reflect well the EU’s constitutional set up. Member states enjoy large 
fiscal autonomy but a lot of EU policies help co-ordinate fiscal policy across countries and impose 
constraints on national discretion. Since the EU budget is small, fiscal co-ordination is achieved 
by a set of rather stringent fiscal rules (OECD, 2014). These rules are imposed through the 
Maastricht Treaty (formally Treaty on the European Union) and Excessive Deficit Procedure, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, regulations contained in the “Six Pack”309, the “Two Pack”310 and the 
“Fiscal Compact” (formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union). Policies are also coordinated and subject to surveillance by the 
                                                    
309
  Regulation 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011 L 
306/1; Regulation 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in 
the euro area, OJ 2011 L 306/8; Regulation 1175/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on 
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-ordination of 
economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12; Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L 
306/25; Council Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L 306/33; Council Directive 
2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ 2011 L 306/41. 
310
  Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area, OJ 2013 L 140, and, Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member 
States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial 
stability, OJ 2013 L 140. 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
SPA GER RUS BRA BEL ITA RSA AUT IND EU MEXARG AUS SWI CAN USA
  
201 
 
Commission and the Council within the annual cycle of the European Semester. Recent changes 
to the EU’s fiscal constitution further reinforced fiscal and economic governance by amending 
surveillance procedures, sharpening sanction mechanisms and setting intermediate fiscal and 
economic targets and adjustment procedures. The encompassing fiscal constitution established 
over the last twenty years and especially in the wake of the economic and fiscal crisis stands in 
contrast with the wide-ranging autonomy of the member states in tax and spending matters 
(Wyplosz, 2013). 
Based on these results, some tentative policy implications may be derived for the EU fiscal 
constitution, particularly in light of the on-going debate on the design of the European fiscal 
union. As revealed in the empirical analysis, the current EU fiscal constitution represents a hybrid 
system consisting, on the one hand, of elements from the decentralized model of fiscal 
constitution, and on the other hand, of composites from the integrated model. A question arises 
whether this hybrid model is sustainable. This is particularly in light of the fact that none of the 
federations resembles this model, and the model which is considered the closest to the European – 
Argentina’s fiscal constitution – is perceived as ill-designed and crisis-prone (see section 5.6). If a 
hybrid model is unsustainable and unsuitable for the EU, what is then the preferred model for 
Europe: decentralized or integrated? 
An integrated model of the EU fiscal constitution would inevitably push toward a larger common 
budget with ability to mitigate – via transfers – idiosyncratic economic shocks in the member 
states. Some observers suggest, however, that such a vehicle for cross-country fiscal transfers 
should not be rashly institutionalized (Balcerowicz, 2012). Particularly, given that the European 
solidarity or common identity – which should justify this kind of bailout transfers – is still weak in 
the EU (Guiso et al., 2014a). If transfers are prematurely institutionalized, they could actually 
hamper the solidarity as many EU citizens still do not perceive as a legitimate step to rescue 
countries affected by crises caused by their own policies (Balcerowicz, 2012). Political tensions 
between “Berlin” and “Athens” or broadly speaking between conservative “North” and profligate 
“South” were observed already during the recent euro area debt crisis. These tensions are likely to 
become an outrage, if transfer recipients are permanently the same countries (Balcerowicz, 2012). 
This kind of political tensions, and resulting threats of break-up of a country, are observed, for 
instance, in Belgium and Spain. Consequently, under the current circumstances, a decentralized 
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model of fiscal constitution with a credible no-bailout rule, well-functioning inter-jurisdictional 
competition, and smoothly operating financial market seems to fit better the EU (Balcerowicz, 
2012). This is not to say that integrated model will be never appropriate. Rather a gradual process 
of building-up common European identity and solidarity is required (Balcerowicz, 2012). 
Common identity and solidarity seem to be preconditions for an integrated model of fiscal 
constitution, with a large EU budget and encompassing fiscal transfers.  
 
5.5. The evolution of fiscal constitutions 
 
Fiscal constitutions evolve over time. There are three questions related to the dynamics of fiscal 
constitutions: (1) “what changes?”, (2) “how does it change?”, and (3) “why does it change?” 
(Benz and Broschek, 2013). The first and second question refers to the evolution of the five 
building blocks. The third question refers to mechanisms that produce constitutional reform. 
Fiscal constitutions may change because the fiscal or economic environment has changed (booms 
or crisis times), because the political setting has changed (large political swings; military or 
authoritarian regimes), or because of separatist movements or a looming break-up of a country. As 
such, fiscal constitutions do not only reflect fiscal policy considerations, but the wider 
environment within which countries thrive. 
 
5.5.1. Evolution of building blocks 
 
Fiscal constitutions have become less decentralized and more integrated over most of the time 
they have been in place, although a few countervailing episodes also occurred (figure 5.16). To 
evaluate the evolution of fiscal constitutions, the average indicator values of all countries are 
calculated for the years between 1917 and 2013.311 While autonomy and responsibility of sub-
                                                    
311
  The indicators for the following countries and periods are coded: Argentina (1853-2013), Australia (1901-
2013), Austria (1945-2013), Brazil (1891-2013), Belgium (1969-2013), Canada (1867-2013), Germany 
(1949-2013), India (1949-2013), Italy (1948-2013), Mexico (1917-2013), Russia (1993-2013), South 
Africa (1996-2013), Spain (1978-2013), Switzerland (1848-2013) and the United States (1791-2013). 
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federal entities are trending downward – except autonomy that increased in the 1980s and 1990s – 
co-determination and budget frameworks tend to strengthen over time. The degree of stability has 
remained – relatively unchanged. Dynamics for individual countries are presented in appendix 
5.7.  
Figure 5.16. The evolution of fiscal constitutions: changes in the five building blocks, 15 
countries average, 1917-2013 
 
Note: The lines represent the annual average of indicator values for 15 countries. The panel is unbalanced, 
i.e. countries enter the sample at different points in time (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Switzerland 
and the United States in 1917, Austria in 1945, Italy in 1948, Germany and India in 1949, Belgium in 1969, Spain in 
1978, Russia in 1993 and South Africa in 1996). 
 
5.5.2. Explaining the evolution of fiscal constitutions 
 
This section provides more insights into the changes to individual building blocks of fiscal 
constitutions. Since the club of federal countries grew over the last 100 years, these changes both 
reflect trends within mature federations and the birth and subsequent evolution of new ones.  
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Autonomy 
The evolution of states’ autonomy can be divided into three periods, (1) the period between 1917 
and the early 1980s, (2) the span between the early 1980s and mid-1990s, and (3) the period 
between the mid-1990s to 2013.  
• First period (1917-80). During the first period (1917-80), lower autonomy was mostly 
linked to crisis times. Autonomy declined during the Great Depression in the early 
1930s, World War II (WWII) and, less clearly, during the oil crises at the beginning of 
1970s. Economic shocks and crises often went together with federal interference in the 
states’ autonomy. In Switzerland, the federal government expanded taxing rights at the 
expense of the cantons (Schaltegger, 2014). After the war, countries behaved differently. 
In Australia, the power to tax income was never returned to the states, mainly due to 
High Court rulings confirming the centralization of taxing powers (Petchey, 2014). In 
Canada, on the other hand, provinces including Quebec and Ontario ended the “tax rental 
agreement” with the federal level and established their own tax base again shortly after 
the war (Bird, 2014). 
• Second period (1980 to mid-1990). During that period, state autonomy increased. States 
started regaining power in the 1980s. In Australia, the credit limitations imposed by the 
Loan Council were phased out and the monitoring of states’ debt was left to financial 
markets (Petchey, 2014). Mexico experienced a considerable surge in state autonomy. 
During the education reform in the early 1990s several policy functions were delegated to 
the states (Diaz-Cayeros, 2014). In the 1990s, the state level in the United States gained 
more power after a series of Supreme Court rulings and the reforms of the welfare state. 
The rulings prescribed devolution of substantial responsibility to the states in 
implementing welfare policies (Rodden, 2014). 
• Third period (mid-1990s onwards). The third phase in the dynamics of state autonomy, 
starting in the mid-1990s, is marked by a renewed decline in state autonomy. Most of this 
reversal is related to the financial crisis in emerging economies in 1998 and the global 
crisis of 2008. In the early 2000s, following a debt crisis and ensuing bailouts of sub-
national government, the federal government in Brazil passed the Fiscal Responsibility 
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Law in 2000, curbed state fiscal autonomy and re-centralized fiscal policy (Pereira, 
2014). In the European Union, the financial crisis of 2008 and debt crisis of 2010 led 
many countries to introduce or refine numerical fiscal rules. In 2009, Germany adopted a 
constitutional debt brake covering all levels of government (Voigt, 2014), soon followed 
by Spain and Italy (Sollé-Ollé, 2014).  
Authoritarian regimes tend to limit state autonomy. Direct elections of governors (heads of 
executive at the state level) are usually suspended in favor of governors appointed by the center. 
In Argentina and Brazil, control over governors’ appointment by military regimes began in the 
1930s, intertwined with democratic episodes where governors were elected (Pereira, 2014; 
Saiegh, 2014). The restoration of democracy in the 1980s in both countries resulted in a surge of 
state autonomy. In Mexico, state autonomy was limited by (almost) single-party rule at all 
government levels between 1929 and 1989 (Diaz-Cayeros, 2014). Single-party rule was also the 
norm at both government levels in India until the early 1990s (Rao, 2014). 
Responsibility 
The responsibility indicator has trended downward since 1917, largely commensurate with 
autonomy. The surge in the late 1980s can be related to institutional changes in Australia, Canada 
and the United States. During the 1980s, the federal government in the United States abolished the 
revenue sharing and equalization mechanism and reduced the size of the intergovernmental grant 
system (Rodden, 2014). In Australia and Canada, states and provinces self-imposed a set of fiscal 
rules, sending a message to financial markets that they will take fiscal sustainability seriously 
(Bird, 2014; Petchey, 2014).  
The main reasons for decreasing state responsibility throughout the 20th century are: (1) a rise in 
all sorts of intergovernmental transfers, and (2) bailouts. Growing intergovernmental transfers 
decrease state responsibility as they need to mobilize less and less revenue by their own. The rise 
in intergovernmental transfers was partly a response to crises, partly a response to regional 
disparities between sub-national units and the rise of inequality as a policy issue (see section 5.5.2 
for a detailed description of various types of intergovernmental transfers): 
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• Equalization. Redistribution across sub-national units has become more important and 
more institutionalized over time, as reducing inequality gained in importance as a policy 
objective. Switzerland introduced equalization in the constitution in 1958 (Schaltegger, 
2014), while Canada did so in 1982 (Bird, 2014). Although lacking a constitutional basis, 
Australia has followed the principle of full horizontal fiscal equalization since the 1980s 
(Petchey, 2014). In 2004, Russia introduced an equalization formula in the Budget Code 
(Jarocińska, 2014). Apart from the United States, nowadays all federations have explicit 
equalization systems.  
• Tax sharing. Tax sharing is a popular means of risk sharing across government levels in 
many federations, often dating back many decades. Argentina introduced its 
Coparticipación system in the mid-1930s in the form of ordinary legislation. Decreasing 
revenues during the economic crisis of 1930s led the federal level to unify all taxes into 
one pool under federal supervision. In 1994 the Coparticipación principle was finally 
anchored in the constitution (Saiegh, 2014). Germany’s tax sharing mechanism is 
constitutional since 1955 and was further extended in 1969 (Voigt, 2014). A tax-sharing-
cum-equalization mechanism was introduced in the mid-1970s, but abolished in 1986 in 
the United States (Rodden, 2014). 
• Stabilization. Stabilization policy and counter-cyclical transfers312 were introduced in the 
second half of the 20th century in the wake of the Great Depression. In 1947, the Swiss 
were the first to adopt a constitutional provision promoting measures to cope with an 
economic slowdown, and the measures were strengthened in 1978 (Schaltegger, 2014). 
In Germany the right to pass counter-cyclical policy measures became constitutional in 
1967 (Voigt, 2014). In Spain, the new constitution of 1978 endowed the federal level 
with the power to coordinate general economic planning (Solé-Ollé, 2014). In Canada, 
the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act of 1985 enables the federal level to 
stabilize provincial revenues (Bird, 2014). 
• Other transfers. Grant systems were gradually established in most federations, either co-
financing policy areas under state jurisdiction or, more recently, compensating for 
                                                    
312
  Counter-cyclical transfers are granted to states in order to mitigate (idiosyncratic) adverse economic 
circumstances.  
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decentralized spending responsibilities. The German and Swiss constitutions contain 
multiple provisions stipulating that the federal level “should” or “must support” state 
activities (see section 5.3.2). Russia increased earmarked transfers to subjects in 1999 to 
finance newly transferred spending mandates (Jarocińska, 2014). In Belgium the 
decentralization move of the last two decades was met with more grants (Jennes and 
Persyn, 2014). In 1998, the Mexican Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal added transfers for 
education, health and infrastructure (Diaz-Cayeros, 2014). In general, bar a few 
exceptions, the institutional anchoring of sectorial grants has increased with the ageing of 
federations.  
• Bailouts. Bailouts are a specific form of ad-hoc intergovernmental transfer. Except for 
Switzerland, all federations bailed out a state at some time. In Australia, New South 
Wales and in Canada Alberta, respectively, were bailed out during or in the aftermath of 
the Great Depression of the 1930s (Petchey, 2014). In the United States, New York was 
bailed out in 1975, shortly after the first oil crisis (Rodden, 2014). In Latin America a 
first round of bailouts occurred after the fiscal crisis and sudden stop episodes of the late 
1980s. Although patterns were similar in Argentina and Brazil throughout the 1990s, the 
trend in the 2000s seems to diverge. While Argentina bailed out two other states in 2003 
and 2011 (Saiegh, 2014), Brazil managed to obey its constitutional no-bailout strategy 
during the 2000s (Pereira, 2014).  
Co-determination 
There are two episodes in the dynamics of co-determination worth discussing: first, a surge in co-
determination in the 1950s and 1960s, and second a slower upward trend since the early 1980s.  
• Stronger co-determination in the late 1940s and early 1950s followed the end of 
authoritarian rule in some countries. The evolution during the 1960s was largely driven 
by Germany and Brazil. In the late 1960s, the power of the second chamber in Germany 
(Bundesrat) rose further, making Germany one of the federations with the strongest joint 
decision-making powers (Voigt, 2014). However, the role of the second chamber was 
reduced again in 2006 (Voigt, 2014). On the other hand, co-determination rights were 
low in Brazil over that period due to authoritarian rule (Pereira, 2014). 
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• Starting in the 1980s, several countries strengthened co-determination. In the 1980s, 
Belgium introduced the Consultation Committee composed of the prime ministers of 
both government levels, which – among others – approves the share of each government 
in the overall deficit needed to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (Jennes and 
Persyn, 2014). The establishment of a Constitutional Court in 1980 also strengthened the 
Belgian states. In 1994, the Supreme Court in Mexico was endowed with the right to 
review federal legislation for compliance with the constitution (Ginsburg et al., 2014). In 
1982, the Canadian provinces obtained the right to approve constitutional amendments 
(Bird, 2014). Australia established the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 
1992 (Petchey, 2014). Finally in Italy, since 1997 political negotiations between the 
central government and regions take place at the Standing Conference for the 
Relationship between the State and the Regions (Scabrosetti, 2014). 
Budget rules and frameworks 
Budget rules and frameworks were beefed up at an unprecedented scale over the last decade, after 
having changed little over a very long period. Numerical rules, procedural rules and other fiscal 
institutions underwent deep changes. The financial and debt crisis of 2010 was the driving force 
behind many reforms. 
The introduction of “second generation” numerical fiscal rules313 was probably the most salient 
element of budgetary reform. Following Switzerland that adopted a constitutional debt brake – 
actually a balanced budget rule – in 2001 (Schaltegger, 2014), Germany, Italy and Spain 
implemented similar reforms in 2009, 2011 and 2012, respectively. The latter rules were more 
encompassing because they covered general government and not only – as in Switzerland – the 
federal level. A Spanish Organic Law also sets debt and expenditure rules for general government 
(Solé-Ollé, 2014). In Italy, expenditure and deficit rules were introduced at the ordinary statutory 
level by the Internal Stability Pact in 1999 (Scabrosetti, 2014). As a post-crisis and preventive 
measure Russia amended its Budget Code in 2012 and introduced a fiscal rule that sets a cap on 
                                                    
313
  “Second generation” of the numerical fiscal rules refers to rules which are defined in structural (cyclical) 
terms as opposed to the rules of “first generation” which define ceilings in nominal terms. Structural rules 
take into account the working of automatic stabilizers during the crises (increased welfare spending and 
decrease of budget revenue), and therefore introduce flexibility in response to economic shocks 
(Schaechter et al., 2012). 
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federal government expenditure (Jarocińska, 2014). In Germany, expenditure rules operating 
through political commitment were established already in 1982 (IMF, 2013b). 
Budget institutions and frameworks were also strengthened. The 2012 fiscal reform in Spain 
introduced medium-term budgetary frameworks for both levels of government and enabled the 
Supreme Audit Institution to check the budget execution of the autonomous regions (Solé-Ollé, 
2014). In the same year, Italy harmonized medium-term budgetary frameworks across levels of 
government and unified accounting methods (Scabrosetti, 2014). Both countries also recently 
established fiscal councils (IMF, 2013a). In Canada, the Parliamentary Budget Office started 
operating in 2008 and in Russia the Public Council did so in 2011 (Jarocińska, 2014). In 
Germany, the 2009 constitutional amendment established the Stability Council (Voigt, 2014). In 
the United States, the Congressional Budget Office was established in 1974 (IMF, 2013b) and in 
Belgium the High Council of Finance - Section "Public Sector Borrowing Requirement" was 
launched in 1988 (Jennes and Persyn, 2014).  
 
5.5.3. Alignment of fiscal constitutions over time 
 
Overall alignment (or coherence) remained flat over long periods but has considerably increased 
since the 1980s (figure 5.17). The increase over the last 30 years can be traced back to the 
strengthening of the budget framework in many federations, often in reaction to low state 
responsibility, and, to lesser extent, to a better alignment of autonomy and responsibility. 
Decentralized federations evolved less than integrated federations. Misalignment was highest 
during war periods and during authoritarian regimes. Some constitutions such as the Argentinian 
or the United States hardly moved with respect to the level of alignment (individual country 
figures for 1980, 1996 and 2013 are shown in appendix 5.8).  
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Figure 5.17. Alignment from 1917 to 2013: average of 15 countries 
 
Note: Incoherence is measured as the average of the variance around intermediate level indicators for all 15 
federations in each year. Coherence is measured as the inverse of incoherence, hence an upward sloping curve means 
rising coherence. 
The clear-cut distinction between decentralized and integrated fiscal constitutions that can be 
observed today is actually quite recent. As cluster analysis of fiscal constitutions for 1980 and 
1996 reveals that the precise division of federations into two groups was impossible. In 1980 and 
1996, at least four clusters of federations could be distinguished, with no characteristic dividing 
line between them. Over time fiscal constitutions moved towards either of the two models. Put in 
other words: fiscal constitutions have become more distinct.  
 
5.6. Fiscal constitutions and fiscal outcomes 
 
This section provides a few simple bivariate correlations between selected features of the fiscal 
constitution and fiscal outcomes. The correlations link fiscal outcomes to both the level and the 
alignment of constitutional decentralization, i.e. to both indicator values and variance. Correlation 
does not mean causation. Fiscal institutions and fiscal outcomes interact. Fiscal institutions may 
affect fiscal outcomes, but the latter might also trigger changes to the basic fiscal framework, as 
shown in section 5.4. In some periods the relationship runs from institutions to outcomes, while in 
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other periods outcomes trigger changes to the institutional framework. In order to capture long-
term effects, average indicator values for the period 1980 to 2013 are taken. 
The correlations suggest that fiscal outcomes are hardly related to the level of constitutional 
decentralization (figure 5.18) but more closely related to alignment or coherence of constitutional 
decentralization (figure 5.19). In other words, the extent to which fiscal constitutions are 
decentralized is less associated with outcomes than the extent to which the various arrangements 
within a fiscal constitution fit together. As such, the results of the simple bivariate correlations 
linking alignment to outcomes can be summarised as follows:  
• Alignment (coherence) and spending. Primary spending growth seems to be positively 
correlated with incoherence. Incoherence might allow states to shift the consequences of 
excessive spending to other government levels or to the general government.  
• Alignment (coherence) and debt. Debt growth seems to be positively correlated with 
incoherence, at least for the period from 1980 to 2010. In less coherent settings, 
e.g. when autonomy and responsibility are not aligned, sub-national units may be able to 
shift the consequences of fiscal profligacy onto the federal level or other states.  
• Alignment (coherence) and crises. There is a correlation between incoherence and the 
number of crisis years. In less well-aligned settings, deficit and debt might accumulate 
more easily, leading to a higher crisis probability.  
• Alignment (coherence) and economic growth. Finally, incoherence is negatively 
correlated with growth rates. Therefore, incoherent fiscal constitutions may affect the 
economic activity negatively. 
Linking the level of constitutional decentralization to the same fiscal outcome variables as above 
(growth of debt, growth of primary spending, economic crises, GDP growth) delivers very weak 
results, maybe with the exception of the relation between decentralization and debt growth, which 
is slightly positive. As it was already pointed out, correlations do not mean causation and, 
therefore, these results are very tentative. In the future, more research needs to be done to unravel 
a causal relationship between coherence and fiscal outcomes. 
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Figure 5.18. Correlations between the degree of decentralization and fiscal/economic 
outcomes 
a) Constitutional decentralization and change in debt stock (% of GDP), 1980-2010 
 
b) Constitutional decentralization and change in primary expenditure (% of GDP), 1980-
2010 
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c) Constitutional decentralization and number of economic crises, 1980-2010 
 
Note: “Crisis” is counted as a year in which specific crisis is observed, such as currency crisis, inflation crisis, stock 
market clash, sovereign debt crisis, and banking crisis. If in a single year two crises occur, for instance banking and 
sovereign debt crises, then this year is counted double. See http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-
topic/topics/7/ (accessed March 5, 2015). 
d) Constitutional decentralization and GDP growth, 1980-2010 
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Figure 5.19. Correlations between incoherence of fiscal constitutions and fiscal/economic 
outcomes 
a) Degree of incoherence and change in debt stock (% of GDP), 1980-2010 
  
Note: Russia is dropped from the sample. In the period 1993-2010 (for which the fiscal constitution is coded) Russian 
public debt decreased by more than 100 percentage points from 116% of GDP to 13% of GDP.  
 
b) Degree of incoherence and change in primary expenditure (% of GDP), 1980-2010 
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c) Degree of incoherence and number of economic crises, 1980-2010 
 
Note: “Crisis” is counted as a year in which specific crisis is observed, such as currency crisis, inflation crisis, stock 
market clash, sovereign debt crisis, and banking crisis. If in a single year two crises occur, for instance banking and 
sovereign debt crises, then this year is counted double. See http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-
topic/topics/7/ (accessed on March 5, 2015). 
d) Degree of incoherence and number of sovereign debt crises, 1980-2010 
  
Note: “Crisis” is counted as a year in which sovereign debt crisis is observed. See http://www. 
reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/7/ (accessed on March 5, 2015). 
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e) Degree of incoherence and GDP growth, 1980-2010 
 
 
5.7. Closing remarks for chapter 5 
 
This chapter contributes to our understanding of federal fiscal constitutions and the interaction 
between constitutional arrangements. It shows convincingly that federal fiscal constitutions vary 
in the degree of constitutionally guaranteed decentralization, with two prevailing types of fiscal 
constitutions being the most common: decentralized and integrated fiscal constitutions. A crucial 
contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate that fiscal constitutions vary in terms of coherence 
(or alignment) of institutional arrangements, where coherent (aligned) fiscal constitutions suggest 
that institutional arrangements “fits well” together. Preliminary evidence shows that alignment (or 
coherence) of fiscal constitutions is associated with selected economic and fiscal outcomes. Over 
the period 1980-2010, less coherent fiscal constitutions were associated with higher debt and 
spending growth, and more economic and sovereign debt crises. Moreover, federations with less 
coherent fiscal constitutions had somewhat lower GDP growth between 1980 and 2010. This 
chapter also derived some very tentative policy implications in the context of the European fiscal 
union.  
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Appendix 5.1. List of the main laws used for coding 
Argentina: 
 Argentina’s Constitution of 1853, Reinstated in 1983 
 Law 12.139 
 Law 12.143 
 Law 12.147 
 Law 12.956 
 Law 14.060 
 Law 14.788 
 Law 14.788 
 Law 25.570 
 Law N 20.221 
 Law N 23.548 
 The 1992 Fiscal Pact 
 The 1993 Fiscal Pact 
Austria: 
 Austria’s Constitution of 1920, Reinstated in 1945 
 Financial Constitutional Law of 1922, Reinstated in 1948 
 Federal Financial Settlement Law of 1959 and subsequent 
 The Stability Pact of 1999 and subsequent 
Australia: 
 Australia’s Constitution of 1901 
 Commonwealth Grants Commission Act of 1976 
Belgium: 
 Belgium’s Constitution of 1831 
 The Special Law for the Reform of the Institutions of 1980  
 The Special Financing Law of 1988 
Brazil: 
 Brazil’s Constitution of 1988 
 Camata Law of 1995 
 Kandir Law of 1996 
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 The Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2000 
Canada: 
 Canada’s Constitution of 1867 
 The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act (multiple years) 
Germany: 
 German Federal Republic’s Constitution of 1949 
 Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz of 1969 
India: 
 India’s Constitution of 1949 
 Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Law of 2003 
Italy: 
 Italy’s Constitution of 1947 
 The Internal Stability Pact of 1999 
Mexico: 
 Mexico’s Constitution of 1917 
 Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal of 1967, Convenios de Adhesion 
South Africa: 
 South Africa’s Constitution of 1996  
 Borrowing Powers of Provincial Government Act of 1996 
 Financial and Fiscal Commission Act of 1997 
 Public Finance Management Act of 1999 
 Provincial Tax Regulation and Processes Act of 2001 
 Municipal System Act of 2003 
Russia: 
 Russia’s Constitution of 1993 
 The Tax Code of 1998 
 The Budget Code of 1998 
 The Federal Law N184 on General Principles of the Organization of Government in 
Subjects of  the Federation 
 Presidential Decree N848 
 Presidential Decree N1602 
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 The Federal Law N122 on Amendments to Several Laws 
Spain: 
 Spain’s Constitution of 1978 
 Ley Organica de las Comuninades Autonomas 8/1980 
 Ley Organica 1/1989 
 Ley Organica 3/1996 
 Ley Organica 10/1998 
 Ley Organica 5/2001 
  Ley Organica 7/2001 
 Ley Organica 3/2009 
 Ley Organica 2/2012 
 Ley Organica 4/2012 
Switzerland: 
 Switzerland’s Constitution of 1848 
 Switzerland’s Constitution of 1874 
 Switzerland’s Constitution of 1999 
 The Federal Tax Harmonization Act of 1990 
United States of America: 
 United States of America’s Constitution of 1789 
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Appendix 5.2. List of experts 
 
ARG: Sebastian Saiegh, University of California 
AUS: Jeff Petchey, Curtin University 
AUT: Erich Thöni, University of Innsbruck 
BEL: Geert Jennes and Damiaan Persyn, Leuven University  
BRA: Carlos Pereira, School of Public and Business Administration 
CAN: Richard Bird, University of Toronto  
GER: Stefan Voigt, University of Hamburg  
SPA: Alberto Solé-Ollé, University of Barcelona  
ITA: Simona Scabrosetti, University of Pavia  
IND: Govinda Rao, Centre for Policy Research  
MEX: Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Stanford University  
RSA:  Bongani Khumalo, Financial and Fiscal Commission  
RUS: Elena Jarocińska, Pompeu Fabra  
SWI: Christoph Schaltegger, University of Lucerne  
USA: Jonathan Rodden, Stanford University  
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Appendix 5.3. Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire on federal fiscal constitutions 
 
This questionnaire is part of on-going work of the OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across 
Government Levels 
 
Expert information 
NAME:         
COUNTRY:        
TELEPHONE NUMBER:        
EMAIL ADDRESS:       
 
For additional questions and to return the questionnaire and any accompanying documents, please contact 
Hansjörg Blöchliger (Hansjoerg.Bloechliger@oecd.org) and Jarosław Kantorowicz (jaroslaw.kantorowicz 
@edle-phd.eu).  
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OVERVIEW AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. This questionnaire asks for information about the current state of the federal fiscal constitution 
and its historical evolution. Fiscal constitution refers to a country-specific set of rules and regulations, 
which guide decision making in the area of fiscal policy and particularly in fiscal relations between the 
federal and state levels of government. This questionnaire is divided into three parts: 
• Part 1 asks about the current state of the federal fiscal constitution; 
• Part 2 asks about the historical evolution of and amendments to the federal fiscal constitution; 
• Part 3 asks about a qualitative assessment of the state and evolution of the federal fiscal 
constitution. 
2. Part 1 comprises 18 questions. Each question is devoted to one building block of the federal 
fiscal constitution. In this section most of the questions can be answered by ticking a box. However, below 
each question space is left, so that you can provide additional information. Part 2 asks you to provide 
information on reforms (amendments) of the federal fiscal constitution in chronological order together with 
a short description of the reform. Finally, Part 3 is complementary to the previous sections, inviting you to 
present a qualitative assessment of the current thrust of the federal fiscal constitution, in particular the main 
features and long-term trends. 
3. The focus of this questionnaire is on the constitutional framework and constitutional 
change/reform/amendment. Many fundamental reforms of the federal fiscal constitution occurred at the 
post-constitutional level (e.g. through judicial decisions and special fiscal legislation), however. Therefore, 
key post-constitutional reforms should also be explicitly mentioned in your responses. 
4.  The questionnaire usually asks about the relationship between the federal and the state level (i.e. 
the level immediately below the federal level, also called the regional level, provincial level etc.). If the 
federal constitution also says something about the local level (municipalities etc.), please provide this 
information in the comments section of each question. This is important when the federal rules for states 
and for local governments differ widely. 
5. Please return the questionnaire by March 31, 2014.  
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Part 1: Current fiscal constitution 
 
1. Tax assignment 
 
The constitutional division of taxing powers between the federal and state levels is at the core of the 
federal setting and fiscal sovereignty of jurisdictions. Please fill the following table on the constitutional 
rulings about tax powers. Several answers can be ticked. 
 Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution allows the federal level to legislate on any tax:  
The federal constitution allows the federal level to legislate only on taxes listed in the 
constitution:  
The federal constitution sets minimum and/or maximum tax rates for federal taxes:  
• If so, please specify:        
 
Please fill the following table depending on what the federal constitution says about specific taxes. For 
each tax category only one answer can be ticked. 
 
The federal 
constitution says that 
only the federal level  
can levy this tax 
The federal 
constitution says that 
the federal level is 
allowed to levy this tax 
The federal constitution 
says that the federal 
level cannot levy this 
tax 
Personal income tax    
Corporate income tax    
Value added tax/retail sales tax    
Property tax    
Natural resource tax    
Social security contribution    
 
 
  224  
 
 
Please fill the following table on the constitutional rulings about state tax autonomy. Several answers can 
be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution allows the state level to legislate on any tax, if not explicitly 
prohibited by the federal constitution:  
The federal constitution allows the state level to legislate only on taxes listed in the 
federal constitution:  
The federal constitution sets minimum and/or maximum tax rates for state taxes:  
• If so, please specify:        
 
Please fill the following table depending on what the federal constitution says about specific taxes. For 
each tax category only one answer can be ticked. 
 
The federal 
constitution says that 
only the state level  
can levy this tax 
The federal 
constitution says that 
the state level is 
allowed to levy this tax 
The federal 
constitution says that 
the state level  
cannot levy this tax 
Personal income tax    
Corporate income tax    
Value added tax/retail sales tax    
Property tax    
Natural resource tax    
Social security contribution    
 
In the following box please give any additional comments regarding the division of taxing power between 
the federal and state levels (e.g. describe some country-specific nuances or mention other important taxes). 
Also, please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which determines the division of taxing powers. 
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Comments (if any):       
 
2. Tax sharing 
 
Some taxes are not assigned exclusively to one level of government but shared among them. Please fill the 
following table on tax sharing mechanisms depending on which answer is appropriate. Several answers 
can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says nothing about tax sharing between the federal and the 
state level:  
The federal constitution says that the federal level shares taxes with the state level:   
• If so, please specify which taxes are allowed to be shared:        
The federal constitution provides some guidelines for tax sharing formula:  
The federal constitution specifies the body responsible for setting and adjusting tax 
sharing formula:  
• If so, please specify (e.g. whether the body is independent, 
intergovernmental, etc.):        
The body responsible for setting and adjusting  tax sharing formula is established by 
post-constitutional legislation:  
• If so, please specify (e.g. whether the body is independent, 
intergovernmental, etc.):        
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on tax sharing mechanism. Particularly, please 
refer to any post-constitutional legislation which regulates the tax sharing between federal and state levels. 
Comments (if any):       
 
 
 
 
  226  
 
3. Spending assignment 
 
Spending powers concerns the division of power in various policy/spending areas. Please fill the following 
table depending on which constitutional power is given to the federal level. Only one answer can be ticked.  
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution allows the federal level to legislate/spend on any policy area:  
The federal constitution allows the federal level to legislate/spend only on policy 
areas listed in the constitution:  
 
Please fill the following table depending on which statements the federal constitution makes about a 
specific policy area. The policy areas correspond to the Classification of Functions of Government 
(COFOG) of the OECD National Accounts. For each policy area only one answer can be ticked. If the 
federal constitution says nothing about a policy area, then no box should be ticked 
 
The federal constitution 
says that only the federal 
level can legislate/spend 
on a given policy area: 
The federal constitution says 
that the federal level should 
or must legislate/spend on  
a given policy area: 
The federal Constitution 
says that the federal level 
cannot legislate/spend on a 
given policy area: 
National defense    
Pu
bl
ic
 
o
rd
er
 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 
Police services    
Law  
courts    
Prisons    
Economic affairs: transport    
Environmental protection    
Housing development    
H
ea
lth
 
Outpatient services    
Hospital services    
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
Primary education    
Secondary education    
Tertiary education    
So
ci
a
l 
pr
o
te
ct
io
n
 Sickness and 
disability    
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Old age    
Family and children    
Unemployment    
Please fill the following table depending on which constitutional power is given to the state level. Only one 
answer can be ticked.  
 Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution allows the state level to legislate/spend on any policy area:  
The federal constitution allows the state level to legislate/spend only on policy areas 
listed in the constitution:  
 
Please fill the following table depending on what the federal constitution says about a specific policy area. 
For each policy area only one answer can be ticked. If the federal constitution says nothing about a policy 
area, then no box should be ticked. 
 
The federal constitution 
says that only states can 
legislate/spend on a given 
policy area: 
The federal constitution says 
that states should or must 
legislate/spend on a given 
policy area: 
The federal constitution 
says that states 
cannot legislate/spend on a 
given policy area: 
National defense    
Pu
bl
ic
 
o
rd
er
 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 
Police services    
Law  
courts    
Prisons    
Economic affairs: transport    
Environmental protection    
Housing development    
H
ea
lth
 
Outpatient services    
Hospital services    
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
Primary education    
Secondary 
education    
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Tertiary education    
So
ci
al
 
pr
o
te
ct
io
n
 
Sickness and 
disability    
Old age    
Family and children    
Unemployment    
 
In the following box please give any additional comments regarding the division of spending powers 
between the federal and state levels (e.g. describe some country specific nuances or mention other 
important categories of spending). Also, please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which 
determines the division of spending powers. 
Comments (if any):       
 
4. Fiscal equalization 
 
Fiscal equalization deals with regional fiscal equity concerns and its main goal is to achieve redistributive 
goals. Please fill the following table on fiscal equalization mechanisms depending on which answer is 
appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says nothing about regional redistribution or fiscal 
equalisation:  
Weak equalization: The federal constitution says that there is a regional equity 
objective and that fiscal equalization should reduce regional inequalities:  
Moderate equalization: The federal constitution says that there is a regional equity 
objective and that fiscal equalization should reduce regional inequity considerably or 
contribute to “similar” regional conditions:   
Strong equalization: The federal constitution says that there is a regional equity 
objective and that fiscal equalization should reduce regional inequity fully or 
contribute to “equal” regional conditions.   
The federal constitution provides some guidelines regarding the way fiscal 
equalization should be pursued:  
• If so, please specify (e.g. expenditure need, cost criterion, tax capacity): 
       
 
The federal constitution specifies the body responsible for setting and adjusting fiscal  
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equalization formula: 
• If so, please specify (e.g. whether the body is independent, 
intergovernmental, etc.):        
The body responsible for setting and adjusting fiscal equalization formula is 
established by post-constitutional legislation:  
• If so, please specify (e.g. whether the body is independent, 
intergovernmental, etc.):        
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on fiscal equalization mechanisms. Particularly, 
please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which determines the fiscal equalization system. 
Comments (if any):       
 
5. Stabilization policies  
 
Most federal constitutions contain an article on stabilization, either for the country or parts of it (risk 
sharing across states). Please fill the following table on stabilization and risk sharing depending on which 
answer is appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says nothing about stabilization policies, either in general or 
for parts of the country:  
The federal constitution says that the federal level should provide for stabilization, 
either in general or for parts of the country:  
The federal constitution says that the federal level must provide for stabilization, 
either general or for parts of the country:  
The federal constitution specifies the way federal stabilization policy should be 
pursued:  
• If so, please specify (e.g. rainy day funds, revenues from higher levels of 
government that protect states from cyclical fluctuations of revenue sources 
or of expenditure, special financial support, etc.):        
Stabilization policy is specified at the post-constitutional level: 
 
• If so, please specify (e.g. rainy day funds,  revenues from higher levels of 
government that protect states from cyclical fluctuations of revenue sources 
or of expenditure, special financial support, etc.):        
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In the following box please describe any ad hoc mechanisms used by the federal level in the past to deal 
with general and idiosyncratic shocks at the state level.  
Please insert text:      
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on stabilization policy and intergovernmental 
risk sharing. Particularly, please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which determines the 
intergovernmental risk sharing mechanism.  
Comments (if any):       
 
6. Intergovernmental grants  
 
The federal constitution may provide for the financial support of state activities/policies (other than for 
stabilization purposes). We ask this question in order to gauge the constitutional background of 
intergovernmental transfers. In the following table, only one answer can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says nothing about federal level support (assistance, 
granting, etc.) of state level activities/policies:  
The federal constitution contains separate articles saying that the federal level 
“supports” (assists, grants, etc.) or “may support” (may assist, may grant, etc.) states’ 
activities:  
• If so, please specify how often the constitution mentions that the federal  
level “supports” (assists, grants, etc.) or “may support” (may assist, may 
grant, etc.) states’ activities, and – if possible – which activities/policies are 
supported:       
 
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on intergovernmental grants. Particularly, 
please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which determines the intergovernmental grants.  
Comments (if any):       
 
7. Numerical fiscal rules 
 
Numerical fiscal rules limit fiscal discretion at all government levels. Fiscal rules can be grouped into four 
types: a) Deficit/budget balance rules, b) Revenue rules (e.g. a rule limiting tax rates), c) Spending rules 
(e.g. a rule limiting spending or spending growth), d) Debt/borrowing rules. The below table asks how 
each of the four types of fiscal rules is constitutionally anchored.. 
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 Please tick if appropriate 
 
Deficit/ 
budget 
balance rules 
Revenue 
 rules 
Expenditure 
rules 
Debt/ 
borrowing 
rules 
Constitutional background of the rules 
 
   
The federal constitution does not specify any numerical rules: 
    
The federal constitution specifies numerical rules only for the 
federal level: 
    
The federal constitution specifies numerical rules for the federal 
and the state level:  
    
The federal constitution specifies numerical rules for the 
federal, state and local level (i.e. rules covering the whole 
general government):     
The federal constitution specifies numerical rules only for the 
state level: 
    
The federal constitution specifies rules only for the local level: 
    
Post-constitutional background of the rules 
    
Post-constitutional legislation specifies numerical rules only for 
the federal level: 
    
Post-constitutional legislation specifies numerical rules for the 
federal and the state level:  
    
Post-constitutional legislation specifies numerical rules for the 
federal, the state and the local level (i.e. rules covering the 
whole general government):     
Post-constitutional legislation specifies numerical rules only for 
the state level: 
    
Post-constitutional legislation specifies rules only for the local 
level: 
    
Status of the rules for the state level: 
    
Rules for the state level are imposed by the federal level: 
    
Rules for the state level are negotiated between levels of 
government: 
    
Rules for the state level are self-imposed: 
    
Status of the local rules: 
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Rules for the local level are imposed by the federal level: 
    
Rules for the local level are imposed by the state level: 
    
Rules for the local level are negotiated between levels of 
government: 
    
Rules for the local level are self-imposed: 
    
Corrective and sanctioning actions (state rules): 
    
In the case of failure to meet state rules, states take 
corrective/sanctioning actions: 
    
In the case of failure to meet state rules, the federal level takes 
corrective/sanctioning actions: 
    
In the case of failure to meet state rules, an independent body 
takes corrective/sanctioning actions: 
    
Corrective and sanctioning actions (local rules): 
    
In the case of failure to meet local rules, the local level takes 
corrective/sanctioning actions: 
    
In the case of failure to meet local rules, the state level takes 
corrective/sanctioning actions: 
    
In the case of failure to meet local rules, the federal level takes 
corrective/sanctioning actions: 
    
In the case of failure to meet local rules, an independent body 
takes corrective/sanctioning actions: 
    
 
In the following box please assess in a few sentences the credibility of the numerical fiscal rules operating 
at the federal, state and local levels. Please refer to any episodes when the numerical fiscal rules were 
explicitly or tacitly violated. 
Please insert text:       
 
In the following box please give in a few sentences any additional comments on numerical fiscal rules. 
Please make a distinction between the rules enshrined in the constitution or post-constitutional legislation. 
Comments (if any):       
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8. No-bailout rules 
 
To curb moral hazard at the state level, federal fiscal constitutions may include clauses which preclude a 
federal bailout of states. Please fill the following table on no-bailout rules depending on which answer is 
appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says nothing about federal level helping out states in 
distress:  
The federal constitution says that the federal level is allowed to bailout states in 
distress:  
The federal constitution says the federal level must bailout states in distress: 
 
• If so, please specify the procedure and consequence of federal bailout (e.g. 
temporary constraint of fiscal sovereignty of the states):        
The federal constitution forbids a federal bailout (i.e. it provides for an explicit no-
bailout rule):  
There have been bailouts of states by the federal level: 
 
There were cases of state level defaults (i.e. cases of state bankruptcy): 
 
 
In the following box please assess the credibility of a no-bailout rule. Please refer to any events which 
explicitly or tacitly led to the violation of a no-bailout rule. Also please give any additional comments on 
no-bailout rules. 
Please insert text:       
 
9. Procedural fiscal rules and budget frameworks 
 
Procedural fiscal rules guide the preparation, implementation and assessment of the federal and state 
budgets. Please fill the following table on the procedural fiscal rules governing the federal budget 
depending on which answer is appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. 
 Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says that the first chamber of parliament can initiate 
amendments in the approval stage of the federal budget:  
The federal constitution says that the second chamber of parliament can initiate 
amendments in the approval stage of the federal budget:  
The federal constitution imposes restraints (amendment rules) on the first and/or  
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second chamber of parliament in the approval stage of the federal budget: 
• If so, please specify those restraints:       
 
The federal constitution gives to one minister (Head of Government or Treasury 
Minister) strong agenda setting powers, or veto power over the spending ministers in 
the budget preparation:  
The federal constitution requires that the federal level establishes and complies with 
a medium-term budgetary framework:  
The federal constitution requires that the execution of the federal budget is assessed 
by an independent supreme audit institution:  
 
Please fill the following table on the procedural fiscal rules governing the state budget depending on 
which answer is appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says nothing about federal involvement in the budget process 
at the state level:  
The federal constitution allows federal involvement in the budget process at the state 
level:  
The federal constitution forbids federal involvement in the budget process at the state 
level (i.e. federal and state levels are autonomous in the management of their 
respective budgets):  
The federal constitution requires that states establish and comply with a medium-
term budgetary framework:  
The federal constitution requires that states coordinate their medium-term objectives: 
 
• If so, how is coordination achieved (e.g. in a consultative manner, through an 
independent body, etc.):        
The federal constitution requires that states use the same financial reporting standards 
as federal level:  
The federal constitution stipulates that the federal supreme audit institution has a 
mandate to audit state budgets:  
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on procedural fiscal rules operating at the 
federal and state levels. Please make a distinction between the rules enshrined in the constitution and post-
constitutional legislation. 
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Comments (if any):       
 
10. State borrowing and debt  
 
Federal constitutions may include instruments restraining or prohibiting state borrowing and debt 
issuance. Please fill the following table on borrowing and debt restraints depending on which answer is 
appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. Please make sure that your answers are coherent with your 
answers to question 7(d) on debt/borrowing rules. 
 Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution places no restrictions on state level borrowing: 
 
The federal constitution prohibits borrowing by states: 
 
The federal constitution prohibits borrowing abroad by states: 
 
The federal constitution requires authorizing state level borrowing by the federal 
level:  
The federal constitution allows state level borrowing but imposes a golden rule: 
 
The federal constitution allows state level borrowing only from limited (specific) 
lender institutions:  
The federal constitution allows state level borrowing from the federal level: 
 
The federal constitution says that the federal level guarantees states’ debt: 
 
The federal constitution allows mutualization of states’ debt: 
 
• If so, please specify how mutualization is achieved (e.g. through the issuance 
of joint debt, responsibility funds, etc.):       
 
The federal constitution assumes that states can declare bankruptcy: 
 
The federal constitution forbids that states can go bankrupt: 
 
The federal constitution requires the establishment of insolvency frameworks or 
other forms of orderly defaults for states:  
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on state borrowing and debt restraints. 
Particularly, please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which influences borrowing and debt 
strategies at the state level. 
Comments (if any):       
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11. Independent fiscal and arms-length agencies 
 
Independent fiscal agencies (e.g. fiscal councils) provide independent analysis of fiscal policy 
developments and issue normative statements and recommendations on public finance stance. Please fill 
the following table on independent fiscal agencies depending on which answer is appropriate. Several 
answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says nothing about an independent fiscal agency (Fiscal 
council or similar entity):  
The federal constitution allows to establish an independent fiscal agency (fiscal 
council or similar entity):  
The federal constitution requires the establishment and functioning of an independent 
fiscal agency (fiscal council or similar entity):  
• If so, please specify (e.g. composition, role of the agency, etc.):       
 
 
A federal "fiscal council" has power to assess states’ fiscal  policy: 
 
A federal "fiscal council" is not allowed to assess states’ fiscal stance:  
 
State constitutions require the establishment of independent fiscal agencies (fiscal 
council or similar entity):  
• If so, please specify (e.g. composition, role of the agency, etc.):        
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on independent fiscal institutions. Particularly, 
please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which set up independent fiscal agencies. Please specify 
whether they have any mandate over the state level. 
Comments (if any):       
 
12. Central bank  
 
Although not directly part of the fiscal constitution, monetary policy may affect fiscal policy. Here we 
would like to assess the role of the central bank in areas that may have consequences for fiscal policy. 
Please fill the following table on central banks. Several answers can be ticked. For federal countries in the 
Euro area, please refer to the power of the national Central Bank.  
 Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution establishes an independent central bank: 
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The federal constitution stipulates that the focus of the central bank is price stability: 
 
The federal constitution forbids to monetize public debt: 
 
The federal constitution precludes the central bank from purchasing federal and states 
bonds/securities in the primary market:  
The federal constitution precludes central bank from purchasing federal and states 
bonds/securities in the secondary market:  
 
In the following box please give any additional comments regarding the central bank and its possible 
influence on the fiscal policy dynamics at the federal and state levels. 
Comments (if any):       
 
13. Banking system and financial regulation 
 
Banking regulations might shape fiscal policy outcomes in a federal setting. Please fill the following table 
on banking system regulations depending on which answer is appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution says that the banking system is primarily the responsibility 
of the federal level (in other words the federation is a banking union):  
The federal constitution precludes states from owning banks and other financial 
institutions:  
States can own banks and other financial institutions but there are special federal 
constraints on state level borrowing from these institutions:  
 
Please describe mechanisms used by the federal level in the past to deal with the banking and financial 
crises at the state level. 
Please insert text:       
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on the banking and financial regulation, which 
might be relevant for fiscal policy dynamics across government levels. 
Comments (if any):      
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14. Supreme/constitutional court 
 
Supreme/constitutional courts can be an important player in interpreting or amending the federal 
constitution. Please fill the below table on the supreme/constitutional court. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
Court’s prerogatives: 
 
The federal constitution says that an independent supreme/constitutional court is 
responsible for constitutional adjudication:  
The federal constitution precludes the supreme/constitutional court from adjudicating 
on the validity of federal laws:  
The federal constitution precludes the supreme/constitutional court from adjudicating 
on the validity of state laws:  
Right to initiative: 
 
The federal constitution says that states can initiate a petition to the 
supreme/constitutional court:  
The federal constitution says that the first chamber of parliament can initiate a 
petition to the supreme/constitutional court:  
The federal constitution says that the second chamber of parliament can initiate a 
petition to the supreme/constitutional court:  
• Please specify all other bodies who can initiate a petition to the 
supreme/constitutional court:        
Timing of the constitutional review: 
 
The federal constitution says that constitutional review can occur only before the law 
is promulgated (ex-ante constitutional review):  
The federal constitution says that constitutional review can occur only after the law is 
promulgated (ex-post constitutional review):  
The federal constitution says that constitutional review can occur before and after the 
law is promulgated:  
Conclusiveness of the judicial decisions: 
 
The federal constitution stipulates that an unconstitutional legislation is automatically 
void:  
The federal constitution stipulates that an unconstitutional legislation needs to be 
revised and amended by the parliament:  
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The federal constitution stipulates that the first chamber of parliament can invalidate 
the decision of the supreme/constitutional court:  
The federal constitution stipulates that the second chamber of parliament can 
invalidate the decision of the supreme/constitutional court:  
Judicial appointments: 
 
The federal constitution says that states participate in appointing judges to the 
supreme/constitutional court:  
The federal constitution says that the first chamber of parliament participates in 
appointing judges to the supreme/constitutional court:  
The federal constitution says that the second chamber of parliament participates in 
appointing judges to the supreme/constitutional court:  
• Please specify all other bodies involved in appointing judges to the 
supreme/constitutional court:        
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on the supreme/constitutional court setting, 
which might be relevant in shaping intergovernmental relations. 
Comments (if any):       
 
15. Political institutions: bicameralism  
 
Legislative bicameralism is considered integral to federalism and part of intergovernmental power 
arrangements. Please fill the following table on bicameralism. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
Regional representation in the second chamber of parliament: 
 
The federal constitution stipulates that the second chamber of parliament is the 
representation of the states:  
The federal constitution stipulates  that each state has the same number of seats in the 
second chamber:  
The federal constitution assumes that the regional representation in the second 
chamber of parliament is partially proportional to the population in each state:  
The federal constitution determines that members to the second chamber of 
parliament are chosen in direct elections:  
The federal constitution determines that members to the second chamber of  
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parliament are chosen by state legislatures/executives: 
Regional interests in the second chamber of parliament: 
 
Members of the second chamber of parliament follow and comply with the 
instructions of state legislatures/executives:  
Party discipline in the second chamber of parliament overrides state representation: 
 
Institutional strength of the second chamber vis-à-vis the first chamber: 
 
The federal constitution says that the second chamber of parliament has full 
legislative power (equivalent to the first chamber of parliament), and hence has a 
veto power over all legislation:  
The federal constitution says that the second chamber of parliament has a veto power 
only over federal legislation that impacts state level:  
Coordination mechanisms between the chambers: 
 
There are some coordination mechanisms (e.g. a navette system) that resolve 
intercameral differences:  
• If so, please specify:       
 
 
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on bicameral legislature. 
Comments (if any):       
 
16. Political institutions: direct democracy 
 
Some federal constitutions provide rules for direct participation of citizens in the legislative process. 
Please fill the following table on direct democracy depending on which answer is appropriate. Both 
answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution allows to launch a national referendum on any law voted by 
the parliament:  
The federal constitution allows to launch referenda on the national budget (federal 
fiscal referendum):  
State constitutions allow to launch referenda on the state budget (state fiscal 
referendum):   
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• If yes, please specify:       
 
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on direct democracy mechanisms, which might 
be relevant in shaping intergovernmental relations and/or fiscal policy at the federal and state level. 
Comments (if any):       
 
17. Political institutions: qualified majorities in fiscal decisions  
 
This section asks about any qualified majorities for fiscal decisions at the federal level. Please fill the 
following table on qualified majority voting depending on which answer is appropriate. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
The federal constitution requires a qualified majority voting in case of federal 
fiscal/financial/budgetary laws:  
• If so, please specify: 
 
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on qualified majority voting in case of some 
fiscal/financial/budgetary laws. Particularly, please refer to any post-constitutional legislation which 
obliged qualified majorities for fiscal decisions. 
Comments (if any):       
 
18. Political institutions: constitutional amendments 
 
Each constitution contains rules on how to amend itself. Please fill the following table on constitutional 
amendment depending on which answer is appropriate. Several answers can be ticked. 
 
Please tick if 
appropriate 
Rights to propose a constitutional amendment: 
 
The federal constitution stipulates that both chambers (first and second) have equal 
rights in proposing a constitutional amendment:  
The federal constitution says that the first chamber of parliament has more rights  in 
proposing a constitutional amendment than the second chamber:  
The federal constitution says that the second chamber of parliament has more rights  
in proposing a constitutional amendment than the first chamber:  
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The federal constitution says that the citizens can ask for constitutional amendment 
(popular initiative):  
Qualified majorities and referenda to approve constitutional amendments: 
 
The federal constitution requires a qualified majority in the first chamber of 
parliament to approve constitutional amendment:  
• If so, please specify required qualified majority:       
 
The federal constitution requires a qualified majority in the second chamber of 
parliament to approve constitutional amendment:  
• If so, please specify required qualified majority:       
 
The federal constitution requires popular referendum to approve constitutional 
amendment:  
The federal constitution requires double majority (of people and states) in a popular 
referendum to approve constitutional amendment:  
Unamendable sections of the federal constitution: 
 
Certain parts of the federal constitution are excluded from amendment: 
 
• If so, please specify which parts:       
 
 
In the following box please give any additional comments on the constitutional amendment process. 
Comments (if any):       
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Part 2: Historical evolution of and amendments of the fiscal constitution 
 
This part of the questionnaire aims at tracking the history of the federal fiscal constitutions. To this end, we 
ask you to list and very briefly describe all changes/reforms/amendments of the fiscal constitution that 
occurred since the establishment of the federation or federal constitution.  
In tracking the evolution of the fiscal constitution please refer to all changes/reforms/amendments in the 
building blocks (18 elements), which are enumerated in Part 1 of this questionnaire. Please be aware that 
some changes/reforms/amendments could also occur at the post-constitutional level (as opposed to pure 
constitutional change), for instance through the decision of the constitutional court or the enactment of 
special fiscal legislation. Please use as many rows in the table as needed and please do not feel restrained 
by the current number of rows. Each row should correspond to a single constitutional 
change/reform/amendment. Please start listing the reforms in a chronological order (from the newest to the 
oldest; the latter should be the founding date of the constitution).  
Year of 
constitutional/ 
post-
constitutional 
change 
Type of change 
(building block) 
Please describe in a few words the change and, if possible, 
explain why it occurred 
                  
                  
 
Part 3: Qualitative assessment of the fiscal constitution 
 
This third part of the questionnaire asks you to deliver a qualitative assessment of the state and evolution of 
the federal fiscal constitution. The purpose of this assessment is twofold. First, to get an impression of the 
main thrust of the fiscal constitution and the way the different building blocks work together. Second, to 
get an impression of the long-term and main trends of the fiscal constitution, by illustrating, e.g., a secular 
trend towards fiscal centralization or decentralization; stricter fiscal rules; stronger interference of federal 
level in state budget processes; stronger constitutional anchoring of interregional redistribution; less power 
of the second chamber; a “centralist” drift of the constitutional court, etc.  
The report should be succinct and if possible count between 2000 and 4000 words, but may be longer if 
you wish to provide more information. Your report should be in a separate document.  
Optional question: In light of the evolution of the fiscal constitution in your country, you may describe 
what potential lessons the European Union should take into account when developing its own fiscal 
constitution. 
 
END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix 5.4. Coding for institutional indicators 
 Weight Coding 
1. Autonomy 
A higher value of the indicator represents larger state fiscal autonomy 
1.1. Tax autonomy 
   For each tax category: 
   The federal constitution says that only the state level can levy a tax 
   The federal constitution says that the state level is allowed to levy a tax 
   The federal constitution says nothing about the state level levying a tax 
   The federal constitution says that the state level cannot levy a tax 
 
   The federal constitution says that only the federal level can levy a tax 
   The federal constitution says that the federal level is allowed to levy a tax 
   The federal constitution says nothing about the federal level levying a tax 
   The federal constitution says that the federal level cannot levy a tax 
 
   Tax categories are weighted by the averages of tax revenue shares across OECD countries to reflect the 
importance of certain taxes. 
   Tax autonomy indicator is further increased by 0.05 if the constitution provides for the principle of 
subsidiarity and by another 0.05 if the states are residual lawmakers. 
 
 
½ 
 
 
 
 
½ 
 
 
 
1 
0.66 
0.33 
0 
 
0 
0.33 
0.66 
1 
 
 
 
+0.05 
1.2. Spending autonomy 
  For each policy area: 
  The federal constitution says that only the state level can legislate/spend in a given policy area 
   The federal constitution says that the state level is allowed to legislate/spend in a given policy area 
   The federal constitution says nothing about the state level to legislate/spend in a given policy area 
   The federal constitution says that the state level cannot legislate/spend in a given policy area 
 
   The federal constitution says that only the federal level can legislate/spend in a given policy area 
   The federal constitution says that the federal level is allowed to legislate/spend in a given policy area 
   The federal constitution says nothing about the federal level to legislate/spend in a given policy area 
   The federal constitution says that the federal level cannot legislate/spend in a given policy area 
    
   Policy areas are weighted by the averages of expenditure shares in given policy areas across OECD 
countries to reflect the importance of certain policy areas. 
   Spending autonomy indicator is increased by 0.05 if the constitution provides for the principle of 
subsidiarity and by another 0.05 if the states are residual lawmakers. 
 
 
½ 
 
 
 
 
½ 
 
 
 
1 
0.66 
0.33 
0 
 
0 
0.33 
0.66 
1 
 
 
 
+0.05 
1.3. Borrowing autonomy 
   The federal constitution places no restrictions on state level borrowing 
  
1 
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   The federal constitution prohibits borrowing by states 
    
   For each positive answer subtract 0.2 from 1: 
   The federal constitution prohibits borrowing abroad  
   The federal constitution requires authorizing states’ borrowing by federal level 
   The federal constitution allows state level borrowing but imposes a golden rule 
   The federal constitution imposes numerical constraints on states’ debt and/or  borrowing 
   The federal constitution imposes constraints on borrowing from state-owned banks 
0 
 
 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 
1.4. Budgeting autonomy 
  The federal constitution forbids federal involvement in the budget process at the state level 
  The federal constitution allows federal involvement in the budget process at the state level 
    
   For each positive answer subtract 0.16 from 1: 
   The federal constitution requires that states establish and comply with mid-term budgetary framework 
   The federal constitution requires that states coordinate their mid-term budgetary objectives 
   The federal constitution requires that states use the same financial reporting standards as federal level 
   The federal constitution stipulates that the federal audit institution has a mandate to audit state budgets   
   The federal level imposes numerical fiscal rules on state level 
   In the case of failure to meet state/local rules, federal level takes corrective/sanctioning actions  
 
½  
 
 
 
½  
 
1 
0 
 
 
-0.16 
-0.16 
-0.16 
-0.16 
-0.16 
-0.16 
2. Responsibility 
A higher value of the indicator represents larger state responsibility for their fiscal actions 
2.1. Institutional anchoring and extent of fiscal equalization 
   Institutional anchoring of fiscal equalization 
   For each positive answer subtract 0.5 from 1: 
   The constitution provides guidelines regarding the way fiscal equalization should be pursued 
   The  constitution specifies the body responsible for setting and adjusting fiscal equalization formulae 
 
   No fiscal equalization 
   Fiscal equalization embedded in the secondary legislation    
   Fiscal equalization embedded in the federal constitution/organic law 
 
   Extent of fiscal equalization 
   No fiscal equalization/weak equalization: fiscal equalization should reduce regional inequality 
   Moderate equalization: fiscal equalization should reduce regional inequity considerably  
   Strong equalization: fiscal equalization should reduce regional inequity fully 
 
 
 
1/3 
 
 
1/3 
 
 
 
 
1/3 
 
 
 
-0.5 
-0.5 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
2.2. Institutional anchoring and extent of tax sharing 
   Institutional anchoring of tax sharing 
   For each positive answer subtract 0.5 from 1: 
 
 
 
1/3  
 
 
 
-0.5 
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   The federal constitution provides some guidelines for tax sharing formulae 
   The federal constitution specifies the body responsible for setting and adjusting tax sharing formulae 
   
   No tax sharing 
   Tax sharing embedded in the secondary legislation    
   Tax sharing embedded in the federal constitution/organic law 
 
   Extent of tax sharing 
   No tax is shared/weak tax sharing: Up to 5% of general government revenue    
   Moderate tax sharing: up to 10% of general government revenue 
   Strong tax sharing: more than 10% of general government revenue 
 
 
1/3 
 
 
 
 
1/3 
 
  
-0.5 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
2.3. Institutional anchoring of stabilization policy 
   No stabilization 
   Stabilization embedded in secondary legislation    
   Stabilization embedded in the federal constitution/organic law 
   
   The federal constitution says that the federal level must provide for stabilization 
   The federal constitution says that the federal level should provide for stabilization 
   The federal constitution does not require, neither allow stabilization 
 
1/2 
 
 
 
1/2 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
0 
0.5 
1 
2.4. Intensity of intergovernmental grants 
   No grants system 
   Grants system embedded in the secondary legislation    
   Grants system embedded in the federal constitution/organic law 
    
  Intensity of grants 
   No grants/weak grants system: Up to 5% of general government revenue    
   Moderate grants system: up to 10% of general government revenue 
   Strong grants system: more than 10% of general government revenue  
 
½ 
 
 
 
 
1/2 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
2.5. Bailout exposure 
   The federal constitution forbids a federal bailout 
   The federal constitution says nothing about federal level helping out states in distress 
   The federal constitution says that the federal level is allowed to bailout or must bailout states in distress 
    
   There were no cases of bailout by the federal level 
   There were cases where states or local governments were bailed-out by the federal level 
 
   The federal constitution does not require that the federal level guarantees debt of the state level    
   The federal constitution requires that the federal level guarantees debt of the state level 
    
 
1/3  
 
 
 
1/3 
 
 
1/3 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
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2.6. Bankruptcy exposure 
   The federal constitution assumes that states can declare bankruptcy 
   The federal constitution forbids that states can go bankrupt    
 
   There are insolvency frameworks or other forms of orderly defaults for the states 
   There are no insolvency frameworks and other forms of orderly defaults for the states 
 
   There were cases of state level bankruptcy 
   There were no cases of state bankruptcy 
 
1/3 
 
 
1/3 
 
 
1/3 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
2.7. Numerical fiscal rules responsibility 
   For each numerical fiscal rule: 
   Rules for the state/local level are self-imposed or in case of local rules imposed by state level 
   Rules for the state/local level are negotiated between levels of government 
   Rules for the state/local level are imposed by the federal level  
  
 
1 
0.5 
0 
3. Co-determination 
Higher value of indicator represents larger states’ participation  in federal decision-making 
3.1. Co-determination through the second chamber 
   The constitution says that the second chamber has full legislative power and  full veto power 
   The constitution says that the second chamber has a veto power over federal laws that impact states    
   The constitution does not mention any veto power of the second chamber 
 
   The constitution says that members to the second chamber are chosen by state legislature/executive 
   The constitution says that member to the second chamber are chosen in universal elections  
The constitution says that the members of the second chamber are appointed by non-regional bodies 
The constitution does not assume state representation in the second chamber 
 
   Members of the second chamber of parliament follow the instructions of the state legislature/executive 
   Members of the second chamber might follow the states interests/instructions 
   Member of the second chamber do not follow the instructions of state legislature/executive 
 
   The constitution stipulates that each state has the same number of seats in the second chamber 
   The constitution stipulates that the regional representation is partially proportional 
   The constitution stipulates no regional representation/party representation 
 
There are some coordination mechanisms for resolving intercameral differences and disputes 
   There are no coordination mechanisms 
  
1/5  
 
 
 
1/5  
 
 
 
 
 
1/5 
 
 
 
1/5 
 
 
 
1/5 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0.66 
0.33 
0 
 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0 
3.2. Co-determination through the constitutional court   
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For each positive answer add 0.33: 
The constitution says that the second chamber or states appoint the judges to the constitutional court 
   The constitution says that the states can initiate the petition to the court against the federal law 
   The constitution says that the second chamber can initiate the petition to the court against the federal 
law   
+0.33 
+0.33 
+0.33 
3.3. Co-determination through the constitutional amendment 
For each positive answer add 0.25: 
The constitution says that the second chamber alone can propose constitutional amendment 
The constitution says that the states can propose constitutional amendment 
   The constitution says that the second chamber needs to approve constitutional amendment 
   The constitution says that the states need to approve constitutional amendment 
  
 
+0.25 
+0.25 
+0.25 
+0.25 
3.4. Co-determination through the executive meetings 
Routine meetings between federal level and state level with authority to reach legally binding decisions 
Routine meetings between federal level and state level without legally binding authority 
No routine meetings between federal level and state level to negotiate policy 
  
1 
0.5 
0 
3.5. Co-determination through the intergovernmental transfers 
   No fiscal equalization 
   Fiscal equalization embedded in the secondary legislation    
   Fiscal equalization embedded in the federal constitution/organic law 
 
   No tax sharing 
   Tax sharing embedded in the secondary legislation    
   Tax sharing embedded in the federal constitution/organic law 
 
   No stabilization 
   Stabilization embedded in the secondary legislation    
   Stabilization embedded in the federal constitution/organic law 
 
   No grants system 
   Grants system embedded in secondary legislation    
   Grants system embedded in federal constitution/organic law  
 
1/4 
 
 
 
1/4 
 
 
 
1/4 
 
 
 
1/4 
 
0 
0.5 
1 
 
0 
0.5 
1 
 
0 
0.5 
1 
 
0 
0.5 
1 
4. Strength of fiscal institutions 
A higher value of the indicator represents stronger fiscal institutions 
4.1. Strength of numerical fiscal rules 
   For each numerical fiscal rule: 
   Rules are enshrined in the federal constitution or organic law 
   Rules are enshrined in the statutory laws 
   No rules or they function as political agreements 
 
 
 
¼ 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
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   Rules cover the general government (e.g. central and state level) 
   Rules cover only the central, state or local government  
   No rules or they are not applied to general, central or sub-central governments 
 
   Rules are imposed by the federal level  
   Rules are negotiated among levels of government 
   Rules are self-imposed by the state level 
 
   In the case of violation, the higher level government takes corrective actions   
   In the case of violation, an independent body takes corrective actions 
   Rules are self-enforced  
¼ 
 
 
 
¼ 
 
 
 
¼  
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
4.2. Strength of procedural fiscal rules 
   The federal constitution gives to one minister strong agenda setting power or veto power over ministers 
   The federal constitution does not prescribe any special budgeting powers to one minister  
    
   The constitution imposes restraints on the first or second chamber in the approval stage of the budget 
   The federal constitution imposes no restraints on first and/or second chamber 
     
   The federal constitution requires that the federal level establishes and complies with MTBF  
   The federal constitution does not require to establish MTBF 
    
   The federal constitution requires that the execution of the federal budget is assessed by audit institution 
   The federal constitution does not mention any budget assessment by supreme audit institution 
    
   The federal constitution requires that states coordinate their mid-term budgetary objectives 
   The federal constitution does not require that states coordinate their mid-term budgetary objectives 
 
   The federal constitution requires that states use the same financial reporting standards as federal level 
   The federal constitution does not require states to use same financial reporting standards as federal level 
 
   The federal constitution stipulates that the federal audit institution has a mandate to audit state budgets  
   Federal constitution does not stipulate federal audit institution to have mandate to audit state budgets   
 
1/7 
 
 
1/7 
 
 
1/7  
 
 
1/7 
 
 
1/7 
 
 
1/7 
 
 
 
1/7 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
 
1 
0 
4.3. Strength of the fiscal council 
   The federal constitution requires the establishment and functioning of an independent fiscal council 
   The secondary law requires the establishment and functioning of an independent fiscal council 
   No fiscal council 
 
   Fiscal council assesses federal and state finance 
 
1/3  
 
 
 
 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
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   Fiscal council assesses only federal or state finance 
   No council/or it is not responsible for assessing stance of public finance 
 
   Fiscal council is fully independent 
   Fiscal council is partially independent 
   Fiscal council is not independent 
1/3 
 
 
 
1/3 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
5. Stability of the fiscal constitution 
Higher value of the indicator represents a more stable fiscal constitution 
5.1. Degree of constitutional review 
   The federal constitution does not preclude any laws from adjudicating on their validity 
   The federal constitution precludes adjudicating on the validity of some federal or state laws 
    
   The federal constitution defines a broad right to initiate petition (4 or more bodies can initiate petition) 
   The federal constitution defines a moderate right to initiate petition (2-3 bodies can initiate petition) 
   The federal constitution defines a single body to initiate a petition (only one body can initiate petition) 
 
   The federal constitution says that constitutional review can be performed ax ante and ex post 
   The federal constitution says that constitutional review can be performed only ex post/ or not specified 
 
   The constitution stipulates that unconstitutional legislation is automatically void 
   The constitution stipulates that unconstitutional legislation need to be revised and amended 
   The constitution does not specify what happens with unconstitutional legislation 
 
1/4  
 
 
1/4 
 
 
 
1/4 
 
 
1/4 
 
 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
5.2. Bicameral veto 
   The constitution says that the second chamber has full legislative power (full veto power) 
   The constitution says that the second chamber has a veto power over federal laws that impact states    
   The constitution does not mention any veto power of the second chamber 
  
   The constitution stipulates that each state has the same number of seats in the second chamber 
   The constitution stipulates that the regional representation is partially proportional 
   The constitution stipulates no regional representation/party representation    
 
1/2  
 
 
 
1/2 
 
 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0 
5.3. Scope of direct democracy 
   The constitution allows to launch a national referendum on laws voted by the parliament 
   The constitution does not allow to launch referenda on national laws 
 
    The constitution does not provide for a right to popular initiative 
    The constitution provides for the ability of citizens to propose legislative initiatives 
 
1/2  
 
 
1/2 
 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
5.4. Rigidity of constitutional amendment   
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   The constitution defines weak right to propose amendment (only one body can initiate amendment) 
   The constitution defines moderate right to propose amendment (2-3 bodies can initiate amendment) 
   The constitution defines broad right to propose amendment (4 or more bodies can initiate amendment) 
    
   The constitution requires a qualified majority in the first and second chamber to approve amendment 
   The constitution requires a qualified majority in the first or second chamber to approve amendment 
   No qualified majority 
   p stands for the required majority 
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Appendix 5.5. Cluster analysis: description and further results 
 
Cluster analysis provides a hierarchical and agglomerative (bottom-up) classification of individual 
elements (Hair et al., 2010). A clustering algorithm begins with each country as a separate cluster 
and successively groups countries into larger clusters. Varied agglomerative methods can be used 
to create clusters, of which four were used in this study: 1) Ward’s method which aims at 
minimizing the within-cluster variance; 2) average-linkage clustering, which determines the 
closest two groups by the average (dis)similarity between the observations of the two groups; 3) 
single-linkage (nearest-neighbor) clustering defines the similarity between clusters as the shortest 
distance from any object in one cluster to any object in the other; 4) complete-linkage (farthest-
neighbor) clustering is comparable to the single-linkage algorithm, except that cluster similarity is 
based on maximum distance between observations in each cluster (Moutinho and Hutcheson, 
2011, pp. 43-44). Also different similarity measures can be applied. In this chapter two similarity 
measures are used, i.e. the Euclidean distances and correlation measures. Distance measures focus 
on the magnitude of the values and portray as similar the objects that are close together, even if 
they have different patterns across the variables. Instead, correlation measures focus on the 
patterns across the variables and do not consider the magnitude of the differences between objects 
(Hair et al., 2010). In general, the various methods applied deliver similar results (see figure 5.20). 
Dendrograms – a tree diagram – are the graphical representation of clustering (Hair et al., 2010). 
Dendograms show successive clusters and provide the loss of information resulting from each 
aggregation. The robustness of the clusters can be further assessed with the approximately 
unbiased (AU) p-values calculated using pvclust package in R software (Suzuki and Shimodaira, 
2004).  
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Figure 5.20. Similarities and differences across fiscal constitutions: dendrograms based on 
various cluster analysis methods (single and complete-linkages), all five building blocks 
Note: The clustering height is a measure of dissimilarity. The higher is the value the more heterogeneous are units 
grouped in a given cluster. The approximately unbiased (AU) p-values computed by multiscale bootstrap resampling 
are printed in red and bootstrap probabilities (BP) are printed in green. AU p-values are more accurate than BP value 
as unbiased p-values (Suzuki and Shimodaira, 2006). Clusters for which AU values exceed 90 are strongly supported 
by data indicating stable clusters. A default number of replication applied in the cluster analysis is 1000. 
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As an additional robustness check the cluster analysis in figure 5.13 is replicated by using only 
four building blocks, i.e. dropping the stability building block. The analysis delivers largely 
similar results (figure 5.21). In addition, results confirm that Argentina, Australia and Mexico 
indeed form a separate cluster or group of “quasi-decentralized” federations which tend to 
combine institutional arrangements from decentralized and co-operative federalism. 
Figure 5.21. Similarities and differences across fiscal constitutions: dendrograms based on 
various cluster analysis methods (Ward’s, average-, single- and complete-linkage methods), 
four building blocks (without stability)  
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Note: The clustering height is a measure of dissimilarity. The higher is the value the more heterogeneous are units 
grouped in a given cluster. The approximately unbiased (AU) p-values computed by multiscale bootstrap resampling 
are printed in red and bootstrap probabilities (BP) are printed in green. AU p-values are more accurate than BP value 
as unbiased p-values (Suzuki and Shimodaira, 2006). Clusters for which AU values exceed 90 are strongly supported 
by data indicating stable clusters. A default number of replication applied in the cluster analysis is 1000. 
 
Appendix 5.6. Factor analysis: description and further results 
Factor analysis and principle component analysis (PCA) can be used to identify which building 
blocks of the fiscal constitutions differentiate most the federations and to assess empirically how 
various building blocks are combined across countries. Factor analysis has some advantage over 
PCA since it gives clear interpretation of factors/components (OECD, 2008). In order to interpret 
the factors, the first selection procedure is followed by a rotation procedure of the factors that are 
considered relevant (Abdi, 2004). A clear interpretation of factors is possible since the rotation of 
axes simplifies the factor structure. Varimax rotation is the most commonly used rotation method 
(Abdi, 2004). A simple solution that Varimax offers is that each factor consists of a small number 
of large loadings and a large number of small loadings (Abdi, 2004). This facilitates the 
interpretation because each original variable tends to be correlated with only one (or a small 
number) of factors, thereby each factor stands for only a small number of variables (Abdi, 2004).  
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Table 5.3 shows the details of the factor analysis carried out for the five building blocks, showing 
that results are largely driven by two factors, namely the first factor covering autonomy, 
responsibility, co-determination and budget frameworks; and the second factor covering stability.  
Table 5.3. Communalities between the building blocks of fiscal constitution: results of factor 
analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Eigenvalue 3.27 0.97 0.60 0.12 0.05 
Share of the variance explained 
(%) 65.5 19.4 11.9 2.3 0.9 
Cumulative share of the variance 
explained (%) 65.5 84.9 96.8 99.1 100 
Correlation with building blocks      
Autonomy 0.97 -0.02 0.18 -0.03 0.17 
Responsibility 0.95 0.02 -0.13 0.28 -0.04 
Co-determination -0.79 0.21 0.56 0.16 0.03 
Budget frameworks -0.85 0.14 -0.48 0.10 0.11 
Stability 0.30 0.95 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 
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Appendix 5.8. Evolution of fiscal constitution’s coherence in individual countries  
Coherence measures how well the building blocks of fiscal constitutions “fit together”. Coherence 
can evolves over time, i.e. the building blocks of a fiscal constitution can become better or less-
well aligned within any type of federation. Given that the most salient reforms to fiscal 
constitutions took place in the last 30 years, the focus is on the trends during that period. The two 
following graphs show the evolution of fiscal constitutions’ coherence by country.  
In most federations, coherence or alignment has increased (figures 5.22 for decentralized and 
figure 5.23 for integrated federal systems). Only the incoherence of the US fiscal constitution has 
remained persistently low for 30 years, while the Argentinian constitution remained highly 
incoherent over the same period. Some 30 years ago some collaborative federations were not only 
more decentralized but also more incoherent. Better coherence in countries such as Spain, 
Germany, Brazil, Italy and Austria followed tighter budget rules and frameworks, often in 
reaction to low responsibility at the state level. Federations whose fiscal constitutions were 
decentralized from the outset appear more stable as they maintain similar coherence levels over 
time.  
Figure 5.22. The evolution of coherence in decentralized federal systems 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
The overarching question posed by this dissertation was: “why is the public debt growing, and 
why are the fiscal crises repetitive and so widespread?” Four narrow questions contribute to the 
answer and shed some light on the overarching question. They were selected after identifying the 
gaps and loopholes in the modern literature on fiscal constitutions. Those questions were as 
follows: 
 
• Question 1: What is a genuine causal relationship between the electoral systems and 
fiscal outcomes? How do electoral systems influence vertical fiscal imbalance, i.e. 
mismatch between local spending and revenue? Additionally, is there any relation 
between the electoral regimes and the composition of public spending? 
• Question 2: Does history matter for fiscal outcomes? More precisely, can distant 
historical events influence vertical fiscal imbalance in a causal way? 
• Question 3: How do judges adjudicate in fiscal cases (cases which have budgetary 
implications) as opposed to other cases? Is the judiciary able to shape fiscal outcomes, 
such as for instance fiscal deficit, in any systematic way?  
• Question 4: How do the building blocks of fiscal constitutions interact? Does the 
manner in which the building blocks are combined influence the growth of public 
expenditure and public debt as well as the likelihood of fiscal crises? Also, what are 
the driving forces behind the reforms of fiscal constitutions? 
 
The concluding chapter comprises two parts. First, it summarizes particular results of the content 
chapters 2-5, which tackle the abovementioned narrow questions. The second part provides an 
outlook and depicts potential avenues for future research on fiscal constitutions. 
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Summary of the results 
 
Besides the introductory chapter (chapter 1), this dissertation consists of four stand-alone content 
chapters and original contributions, which are all concerned with fiscal constitutions. The 
introductory chapter was instrumental in setting the stage for the discussion on fiscal 
constitutions. It clarified the meaning of the term “fiscal constitution” and identified gaps in the 
research covering fiscal constitutions. The original contributions are organized within four content 
chapters, which are as follows. 
Chapter 2 examined electoral systems and their impact on selected fiscal variables, such as 
vertical fiscal imbalance (mismatch between local spending and revenue) and the allocation of 
public spending. The political economy literature theorizes various channels through which 
electoral systems might determine fiscal outcomes. Empirical evidence supporting or rejecting 
theoretical arguments is not abundant and not sufficiently robust, however. It is widely recognized 
that the existing empirical literature linking electoral systems and fiscal outcomes does not 
identify the causal relationship. Reasons for this are omitted variable bias, infrequent institutional 
changes and small samples. Chapter 2 attempted to overcome these problems. A quasi-
experimental empirical setting was employed and provided evidence that electoral systems 
influence selected fiscal outcomes. The empirical design employed in chapter 2 rested on a 
discontinuity in the application of electoral rules in Polish municipalities in the period 2002-2012. 
The results presented confirmed existing theoretical arguments only to some extent. As compared 
to the majoritarian regimes, proportional electoral systems tend to promote broad public 
expenditure and undermine narrow public spending. However, these effects seem to be much 
weaker as compared to previous findings in the cross-country studies. Additionally, proportional 
systems lead to a larger vertical fiscal imbalance, which is measured as a share of local 
expenditure covered through intergovernmental transfers and borrowings. The average treatment 
effects of electoral rules on fiscal imbalance are not only statistically significant but also non-
negligible from the economic point of view and robust to numerous alternative specifications and 
falsification tests. This result is important because greater VFI leads to greater general 
government deficits and, consequently, to greater public debt. 
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Chapter 3 subscribed to the literature stream that has attempted to answer the question regarding 
whether history matters. However, in chapter 3 a more specific question was posed concerning 
whether history matters for fiscal outcomes. In the context of the Polish municipalities the answer 
was positive. To confirm it, this chapter exploited a natural experiment, which was provided by 
Poland’s partition. After Poland lost its independence in 1795, its territory was divided between 
three empires (Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary), was governed by foreign institutions, and 
was influenced by the culture and norms of these countries for more than 120 years. By means of 
spatial regression discontinuity, chapter 3 showed that municipalities from the former Prussian 
empire have imposed contemporarily higher property tax rates as compared to municipalities that 
were exposed to the Russian ruling. Higher property tax rates lead to greater own revenue and 
higher fiscal autonomy in the Prussian part of Poland. Consequently, the municipalities belonging 
to the former Prussian partition cast smaller vertical fiscal imbalance than the municipalities from 
the former Russian part. Given the link between VFI and general government deficits and debt, 
these results can shed some light on the overarching question: “why is the public debt growing?” 
 
Chapter 4 analyzed overall judicial behavior and contrasted it with the judicial behavior in 
adjudicating fiscal cases. Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the 
United States, to explain judicial decision-making. In this respect, there is an important ongoing 
debate over whether judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology. The analysis of the 
decision-making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal seems to support the existence of some 
party alignment. That is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because 
judges’ preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are 
incentivized to show their loyalty to the nominating party. Party alignment exists but subject to 
institutional constraints. The results from chapter 4 are in line with previous findings for other 
Kelsenian constitutional courts in Europe. Interestingly, although to lesser extent, the ideological 
vote is also cast in fiscal cases. The identified institutional constraints limit the ideological vote in 
fiscal cases but are not able to entirely eliminate it. The fact that ideological bias is also present in 
fiscal cases – despite considerable institutional restraints – might have important implications for 
public finance. Given that the majority of judges in the adjudicating benches are occasionally 
politically aligned with the petitioners (opposition parties), it might be more difficult for the 
governing party to pursue major reforms of public finance, such as fiscal consolidation and public 
debt reduction. For instance, in times of economic distress the necessary fiscal adjustments might 
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be severely delayed or entirely damped by the Tribunal. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal 
can be perceived as a veto player biasing policy towards a status quo and hampering fiscal 
adjustments. 
 
Chapter 5 provided an empirical assessment of federal fiscal constitutions and the interaction 
between constitutional arrangements. It demonstrated that federal fiscal constitutions around the 
world have differed in the degree of constitutionally guaranteed decentralization. More 
specifically, two types of fiscal constitutions could be distinguished: decentralized and integrated. 
Decentralized federations are those federations where states (sub-central units) enjoy high tax and 
spending autonomy; face high responsibility for their own fiscal policy, have little co-
determination power at federal level; and have intergovernmental budget rules and frameworks 
that are relatively weak. The opposite is the case in integrated federations. A cluster analysis 
suggested that the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Argentina and Mexico feature 
decentralized fiscal constitutions, while Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Russia, 
South Africa and Spain feature integrated fiscal constitutions. An important contribution of this 
chapter was to show that fiscal constitutions have varied in terms of coherence (or alignment) of 
institutional arrangements. Coherent (aligned) fiscal constitutions combine arrangements in a 
balanced manner or in a way that arrangements “fit well” together. For instance, an aligned fiscal 
constitution provides similar degrees of autonomy for various budget items (taxation and 
spending); or the fiscal constitution aligns a certain level of autonomy with a similar level of 
responsibility. Incoherent fiscal constitutions combine arrangements in an unbalanced manner, for 
instance by combining low tax autonomy with high spending autonomy or low responsibility for 
fiscal policy with high autonomy. Some preliminary evidence was also shown to demonstrate that 
the degree of decentralization of fiscal constitutions has been marginally associated with 
economic and fiscal outcomes. On the contrary, it was shown that alignment (or coherence) of 
fiscal constitutions has been associated with outcomes. Over the period 1980-2010, less coherent 
fiscal constitutions were correlated with higher debt and spending growth, and more economic 
and sovereign debt crises. These results add new insights to the debate on “why is the debt 
growing and why are fiscal crises repetitive?” Moreover, it was tentatively demonstrated that 
federations with less coherent fiscal constitutions had somewhat lower GDP growth between 1980 
and 2010. In addition, chapter 5 has examined the causes and the driving-forces of reforms and 
amendments of fiscal constitutions since their inception. It was found that reforms of fiscal 
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constitutions usually follow events like economic and fiscal crises, the establishment or fall of 
authoritarian regimes or separatist threats. Furthermore, it was shown that while budget 
frameworks were strengthened over the last 100 years, the autonomy and responsibility of states 
declined. Furthermore, the coherence of fiscal constitutions increased over the last three decades. 
 
It should be noted that all chapters included some preliminary policy implications. They were 
derived in the EU context or in the context of Poland. 
 
Avenues for future research 
 
The avenues for future research on fiscal constitutions are organized within two blocks. The first 
block relates to the issues and topics that were touched upon in this dissertation. The second block 
poses new research questions, which are however related to the overarching question of this 
dissertation, i.e. “why is public debt growing, and why are fiscal crises repetitive and so 
widespread?” 
 
Contrary to other subfields of law and economics, such as for instance behavioral and labor law 
and economics, the empirical investigation on fiscal constitutions rarely relies on the design-based 
research, which allow the inferring of a genuine causality between institutions and fiscal outcomes 
(see section 1.4). A search for credible natural or quasi-experimental settings should therefore be a 
fruitful way forward. The likelihood of finding natural or quasi-experimental settings increases if 
one studies lower tiers of governments, such as for instance municipalities and districts. This, 
however, should not be considered a drawback, but on the contrary an advantage as it explicitly 
requires the delving into the intergovernmental structure and the interactions between the tiers of 
government. The research on the intergovernmental settings might fuel and inform institutional 
discussions in emerging “federations”, either individual countries that are on a secular path 
towards decentralisation, or supranational entities such as the EU that are about to build their 
fiscal intergovernmental framework.  
 
This section also calls for more encompassing analysis of institutions which, at first glance, do not 
seem to influence public finance, such as the judiciary. Yet even more importantly, it calls for 
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more systematic analysis of interactions between the building blocks of fiscal constitutions. As 
chapter 5 showed, there might be some key complementarities and synergies between the building 
blocks that influence fiscal outcomes both negatively and positively. An important contribution in 
this respect is the paper by Ardanaz and Scartascini (2014). The authors show that the effect of the 
form of government (presidential or parliamentarian) on public expenditure is conditional to the 
specific procedural fiscal rules. More specifically, they demonstrate that the negative effect of 
presidentialism on the size of the government (spending-to-GDP) disappears when the executive’s 
discretion over the budget process is high. 
 
Likewise, more research is needed on the dynamic or historical context of fiscal constitutions. 
First of all, it is vital to investigate more systematically how distant historical events set fiscal 
constitutions on different trajectories, which now materialize in varied fiscal outcomes even 
within the same country. A related issue entails examining the origins of fiscal constitutions and 
the driving forces of change and reform. In the Polish context, for example, an interesting 
question concerns why the post-socialist Constitution of 1997 included a very restrictive 
numerical fiscal rule limiting the growth of public debt to 60% of GDP314. Some preliminary 
research conducted by the author of this dissertation suggests that the following factors might 
have played an important role in constitutionalizing the debt rule (based mostly on the transcripts 
from the constitution-making assembly’s deliberations). 
 
• The negative past events, namely the debt trap originating from excessive borrowing in the 
1970s, set the credible argumentation in favor of the debt rule. Institutional reforms in the 
EU and particularly the Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty on the European Union) of 
1992, comprising the convergence criteria315 and excessive deficit procedure316, also 
influenced the constitution-drafters in Poland. Poland signed the Accession Treaty with the 
EU in 1993 and wished to show its eagerness in adopting the EU rules. 
                                                    
314
  See Article 216(5) of the Polish Constitution 1997. 
315
  As of today, the convergence criteria are accommodated in Article 140 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
316
  As of today, the excessive deficit procedure is enshrined in Article 126 and Protocol 12 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. 
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• The constitution-making procedural rules, especially the super-majority rule of 2/3 at the 
General Assembly, led to a more consensual outcome over the final draft of the 
constitution. Owing to the super-majority rule, bargaining and veto power of smaller, 
fiscally conservative parties was increased. 
• The constitution making process in Poland lasted around five years (effectively around 3 
years).317 It is much more than the average of 16 months calculated by Ginsburg et al. 
(2009, p. 209). This relatively long period of time spent in constitutional deliberation 
opened the avenues for discussions over more detailed provisions, such as the debt rule. 
The ample time allowed for mobilization and bargaining, which would be less likely if the 
constitution-making process was short.  
• Determined and charismatic political leaders, such as for instance Leszek Balcerowicz, 
strongly backed up the debt rule. They were promoting the rule through formal and 
informal channels and sensitizing political groups and public opinion to the problem of 
excessive public debt. 
 
The knowledge regarding the driving factors behind introduction and reforms of the fiscal rules is 
informative not only from a policy-making point of view but also crucially contributes to the 
empirical investigation (recall discussion on the confounding factors in section 1.4).  
 
Going beyond issues touched upon in this dissertation, another fruitful avenue for future research 
concerns the determinants of “hidden” public debt. It is the debt that stems from implicit liabilities 
of the public finance sector, such as future retirement benefits. In 2013, the European Parliament 
and the Council adopted a new methodology for national account, so-called ESA 2010318. 
According to it, the EU member states are obliged, as of 2017, to measure the extent of implicit 
liabilities from future retirement benefits. Therefore, at least for the EU member states data will 
be readily available, which would enable the pursuit of some preliminary empirical investigation 
in this respect. 
                                                    
317
  It needs to be stressed that the long amount of time spent on drafting was due to the prior promulgation of 
the Little Constitution 1992, which set the basic organizational features of the state. 
318
  Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
European system of national and regional accounts in the European Union Text with EEA relevance, OJ 
2013 L 174. 
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It is well recognized that the deficit bias is caused by the fact that fiscal policy constitutes a 
political process. The public choice literature emphasizes that politicians – similarly to other 
individuals – are interested in pursuing their own objectives, which are mainly re-election 
prospects. Politicians often use the deficits instrumentally in order to increase the chance of being 
re-elected. A thought-provoking question in that respect is, therefore, whether the enactment one-
term limitation (i.e. the re-election is not permitted) would be able to break the link between the 
political process and deficit.  
 
Given how burgeoning the field of behavioral economics is, it would be remarkable to verify 
whether behavioral concepts could inform the debate on the persistence of deficit and 
determinants of public debt. More precisely, one could verify whether certain well-established 
behavioral biases on the part of policy-makers and/or voters have some power in explaining the 
occurrence of excessive public deficits and ensuing public debt. An interesting overview of the 
behavioral concepts applied in the public choice research is given by Schnellenbach and Schubert 
(2014). 
 
A further question worth investigating is the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, 
notably in the context of the recently triggered quantitative easing in the Eurozone (Pacces and 
Repasi, 2015). Simplifying it, the quantitative easing is a program of government bond purchase 
by a central bank. The risk in applying the quantitative easing is that it might generate the moral 
hazard because, as a result of it, governments might postpone necessary economic and fiscal 
reforms (Roubini, 2013). Regarding the analogies between the fiscal and the monetary policy, one 
could also contemplate an idea of delegating the fiscal policy to an independent fiscal council 
(Leeper, 2009). A delegation of competences to an independent council in the monetary policy 
was judged as a successful policy shift (Wren-Lewis, 2011). Could the delegation of power to an 
independent fiscal council be equally successful in the area of public finance? This and other 
questions put forth in this dissertation remain to be comprehensively answered. The author of this 
dissertation hopes that this dissertation at least to some extent will stimulate the pursuit of these 
answers and of research on fiscal constitutions more generally. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Fiscal Constitutions: An Empirical Approach 
 
The overarching question posed by this dissertation is: “why does the public debt grow, and why are fiscal 
(debt) crises repetitive and so widespread?” A special focus in answering this question is given to a fiscal 
constitution, which contains a country-specific set of laws, rules and regulations, and guides decision 
making in the area of fiscal policy. By shaping incentives and limiting arbitrariness, the fiscal constitution 
determines the course of fiscal policy and fiscal outcomes in the long term. This dissertation does not give, 
however, an exhaustive response to the overarching question. Instead it asks much narrower questions, 
which are selected after reviewing and identifying the main weaknesses and gaps in the modern literature 
on fiscal constitutions.  
Besides an introductory chapter that is instrumental in setting the stage for the discussion on fiscal 
constitution, this dissertation consists of four chapters including original contributions to the literature 
based on targeting self-contained questions.  
Chapter 2 examines electoral systems and their impact on selected fiscal variables, such as vertical fiscal 
imbalance measured as a share of local expenditure covered through intergovernmental transfers and 
borrowings. It uses a quasi-experimental empirical setting and provides evidence that electoral systems 
influence fiscal imbalance. The empirical design employed in chapter 2 rests on a discontinuity in the 
application of electoral rules in Polish municipalities in the period 2002-2012. The results presented show 
that proportional systems lead to a larger vertical fiscal imbalance as compared to the majoritarian regimes. 
This result is important forasmuch as larger vertical fiscal imbalance leads to greater general government 
deficits and, consequently, to larger public debt. 
Chapter 3 subscribes to the literature stream that attempts to answer the question regarding whether history 
matters. This chapter exploits a natural experiment, which was provided by Poland’s partition in the 19th 
century. By means of spatial regression discontinuity, it is shown that municipalities from the former 
Prussian empire impose contemporarily higher property tax rates as compared to municipalities that were 
exposed to the Russian ruling. Higher property tax rates lead to larger own revenue and higher fiscal 
autonomy. As a consequence of it, there is a smaller vertical fiscal imbalance in the municipalities 
belonging to the former Prussian partition. Given the positive link between vertical fiscal imbalance and 
  302  
 
general government deficits and debt, these results can shed some light on the overarching question: “why 
does the public debt grow?” 
Chapter 4 analyzes judicial behavior overall and contrasts it with the judicial behavior in adjudicating 
fiscal cases. The analysis of the decision-making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal seems to support the 
existence of some party alignment. It is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either 
because judges’ preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are 
incentivized to show their loyalty to the nominating party. The fact that ideological bias is present also in 
fiscal cases might have important implications for public finance. Occasionally the majority of judges in 
the adjudicating benches are politically aligned with the petitioners, which in the Polish context are 
typically opposition parties. For that reason it might be harder for the governing party to pursue major 
reforms of public finance, such as fiscal consolidation and public debt reduction.  
Chapter 5 provides an empirical assessment of federal fiscal constitutions and the interaction between 
constitutional arrangements. It demonstrates that federal fiscal constitutions differ in the degree of 
constitutionally guaranteed decentralization. More specifically, two types of fiscal constitutions can be 
distinguished: decentralized and integrated. An important contribution of this chapter is to show that fiscal 
constitutions vary in terms of coherence (or alignment) of institutional arrangements. Coherent (aligned) 
fiscal constitutions combine arrangements in a balanced manner or in a way that they “fit well” together. 
The thesis provides some preliminary evidence that the degree of decentralization of fiscal constitutions is 
hardly associated with economic and fiscal outcomes, but alignment (or coherence) of fiscal constitutions 
is correlated with selected outcomes. For instance, over the period 1980-2010, less coherent fiscal 
constitutions were correlated with higher debt and spending growth, and more economic and sovereign 
debt crises. Again, this finding contributes to answering the overarching question “why does the public 
debt grow, and why are fiscal (debt) crises repetitive and so widespread?” 
Chapter 6 includes conclusions. However, it does not only summarize the main findings of the dissertation, 
but also sets a general agenda for future research on fiscal constitutions. 
 
